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Abstract 
This research aims to unveil whether the tremendous banking sector reforms within the dynamic nature of the 
ȜȬȶȴɀȿɀȾȺȴȶȿɇȺɃɀȿȾȶȿɅȹȲɇȶȲȴȹȺȶɇȶȵɀȿȶɀȷɅȹȶȴȲɅȲȽɊɄɅȜȬȸɀȲȽɄȺȿȴɃȶȲɄȶȷȺȿȲȿȴȺȲȽȺȿɄɅȺɅɆɅȺɀȿɄȴɀɄɅ
efficiency. Using a single stage stochastic frontier approach, cost efficiency of the enlarged EU is estimated 
and evaluated for the period 2005-2011. The results suggest that EU pursuits have been successful but that 
stronger controls are needed.   
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
This study estimates the banking cost efficiency of the enlarged EU during the period 2005-2011, a period 
during which the banking sector experienced major changes. Integration and consolidation in the banking 
sector can enhance overall economic performance via macroeconomic stabilisation, higher levels of efficiency 
ȲȿȵȴɀȿɄɆȾȶɃɈȶȽȷȲɃȶ ȜȚ These include the enlargement of EU in 2004 and 2007, banking regulatory 
reforms such as Basel II (2005) and the updated Financial Services Plan as well as the recent EU sovereign 
debt and banking crisis (2008-2011). Consequently, this time frame provides a very interesting context for the 
study of efficiency as the real effects of fluctuating business cycles, risk and institutional factors can more 
evidently be seen.  
Banking cost efficiency is therefore of great interest not only to academics but to bank managers, governments, 
bank creditors and policymakers. Inefficiency means, that given the input prices, with the inputs utilised, more 
output could have been produced. This means waste. Waste, especially at times like this is expensive. If banks 
were fully efficient, that means they would have been able to produce more loans per deposit and the ECB 
would not have to struggle to repair the non-lending behavior of banks by maintaining record low interest rates. 
Cost efficiency therefore is a key to the survival of many crises-struck banks as well as the gradual stabilization 
and health preservation of the EU banking sector.  
The majority of times it addresses two major issues: the estimation of cost and/or profit efficiency of financial 
institutions, and its correlates. From the micro perspective, the issue of banking efficiency is crucial given the 
enhancement of competition due to the increasing presence of foreign banks in the European regions and the 
improvement in the institutional, regulatory and supervisory framework. From the macro perspective, the 
efficiency of the banking industry influences the cost of financial intermediation and the overall stability of the 
financial system, as banks constitute the spinal cord of most of the financial markets in the Central Eastern 
European economies (Rossi et al., 2005). Indeed, an improvement of banking performance indicates a better 
allocation of financial resources, should allow for a reduction in lending interest rates and therefore an increase 
of investment that favors growth. (Mamatzakis, Filippaki and Staikouras, 2007). Efficiency is also a decisive 
element in the game of mergers and take-overs where inefficient banks are an easy and sought after prey. 
Although the literature on bank efficiency is vast, it is heavily geared towards the US banking system. This is 
somewhat ambiguous given the great interest which a unified market for financial services stimulates. Banking 
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efficiency studies for the EU tend to have a particular focus as it is difficult to thoroughly analyse the results of 
all the EU member countries. Some of the studies focus on transition economies (Fries and Taci, 2005; Kasman 
and Yildirim, 2006), some divide Europe into regions and compare the Eastern and Western regions (Yildirim 
and Philippatos, 2002) and some examine the efficiency gaps between old and new member countries (Hollo 
and Nagy, 2006). More recent studies examine how banking sector reform, regulation and supervision in the 
EU, integration and competition has affected efficiency (Brissimis, Delis and Papanikolaou, 2008; Chortareas, 
Girardone and Ventouri, 2011) while another sub-section provides evidence on whether efficiency has 
converged over the years (Casu and Girardone, 2010; Andries and Carparu, 2011). Others, simply examine 
whether there is an efficiency gap between the various bank types.  
According to European Central Bank (2012), the European Union in year 2011 consisted of 27 countries, 17 of 
which were also members of the Eurozone: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. Frontiers of 
the enlarged EU, the old vs. new member states, the Eurozone vs. non-Eurozone countries, and pre-crisis 
period vs. post-crisis period shall be evaluated by means of the single-stage stochastic frontier approach (SFA) 
as suggested by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977).  
Due to the vast variety of available estimation methods, as well as the difficulty of accounting for all the 
relevant correlates within the cost frontier, these studies lead to contrasting results. Furthermore, differences 
that may be considered as minor e.g. including all types of banks in the sample and including only commercial 
banks still make the studies non-comparable. Additionally, very few studies estimated a common frontier for 
all 27 EU member states. This means that banks which could have contributed to forming the best practice 
frontier were excluded and the benchmark set is not suitable for comparing efficiency between different 
samples of countries. Another major dissimilarity between studies is that they were undertaken at different time 
periods. Cost efficiency is certainly not a static variable and given that it is altered by a tremendously dynamic 
EU environment, no study can be judged as incorrect. Nevertheless, as the literature does not assist in reaching 
any meaningful conclusions, they are certainly inadequate. This dissertation aims to provide a well-rounded 
idea of where the countries of the EU stand at present in terms of banking cost efficiency using recent data. The 
most significant correlates of cost efficiency, as identified in previous literature, are included in the frontiers in 
order to produce as accurate results as possible.  
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This dissertation is structured as follows. Firstly, a background of the EU banking system will briefly 
acknowledge how EU officials have pursued the creation of a single market for financial services, how the 
recent credit crisis affected these actions and how these in turn might have impacted banking cost efficiency. 
Secondly, the literature shall be reviewed in order to examine whether the desirable effects of integration on the 
ȜȬȳȲȿȼȺȿȸɄɊɄɅȶȾɄȴɀɄɅȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴɊȹȲɇȶȾȲɅȶɃȺȲȽȺɋȶȵ and how efficiency is related to other market aspects. 
Thirdly, the methodology utilized will be explained and justified. Then, a section explaining the data/variables 
used as well as their sources will follow along with summary statistics. And lastly, the findings and their 
importance will be thoroughly explained along with likely justifications for the estimated cost efficiency of 
ȶȲȴȹȴɀɆȿɅɃɊɄȳȲȿȼȺȿȸɄȶȴɅɀɃ 
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CHAPTER 2 - The EU Banking Sector: A Background 
 
ȫȹȶȲȺȾɀȷɅȹȶȪȺȿȸȽȶȤȲɃȼȶɅȧɃɀȸɃȲȾȾȶȹȲɄȳȶȶȿɅɀȲȴȹȺȶɇȶȹȲɃȾɀȿȺɀɆɄintegration of the economies of the 
EU Member States, thereby improving efficiency by broadening economic and financial opportunities for their 
citizens. The legal basis for EMU was established by the Treaty on European Union (EU Treaty), which was 
signed in Maastricht on 9 February 1992 and was finally ratified and entered into effect on 1 November 1993. 
The importance of fostering financial integration lies partly in the fact that reducing financial barriers between 
Member States is expected to create productivity gains which will increase the efficiency and competitiveness 
ɀȷ Ʌȹȶ ȜȬɄ ȶȴɀȿɀȾɊ  (EC, 2007). The Maastricht Treaty differentiated monetary policy from financial 
supervision and stability. Monetary policy is centralized in the EMU while the responsibility for financial 
supervision and stability lies at the national level. A subordinate coordinator is the European System of Central 
banks.  
The integration of the banking sector particularly was a vital aspect of the single market program. The Second 
Banking Directive of 1989 and the Investment Services Directive of 1993 enabled banks to establish branches 
in other EU member countries and provide services on a cross-border basis (according to the home country 
control). Moreover, the Capital Adequacy Directive was adopted, harmonizing banking sector regulation. In 
1998 the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) initiative was launched. The FSAP includes of legislative and 
other measures geared towards achieving three strategic objectives. More recently, and relevant to the time 
period of this dissertation, the Commission adopted a White Paper on EU financial services policy for the years 
2005-2010. Dynamic consolidation was the leitmotiv of the White Paper which was aimed at removing the 
remaining economically significant barriers to financial services, implementing and enforcing existing 
legislation and enhancing supervisory cooperation and convergence in the EU.  
ȦɇȶɃȲȽȽȲȿɀɇȶɃɇȺȶɈɀȷȺȿɅȶɃȶɄɅɃȲɅȶɄȷɀɃɄɀȾȶȴȲɅȶȸɀɃȺȶɄȳɊȳȲȿȼɄȺȿɅȹȶȶɆɃɀȲɃȶȲɄɆȸȸȶɄts that progressive 
integration in the market for financial services over the last three decades has led to significantly lower 
financing costs for both households and corporations. Moreover, lower costs have been enjoyed by all 
ȴɀɆȿɅɃȺȶɄ Ⱥȿ Ʌȹȶ ȶɆɃɀ ȲɃȶȲ¡  (ECB, 2012). Fries and Taci (2005) identify an interesting point. Progress in 
banking reform as measured by the EBRD transition indicator is significantly associated with a decrease in 
banking costs in the early stages of reform. However, as banking reforms progress further costs tend to 
iȿȴɃȶȲɄȶ ȫȹȺɄ ȿɀȿ-linear relationship between reform and cost efficiency may reflect the transition from 
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defensive restructuring of banking operations (that is, cost cutting) to operating strategies based on service 
improvements and innovation as the econɀȾȺȴȶȿɇȺɃɀȿȾȶȿɅȷɀɃȳȲȿȼȺȿȸȺȾɁɃɀɇȶɄ ȝɃȺȶɄȲȿȵȫȲȴȺ 
 
Bikker (2001) had suggested that since bank earnings across European nations were not much correlated, cross 
border consolidation could improve efficiency through risk diversification. Cross border consolidation can 
enable more effective risk diversification because nations differ greatly in their government policies, 
supervision, trade and investment barriers, fiscal policy and macroeconomic cycles. On the other hand, Vennet 
(2005) proposed that one of the strongest arguments against this consolidation is that due to the 
macroeconomic convergence in the Eurozone, caused by a common monetary policy and the consolidation of 
government budgets induced by the Stability and Growth Pact, geographical diversification in Europe in fact 
yielded little benefits. 
 
In 2005, there was almost complete domestic consolidation within individual European nations measured by 
the number of domestic M&As vs. cross border M&As. During the past half-decade, the number of banks in 
ɅȹȶȜȬȹȲɄȲȽɄɀȳȶȶȿȵȶȴȽȺȿȺȿȸșɊɅȹȶȶȿȵɀȷɅȹȶȿɆȾȳȶɃɀȷȳȲȿȼɄȺȿɅȹȶȜȬ-27 fell by 2.2% to 6,825, 
ɀȷɈȹȺȴȹɈȶɃȶȳȲȿȼɄȳȲɄȶȵȺȿɅȹȶȶɆɃɀȲɃȶȲ  (EBF, 2011). According to Schoenmaker and van Laecke 
 Ʌȹȶ Ƚɀȿȸ ȶɉɁȶȴɅȶȵ ȴɃɀɄɄ-border merger wave in Europe has started. European banking is finally 
ȲɃɃȺɇȺȿȸ  
 
Ferguson (2007), estimates a slightly increased risk of banking crises with financial integration, but the overall 
effect on productivity remained nevertheless positive.  As said by Vives (2005) ȚȲɃȶ ɅȹȶɃȶȷɀɃȶȿȶȶȵɄ Ʌɀȳȶ
taken not to attempt to correct perceived low levels of integration through excessive harmonization of 
ɃȶȸɆȽȲɅȺɀȿȺȿȲɃȶȲɄȺȿɈȹȺȴȹɀȿȽɊȾɀȵȶɄɅȲȾɀɆȿɅɄɀȷȺȿɅȶȸɃȲɅȺɀȿȴȲȿȳȶȶɉɁȶȴɅȶȵ The IMF criticized the EU 
ȷɀɃ ȹȲɇȺȿȸ ȶɉȴȶɄɄȺɇȶ ȴɀȿȴȶɃȿ for competitiveness which led to acceptance of the Financial Services 
ȘɆɅȹɀɃȺɅɊɄ ȽȺȸȹɅɅɀɆȴȹ ɀɃɅȹɀȵɀɉɊɈȹȺȴȹɈȲɄȷɆɃɅȹȶɃɄɆɁɁɀɃɅȶȵȳɊɅȹȶɇȺȶɈɅȹȲɅȷȺȿȲȿȴȺȲȽȺȿȿɀɇȲɅȺɀȿɄȹɀɆȽȵ
be encouraged at all costs (Reuters, 2011).  
 
The recent financial there was a pronounced decline in cross-border economic activity as banks shifted their 
focus from pursuing growth opportunities to repairing their balance sheets. A sharp decline followed by a 
gradual return to pre-crisis trends was also witnessed in the total value of cross-border activities of EU banks 
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ɄȺȿȴȶ ECB, 2010). Foreign branches lost market share to domestic institutions despite that today, in a 
majority of EU countries, more than half the banks are foreign owned. Consolidation of the EU banking sector 
continued in 2008 and 2009, since the number of credit institutions declined at a steady pace. Notable 
exceptions to this trend were the Baltic countries, which saw an increase in both domestic and foreign banks, 
indicating that there was still room for new service providers in these markets. This will be proven by the 
results of this dissertation.  
 
During 2011 the intensification of the European sovereign bond market crisis strongly affected the euro area 
ȷȺȿȲȿȴȺȲȽɄɊɄɅȶȾȩȺɄȶɄȺȿɄɀɇȶɃȶȺȸȿɃȺɄȼȲȵɇȶɃɄȶȽɊȲȷȷȶȴɅȳȲȿȼɄȷɆȿȵȺȿȸȴɀɄɅɄɅȹɃɀɆȸȹɄȶɇȶɃȲȽȴȹȲȿȿȶȽɄȝȺɃɄɅ
ȽɀɄɄȶɄ ɀȿȹɀȽȵȺȿȸɄɀȷȸɀɇȶɃȿȾȶȿɅȵȶȳɅɈȶȲȼȶȿȳȲȿȼɄ ȳȲȽȲȿȴȶ ɄȹȶȶɅɄ ȺȿȴɃȶȲɄȺȿȸ ɅȹȶȺɃ ɃȺɄȼȺȿȶɄɄ ȲȿȵȾȲȼȺȿȸ
funding more costly and difficult to ɀȳɅȲȺȿșȲȿȼɄȶɉɁɀɄɆɃȶɄȲɃȶȾɀɄɅȽɊɅɀɅȹȶȹɀȾȶɄɀɇȶɃȶȺȸȿȪȶȴɀȿȵȹȺȸȹȶɃ
sovereign risk reduces the value of the collateral that banks can use to raise wholesale funding and central bank 
liquidity. The consequences of this channel have so far been contained by the intervention of central banks. 
Third, sovereign downgrades generally flow through to lower ratings for domestic banks. Fourth, a weakening 
of the sovereign reduces the funding benefits that banks derive from implicit and explicit government 
guarantees. Since end-2009, the value of guarantees seems to have diminished for the weaker euro area 
ȴɀɆȿɅɃȺȶɄȪɀɇȶɃȶȺȸȿɅȶȿɄȺɀȿɄȺȿɀȿȶȴɀɆȿɅɃɊȾȲɊɄɁȺȽȽɀɇȶɃɅɀȳȲȿȼɄȺȿɀɅȹȶɃȴɀɆȿɅɃȺȶɄȶȺɅȹȶɃɅȹɃɀɆȸȹȳȲȿȼɄ
direct exposures to the distressed foreign sovereign such as the example of the Cypriot banking system being 
exposed to Greek sovereign bonds, or indirectly, as a result of cross-border interbank exposures or possible 
contagion across sovereign debt markets (CGFS, 2011). 
 
In this environment, it is the ȜȚșɄ ɃɀȽȶ Ʌɀ ȴɀȿɇȶɊ ȳȲȽȲȿȴȶȵ Ȳȿȵ ȹɀȾɀȸȶȿȶɀɆɄ ɄȺȸȿȲȽɄ Ʌɀ Ʌȹȶ ȶɆɃɀ ȲɃȶȲ
economy as a whole in response to monetary policy decisions. However, this was impaired due to the key role 
played by the banking sector in the financing of the euro area economy. The sɅɃɀȿȸȵȺȷȷȶɃȶȿɅȺȲɅȺɀȿ ȺȿȳȲȿȼɄ
cost of funding across the euro area, which may be passed on to their customers in the supply and price of 
credit offered by these banks, thereby affecting the transmission of monetary policy. There are also signs of 
country-ȵȶɁȶȿȵȶȿɅɁɃȺȴȶȵȺȷȷȶɃȶȿɅȺȲɅȺɀȿȺȿɅȹȶɁɃȺȾȲɃɊȾȲɃȼȶɅȷɀɃȳȲȿȼɄȽɀȿȸ-term debt, which started with the 
ɄɀɇȶɃȶȺȸȿȵȶȳɅȴɃȺɄȺɄȝɀɃȶɉȲȾɁȽȶȵɆɃȺȿȸȳȲȿȼɄȴɀɄɅɄɀȷȲȴȴȶɄɄȺȿȸɅȹȶɁɃȺȾȲɃɊȳɀȿȵȾȲɃȼȶɅȷɀɃ Ƚɀȿȸ-
term debt depended mainly on their individual rating class.  
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On the supply-ɄȺȵȶ Ʌȹȶ Ȳȳɀɇȶ ȾȶȿɅȺɀȿȶȵ ȵȺȷȷȶɃȶȿȴȶɄ Ⱥȿ ȳȲȿȼɄ ȲȴȴȶɄɄ Ʌɀ Ȳȿȵ ȴɀɄɅɄ ɀȷ ȷɆȿȵȺȿȸ Ȳȿȵ Ⱥȿ ɅȹȶȺɃ
balance-sheet conditions (together with the large variations in credit risk across countries and respective 
sovereigns) contributed to significant and heterogeneous impairments of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, specifically the bank lending channel and the interest rate channel. This, in turn, translated into a 
ɄɆȳɄɅȲȿɅȺȲȽ ȵȶȸɃȶȶ ɀȷ ȹȶɅȶɃɀȸȶȿȶȺɅɊ Ⱥȿ ȷȺɃȾɄ ȲȴȴȶɄɄ Ʌɀ Ȳȿȵ ȴɀnditions for bank funding, as can be seen, for 
example, in the heterogeneity across countries in reported changes in credit standards by euro area banks in the 
bank lending survey (Matheron et al., 2012). In this environment, the monetary transmission process of the 
euro area through banks ceased to function properly. ȠȿȴɃȶȲɄȺȿȸȵȺɄɁȲɃȺɅȺȶɄȲȴɃɀɄɄȳȲȿȼɄȴɀɄɅɀȷȷɆȿȵȺȿȸȺɄȲȽɄɀ
expected to have adversely impeded any progress made with respect to cost efficiency of EU banks and 
increased its variation among banks since 2008 when the crisis deepened.  
 
Nevertheless, Europe performed better during the crisis than what could have been expected on the basis of 
ȶɉȺɄɅȺȿȸȲɃɃȲȿȸȶȾȶȿɅɄȝȶɃɃɊȲȿȵȪȲɁȺɃȘȴȴɀɃȵȺȿȸɅɀȝȶɃɃɊȲȿȵȪȲɁȺɃɅȹȶȜɆɃɀɁȶȲȿȬȿȺɀȿwas 
ill-ɁɃȶɁȲɃȶȵ Ⱥȿ ȴȲɄȶ ɀȷ Ȳ ȷȺȿȲȿȴȺȲȽ ɄɅɀɃȾ ȳȶȴȲɆɄȶ ȺɅɄ ȾȲɃȼȶɅ ȺȿɅȶȸɃȲɅȺɀȿ ȷȲɃ ɀɆɅɁȲȴȶȵ ȺɅɄ ɁɀȽȺȴɊ ȺȿɅȶȸɃȲɅȺɀȿ 
Schoenmaker and Oosterloo (2007) paralleliɋȶȵɅȹȺɄɁɃɀȳȽȶȾɅɀɅȹȶȤɆȿȵȶȽȽ-Fleming trilemma the inherent 
incompatibility between integration, financial stability and independent national supervision. There are 
important lessons to be learned from this. Regulation should not follow crises but precede it. The realization 
that supervision is inadequate should not occur after the damage has been done but with its first signs e.g. the 
tension that exists between home and host country responsibility for the supervision and stability of the 
financial system. Integration is beneficial only if there are the right controls in place. At times of crises, 
governments will seek to protect their national sovereignty and their ȳȲȿȼȺȿȸ ɄɊɄɅȶȾɄ stability -something 
which the EU has even encouraged The crisis exposed the coordination shortcomings between national 
ɄɆɁȶɃɇȺɄɀɃɄ EC, 2010). As wise Plato said 24 centuries ago: «A common interest connects but the same one 
divides».  
 
Within the banking cost efficiency context, this dissertation will provide some answers to whether the costs 
suffered by banks in a unified financial market at times of prosper or distress, exceed the benefits during 
prosperous times.  
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CHAPTER 3 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Cost Efficiency  
 
Efficiency is a widely interpreted and researched concept. Most studies on banking efficiency focus on cost 
efficiency (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The cost efficiency of a bank is commonly measured as its cost level 
compared to that of the best practice banks on the frontier, controlled for its types of banking activities and the 
input prices it faces. It is usually expressed as a number from interval 0-1, where 1 indicates the best cost-
operating bank and the smaller number, the less cost efficient the bank (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003). 
Necessary, but not sufficient condition to be cost efficient is the technical or X-efficiency. This ensures that a 
bank uses the minimum of inputs to produce a given output. The second condition to be cost efficient is 
allocative efficiency which occurs when there is an optimal distribution of goods and services in terms of 
consumer welfare maximization. An alternative concept is profit efficiency but given that profit can often be 
negative and the production function models are logarithmic in nature, results are less satisfactory. Also, scale 
and scope economies as well as the elasticities of substitution are often investigated in conjunction with cost 
and profit efficiencies. 
 
The literature can be firstly divided into the two main estimation methods - parametric or non-parametric. The 
former, known as Data Envelopmental Analysis (DEA), was developed by Charnes et. al and is a mathematical 
programming technique and the latter is called the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Efficiency estimates 
using the DEA are often found to be lower than the SFA because DEA (like any determinist technique), 
assumes that all deviations between observed costs and the minimum costs of the frontier are due to inefficient 
behavior while the SFA allows to divide the disturbance term into inefficiency and noise.  
 
A general overview of EU banking cost efficiency will be supplied. All the sub-sections are interconnected. 
Integration occurs from greater cross-border competition and M&A activities by more efficient institutions, 
which in turn may impede competition. Regulation and supervision is a catalyst to how these are conducted and 
consequently to how systemic and bank risk are controlled. Previous studies will be reviewed in a 
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chronological order as progression of cost efficiency over time is of tremendous importance in the EU 
literature. 
Among the first to examine cost efficiency in the EU was Bikker (1999). Apart from huge differences in the 
cross-country cost-levels, he found that on average, Spanish, French and Italian banks appear to be less 
efficient than those in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, while banks in Luxembourg, Belgium and 
Switzerland are the most efficient.  
 
Altunbas et al. (2001) proceeded to a stochastic frontier analysis on a large sample of European banks (from 15 
countries), over the period 1989-1997. Over this period, bank efficiency increased. Scale economies ranged 
between 5% and 7%, while X-inefficiency measures appeared to be much larger, between 20% and 25%.  They 
also suggest that X-inefficiencies also appear to vary to a greater extent across different markets, bank sizes 
and over time. Particularly, they found that on average British and Swedish banks were more inefficient than 
other European banks. Austria, Denmark, Germany and Italy appeared as having the most cost efficient 
banking sectors. Additionally, they suggested that technical progress has had a similar influence across 
European banking markets between 1989 and 1997, reducing total costs by around 3% per annum. Overall, 
these results indicate that Europe's largest banks benefit most from technical progress although they do not 
appear to have scale economy advantages over their smaller counterparts.  
 
Lozano-Vivas, Pastor and Hasan (2001) use the DEA to estimate the efficiencies of 612 banks from ten EU 
countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherland, Spain and the United 
Kingdom) in 1993. Their results prove that the effect of environmental conditions on banking (in)efficiency is 
strong. Banks from Spain, Portugal and Denmark are found as relatively more efficient and also able to 
maintain their high scores even if they decide to move and install in another European country from the 
sample. At the same time, it is more difficult for banks from other countries to settle profitable networks in 
Spain, Portugal and Denmark. The least efficient banking systems were the Italian and French. 
 
Maudos et al. (2002) analyzes the cost and profit efficiencies of banks for ten EU countries - Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom - during 1993-1996. It 
must be noted that their sample included all specializations and they used the production approach in choosing 
inputs and outputs. Using the distribution free approach, they reported average cost efficiency levels of 82.7% 
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where Austria, Germany, Belgium and Spain scored the higher scores and France, Italy and Finland appeared 
as the least efficient of the 10 countries included in the sample. This sample of countries produced a high cost 
efficiency average relative to the time period examined but this might be due to that the countries examined 
compose the Central region - usually a better performer.  
 
Turati (2003) estimates the evolution of cost efficiency scores in some of the biggest aforementioned Central 
European banking markets from 1992 to 1999 using both parametric and non-parametric approaches. He 
particularly examines commercial banks in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK. Following the 
ȺȿɅȶɃȾȶȵȺȲɅȺɀȿȲɁɁɃɀȲȴȹ ȹȶ ȷȺȿȵɄȿɀ ɄɅɃȺȼȺȿȸȵȺȷȷȶɃȶȿȴȶɄ ȺȿȾȶȲȿȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴɊ among these countries. Spain 
and UK are found to be below the mean cost efficiency while Germany is found as the most efficient. On the 
contrary, Casu and Molyneux (2003) who estimate a common frontier of the same sample of countries from 
1993-1997 found significant differences in efficiency scores mainly attributed to country-specific factors. In 
particular, they found that the UK had the highest cost efficiency and Spain the lowest.  
 
Yildrim and Philippatos (2002) examine the period 1992-2000 for commercial banks of the 12 Central and 
Eastern European transition economies and find that the managerial inefficiencies in those banking markets 
was significant, with average cost efficiency level of 72 and 77 percent by the DFA and the SFA, respectively. 
According to the SFA, approximately one-ɅȹȺɃȵɀȷȳȲȿȼɄɁɃɀȷȺɅɄȲɃȶȽɀɄɅɅɀȺȿȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴɊ   
 
Weill (2003) investigated the efficiency gap between Western and Eastern countries using the SFA and finds 
that there is a substantial efficiency gap mainly caused by differences in managerial performance which was 
nevertheless reduced between 1996 and 2000 for most CEE countries. He too, concluded that it was 
environmental factors rather than risk preferences influenced efficiency gaps the most. 
 
Kosak, Zajc and Zoric (2009) estimate cost efficiency of banks in ten new EU Member States and five old EU 
Member during 1996-2003. The average efficiency score of the entire sample of banks was 0.815, a number 
very close to the average previously calculated. Among the 15 banking markets included in the analysis, the 
banking sectors of Cyprus and Malta stood out since their average efficiency reached 91% and 92% 
respectively. These two banking sectors scored higher than the banking sectors of CEE and Baltic countries 
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(78.3%) even though they joined the EU together. In the EU-5 group (Germany, Italy, UK, Denmark, Spain) 
only Italian and Dutch banks turned out to be less efficient than most banks in the other EU-5 countries.  
 
Kosak and Zoric (2009) also investigate the cost efficiency of 8 of the Central Easter and Baltic regionɄ
countries for a longer period  1998-2007 - by employing the Battese and Coelli (1995) SFA.  The cost 
efficiencies of each country examined are as follows ranking them from the best: Estonia (0.9481), Lithuania 
(0.9448), Latvia (0.9292), Poland (0.9221), Slovenia (0.9134), Hungary (0.8963), Czech Republic (0.8119) and 
finally Slovakia (0.7676). Also, cost inefficiency constantly decreased from 0.8357 in 1996 to 0.9306 in 2006.  
With the exception of Mamatzakis et. al (2008) who employ the SFA in six of South Eastern or Balkan 
countries between 1998-2003 and have found a very low average inefficiency score (0.378), the results of 
Yildrim and Philippatos and Kosak et. al (2009) lead to the conclusion that accession was benefitting for these 
countries and the EU cost efficiency had been rising steadily until the financial crisis.  
 
Gallizo et. al (2011) confirm these results by the same method by showing that banks from countries that 
joined to EU in 2004 were more efficient than those that joined in 2007 or were still negotiating their 
accession. These results are in line with that cost efficiencies within the EU converge over time and also that 
the inefficiencies of lower ranked countries decrease at a faster rate than their more efficient counterparts.  
More recent data by Andries and Capraru (2011) calculated cost efficiency by the SFA and found that it 
slightly improved between 2003 and 2009 (with 2009 being an exception). Efficiency between Eurozone and 
non-Eurozone countries was compared, with non-Eurozone countries being negligibly lower than Eurozone 
ones through that time period. However, the decline in cost efficiency scores was lower for the non-Eurozone 
region and this was rational as this region experienced much lower contagion risk. The EU average was 
calculated to be 0.71. 
 
Ferreira (2011) applies both the SFA and DEA for the enlarged EU as well as the old member states for the 
period 2004-2008. The efficiency rankings by DEA were quite different to the ranking of the SFA emphasizing 
the importance of the estimation method in interpreting efficiency outputs. Her estimations denote that the 
EMU increased efficiency overall and the inclusion of the new EU-member states in the sample slightly 
reduced the average due to increased heterogeneity of the banking sectors.  
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Integration/Efficiency convergence  
 
This single passport system, coupled with the removal of capital controls, accelerated the pace at which 
European banks internationalized. The literature supports that the single currency and European integration had 
a positive impact on the cost efficiency of banks (Mamatzakis, 2008; Weill, 2009). Eurozone countries and 
older member countries were found to experience a more intense convergence process than banking systems of 
non-Eurozone countries and new member countries (Andries and Carparu, 2011).   
A positive impact of EU integration on bank cost efficiency should result in convergence towards best practice 
(Casu and Girardone, 2010). Casu and Girardone (2010) estimate a common frontier using DEA for 
commercial and savings banks operating in the EU-15 area before the 5
th
 enlargement in 2004 and find that 
there is indeed convergence towards a common average, but that that level has decreased. This decrease was 
mostly due to the lagging behind  of the better performers rather than the catching up  of the worse ones 
(perhaps because of the lack of cross-border competition at the time). At the same time however, and in line 
with Lozano-ȭȺɇȲɄ  findings, those that displayed low efficiency levels improved more quickly than 
others. Weill (2008) analyzed some measures of relative performance of banks both in Western Europe and 
Central and Eastern European nations, also reporting an overall convergence in cost efficiency.  
Examining the period from 2004-2010 on all the EU countries, Andries and Capraru (2011) concluded that 
there were large differences in the level of cost efficiency between national banking systems. Their results 
indicate that efficiency convergence started pacing up during the pre-crisis period but from 2009 however, the 
evolution of the average scores declined.  
A drawback of integration-efficiency studies is that changes in prices, variety of services, availability of credit 
and other effects of consolidation on customers, i.e. consumer surplus are important yet are not included in 
ȾȶȲɄɆɃȶȵȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴɊȶȷȷȶȴɅɄȪȺȾȺȽȲɃȽɊȲȿɊȺȿȴɃȶȲɄȶȵɇȲɃȺȶɅɊɀȷɄȶɃɇȺȴȶɄɀɃȺȾɁɃɀɇȶȵȲȴȴȶɄɄɅɀȾȲɃȼȶɅ-based 
sources of finance from universal banking or cross-border market penetration are alsɀ ȶɉȴȽɆȵȶȵ  șȶɃȸȶɃ
2003).  
 
Iftekhar and Lozano-Vivas (2008) investigate whether the deregulatory process was associated with the 
convergence of banking industries across the EU. The results suggest that the deregulatory process may have 
increased the dispersion in how banks intermediate, while reducing the dispersion in their performance. 
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ȫȹȶɃȶȷɀɃȶ ɅȹȶȺɃ ɃȶɄɆȽɅɄ ȺȾɁȽɊ ɅȹȲɅȜȬɃȶȸɆȽȲɅɀɃɊɁɃɀȴȶɄɄȶɄȹȲɇȶɄɆȴȴȶȶȵȶȵȺȿȴɃȶȲɅȺȿȸȲȾɀɃȶȽȶɇȶȽɁȽȲɊȺȿȸ
ȷȺȶȽȵȲȿȵȲɄȲɃȶɄɆȽɅȷȲȴȺȽȺɅȲɅȶȵɅȹȶȴɀȿɇȶɃȸȶȿȴȶɀȷȳank cost efficiency levels. 
 
Supervision and Regulation  
 
The debate regarding whether the EU banking regulation and supervision had benefitting outcomes is now as 
tense as ever. Brissimis et al. (2008) examined the relationship between banking sector reform and 
performance (measured by productive efficiency, net interest margin and total factor productivity) of newly 
acceded EU countries via non parametric techniques. Reforms were proxied by variables extracted from the 
EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) index of banking sector reform. He found that 
reforms substantially benefitted the efficiency of EU banks. Specifically, the most significant effects seem to 
have occurred in 2005. Pasiouras and Fethi (2010) comment that this is mainly attributed to the financial 
liberalization programs which helped foreign banks ɀɇȶɃȴɀȾȶ Ʌȹȶ ɀɆɅɄȺȵȶɃ ȽȲȳȶȽ and made the entry to 
banking markets more transparent. Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas (2005), estimated the effect of deregulation 
on total factor productivity in Spanish banks, and also got positive results.  
Pasiouras et al. (2009) found proof that market discipline and supervisory power increase both cost and profit 
efficiency, while results on capital requirements and restrictions on bank activities were mixed. Lozano-Vivas 
and Pasiouras (2008) on the other hand disagree with the former but find that capital requirements boost cost 
efficiency. Clarifying Pasiouras et. al (2009) results, Chortareas, Girardone and Ventouri (2010) provided more 
evidence that strengthening capital restrictions and official supervisory powers (essentially the purpose of 
Basel III) can improve the efficient operations of banks.  Barth et. al (2010), Chortareas, Girardone and 
Ventouri (2010) concluded that interventionist supervisory and regulatory policies such as private sector 
monitoring and restricting bank activities can result in higher bank inefficiency which can indirectly impede 
bank soundness. On the contrary, Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) found that these can diminish the probability 
of banking crises. Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2008) also find proof for the latter but disagree with the 
former. 
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Efficiency and Risk  
 
An interesting theory regarding this relationship was posed by Hughes and Mester (1998) who stated that both 
capital and risk are likely to be determined by the level of efficiency. They based this opinion on that 
supervisory authorities are likely to allow more efficient banks (which are efficient due to high quality 
management) greater flexibility in terms of their capital leverage or their overall portfolio risk, all else equal. 
With the same logic, a less efficient bank will be assumed as more prone to moral hazard. In line with their 
theory, Altunbas et al. (2007) found that less efficient banks tend to hold more capital and take on less risk. 
Even though it is likely that this had been true for the time period that Altunbas et al. (2007) examined (1992-
2000), vast EU banking sector reforms after 2000 may have actually urged less efficient banks to pursue more 
risky activities.   
In contrast to Altunbas et al. (2007), Salas and Saurina (2003) suggest that; in a pro-competitive environment 
less efficient banks which are thus more prone to takeovers are encouraged to undertake excessive risk taking 
at least in the short term . If during the EU financial services integration process, more efficient banks gained 
ȾɀɃȶ ȾȲɃȼȶɅ ɁɀɈȶɃ ȽȶɄɄ ȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿɅ ȳȲȿȼɄ ȴȹȲɃɅȶɃ ɇȲȽɆȶɄ ȵȶȴɃȶȲɄȶȵ Ȳȿȵ ɅȹȲɅ Ⱥȿ ȴɀȾȳȺȿȲɅȺɀȿ ɈȺɅȹ Ʌȹȶ ȳȲȿȼɄ
limited liabiȽȺɅɊȲȿȵɅȹȶȶɉȺɄɅȶȿȴȶɀȷȲɂɆȲɄȺȷȽȲɅȵȶɁɀɄȺɅɃȲɅȶȺȿɄɆɃȲȿȴȶ, could have encouraged them to take 
on more risk. In other words, the elimination of monopoly rents reduces ȳȲȿȼɄȺȿȴȶȿɅȺɇȶɄɅɀȲȴɅɁɃɆȵȶȿɅȽɊȝɀɃ
this reason, regulators have focused on reforming deposit insurance, moving towards risk-based systems and 
limiting coverage.  
Given the above, the direction at which causality runs between efficiency and risk needs to be identified. 
Fiordelisi, Ibanez and Molyneux (2010) use Granger-causality methods through a recent time period (1995-
2007) to investigate this using data of commercial banks from 26 European countries. They measure risk by 
variables such as non-ɁȶɃȷɀɃȾȺȿȸ ȽɀȲȿɄ ɅɀɅȲȽ ȽɀȲȿɄȤɀɀȵɊɄȢȤȭȶɉɁȶȴɅȶȵȵȶȷȲɆȽɅ ȷɃȶɂɆȶȿȴɊȲȿȵȴȲɁȺɅȲȽ
adequacy and employ the SFA to estimate cost and revenue efficiencies. They found that subdued cost/revenue 
ȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴɊ ȴȲɆɄȶɄ ȹȺȸȹȶɃ ɃȺɄȼ ɄɆɁɁɀɃɅȺȿȸ Ʌȹȶ ȳȲȵ ȾȲȿȲȸȶȾȶȿɅ ȹɊɁɀɅȹȶɄȺɄ Deteriorations in cost efficiency 
experienced by poorly managed banks, precede increases in non-performing loans increasing future risk 
(Podpiera and Weill, 2008; Williams, 2004).  
The above results are in line with the efficient-structure paradigm. Achieving greater cost efficiency by 
improved managerial performance would translate to lower future risk and would therefore increases potential 
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to the pursuit of market power, which according to Keely (1990) would lead to banks holding more capital 
relative to assets and experience a lower default risk.  Yildirim and Philippatos (2002) find a positive link 
between larger and better capitalized banks and cost efficiency when examining a sample of EU transition 
economies between 1993 and 2000.  
 
Accordingly, banks that hold more capital have less risk and therefore higher risk tolerance which enables them 
undertake strategies that lead them to reaping more market shares and becoming more efficient. With respect to 
the causal effect running risk to efficiency; Fiordelisi et. al (2010) concluded that increases in bank capital 
precede cost efficiency improvements suggesting that moral hazard incentives appear to fall as bank capital 
increases. Consequently, cost efficiency positively Granger-causes higher capitalized banks while higher 
capital levels also induce greater efficiency. This is an optimistic finding given that it implies that banks will 
find it advantageous to increase their efficiency prior to the implementation of the higher capital requirements 
i.e. Basel III and at the same time the higher capital requirements will boost efficiency further.  
 
 
Competition 
 
Boosting competition was one of the reasons of establishing the EU. The relationship as well as causal 
relationship between competition and efficiency has been exclusively tested and examined as aforementioned 
in the literature review. Competition has traditionally  according to economic theory  been considered as the 
ɁɃȶɃȶɂɆȺɄȺɅȶɀɃȵɃȺɇȶɃɀȷȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴɊȫȹȶɃȶȷɀɃȶȺȷɅȹȺɄɅȹȶɀɃɊȹɀȽȵɄȲȾɀɃȶȴɀȿȴȶȿɅɃȲɅȶȵȾȲɃȼȶɅɈȺȽȽ mean that 
few powerful banks incur higher costs and possible collude among them and impair efficiency (Leibenstei, 
1966). This poses the Structure-conduct performance (SCP) which was ȷɆɃɅȹȶɃȵȶɇȶȽɀɁȶȵȺȿɅɀȟȺȴȼɄɂɆȺȶɅȽȺȷȶ
ȹɊɁɀɅȹȶɄȺɄ ɈȹȺȴȹ ɄɆȸȸȶɄɅ Ʉ ɅȹȲt managers of powerful institutions prefer to pursue a quiet life rather than 
increasing efficiency by making efforts to lower their costs. Accordingly, a more competitive market would 
urge banks to lower their costs in order to survive. Indeed, in spite of the commonly accepted view favouring a 
positive relationship between cost efficiency and competition, empirical literature exists supporting a negative 
link (Berger, 1995; Goldberg and Rai, 1996; Weill, 2004). Competition may have a deleterious impact on 
stability if it incentivizes prudent risk-taking behavior (Mamatzakis, 2005). On the other hand, a few relatively 
large banks are more likely to display a too big to fail problem by which large banks increase their risk 
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exposure anticipating the unwillingness of the regulator to let the bank fail in the event of insolvency 
problems  (Hughes and Mester, 1998).  
The efficient-structure paradigm first developed by Demsetz (1973) provides an opposing argument to the 
SCP. This theory states that concentration leads to lower costs if market power is the result of superior 
management or greater efficiency of the production processes. So greater efficiency may induce market power 
but market power may not induce greater efficiency.  Casu and Girardone (2006) and Weill (2004) are able to 
empirically prove this inverse relationship between efficiency and competition for some of the EU banking 
systems by employing both structural (concentration ratios) and non-structural (Panzar-Rosse statistic) 
concentration measures.  
 
On the contrary, Yildrim and Philippatos (2002) and Brissimis et al. (2008) find evidence that the degree of 
competition has a positive influence on cost efficiency. The former also find that market concentration is 
negatively linked to efficiency providing evidence for the SCP. Goddard et al. (2001) also support that 
structural factors appear to be more important in Europe and that the SCP hypothesis holds as banks are able to 
extract monopolistic rents in concentrated markets by their ability to offer lower deposit rates and charge 
higher loan rates.  
 
It is important to bear in mind that the industrial organization literature shows that measures of market 
structure, such as the number of institutions and concentration ratios, are not necessarily related to the level of 
competitiveness in an industry (Baumol et al., 1982; Bikker, 2004). Furthermore, it is very likely that the 
dynamic nature of the EU banking industry exhibits conflicting characteristics during different time periods.  
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CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The econometric estimation of cost efficiency is not undisputed. The main problem in measuring inefficiency is 
to separate genuinely inefficient behavior from other random factors affecting costs or profits (Maudos, 2002). 
In the case of the banking sector, the four most commonly used approaches differ from each other in the 
assumptions they make. The stochastic frontier approach (SFA) is a fully parametric approach and proposes 
that the observed costs of a bank may deviate from the cost frontier either because of random fluctuations or 
because of inefficiency. To separate these two components, an asymmetrical probability distribution is 
assumed for the inefficiency term. The thick frontier approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1991) assumes that the 
differences in predicted costs within the quartile of banks with lowest average costs for a given size are due to 
random factors, while the differences in predicted costs between the quartiles with lowest and highest costs are 
due to inefficiency. Data envelopmental analysis (DEA), like any determinist technique, assumes that all 
deviations between observed costs and the minimum costs of the frontier are due to inefficient behaviour. 
Finally, the distribution free approach (DFA) by Berger (1993) is based on the hypothesis that efficiency is 
persistent over time, whereas random errors tend to cancel each other out in the course of time. The availability 
of a data panel enables standard models of fixed and random effects to be of without needing to make any 
distribution assumption for the inefficiency term (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984). However, they impose the 
assumption that efficiency is constant over time. In the context of the stochastic frontier approach, the 
availability of a data panel permits consistent estimators of efficiency, whereas this estimation is inconsistent, 
though unbiased, with cross-section data. 
 
The main problem with deterministic frontier methods is that they do not allow for the usual random errors 
encountered in formulating a model. It assumes that the whole of the error term represents inefficiency when it 
has been firmly established that exogenous factors (including luck) significantly affect the level of efficiency in 
Ȳ ȴɀɆȿɅɃɊɄ ȳȲȿȼȺȿȸ ɄɊɄɅȶȾ Ȳȿȵ ɅȹɀɄȶ ȿȶȶȵ Ʌɀ ȳȶ ȲȴȴɀɆȿɅȶȵ ȷɀɃ țȶɅȶɃȾȺȿȺɄɅȺȴ ȲɁɁɃɀȲȴȹȶɄ ȷɆɃɅȹȶɃȾɀɃȶ ȲɃȶ
extremely sensitive to outliers (Parsons, 2004). Given this, it is judged as best to use the Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis. 
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Much of the work on stochastic frontiers began in the 1970s. Major contributors are Aigner (1977), Schmidt, 
Lovell, Battese and Coelli (1995) and Kumbhakar (2003). SFA is a method independently introduced by 
Aigner et al. (1977), and Meeusen and van Den Broeck (1977). The model is based on the following stochastic 
frontier production function which has the following general form: ݕ௜ ൌ ݃ሺݔ௜ǡ ߚሻ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ 
 
where yi is the output of the i-th firm, ݔ௜  is a vector containing logarithmic inputs, ߚ is a vector of unknown 
parameters specifying technology and ߝ௜  is the residual. The single-equation stochastic cost function model is 
given as: ܶܥ ൌ ܶܥሺܳ௜ǡ ௜ܲሻ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ 
 
where  is observed total cost, ୧ is a vector of outputs, and ୧ is an input price vector. Following Aigner et. 
al (1977), the disturbance term can be decomposed to ɂ୧ ൌ ݒ୧ െ ୧ where ୧ and ୧ are independently 
distributed.  
 
The first error term, ୧, is assumed to be distributed as two-sided normal with 0 mean and variance ɐ୴ଶ 
capturing the effects of  statistical noise, whereas  ୧ is a one-sided positive disturbance reflecting inefficiency 
and usually assumed to follow a half-normal distribution. Furthermore, the distributions of ୧ and ୧ have to be 
assumed in order to separate them from ߝ௜ . The priori distributional assumption of the inefficiency term 
ɃȶɂɆȺɃȶȵ Ʌɀ ȾȲɉȺȾȺɋȶ Ʌȹȶ ȾɀȵȶȽɄ ɁȲɃȲȾȶɅȶɃɄ ȺɄ ȶɄɄȶȿɅȺȲȽȽɊ Ʌȹȶ ȪȝȘɄ ȸɃȶȲɅȶɄɅ ɄȹɀɃɅȴɀȾȺȿȸ ȫȹȶ ȴȹɀȺȴȶ ɀȷ
distribution for the inefficiency term includes a half-normal, a truncated normal and a gamma distribution. 
Fortunately, according to Altunbas and Molyneux (1994), efficiency estimates are relatively insensitive to the 
different distributional assumptions. 
 
The observation-specific estimates of technical inefficiency ݑ, can be calculated by using the distribution of the 
inefficiency term conditional on the estimate of the composite error term, as proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982). 
The mean of this conditional distribution for the half-normal model is shown as 
 ܧሺݑ௜ȁߝ௜ሻ ൌ ߪߣ ? ൅ ߣଶ ൤ ݂ሺߝ௜ߣȀߪ ? ൅ ܨሺߝ௜ߣȀߪ ൅ ൬ߝ௜ߣߪ ൰൨ǡ 
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where 	ሺ ?ሻ and ሺ ?ሻ are the standard normal distribution and the standard normal density function, 
respectively. ሺȁɂሻ is an unbiased but inconsistent estimator of ୧, since regardless of N, the variance of the 
estimator remains non-zero (Greene, 1993). Jondrow et al. (1982) have shown that the ratio of the variability 
(standard deviation, ɐ) for  and  ȴȲȿȳȶɆɄȶȵɅɀȾȶȲɄɆɃȶȲȳȲȿȼɄɃȶȽȲɅȺɇȶȺȿȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴɊɈȹȶɃȶɉ ൌ ɐ୳Ȁɐ୴ǡ 
is a measure of the amount of variation stemming from inefficiency relative to noise for the sample.  
 
The method of maximum likelihood is proposed for simultaneous estimation of the parameters of the stochastic 
frontier and the model for the technical inefficiency effects. The likelihood function and its partial derivatives 
with respect to the parameters of the model are presented in Battese and Coelli (1993). The likelihood function 
is expressed in terms of the variance parameters ߪ௦ଶ  ? ߪ௩ଶ ൅ ߪଶ and ߛ  ? ߪଶȀߪ௦ଶ as follows: 
 
݈݊ܮ ൌ ෍ቊ ? ?݈݊  ?ߨ െ ݈݊ߪ௦ ൅ ݈݊߮ ൬െെߝ௜ߣߪ௦ ൰ െ ߝ௜ଶ ?ߪ௦ଶቋே௜ୀ଴  
 
 
The technical efficiency of production of the i
th
 bank at the j
th
 observation is defined as: 
 ܶܧ௜௝ ൌ ݁ݔ݌൫െ ௜ܷ௝൯ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ሺെݖ௜௝ߜ െ ݓ௜௝ሻ 
 
From a number of different functional forms used in the literature to model production functions, this study 
uses the translog cost function. Compared to the Cobb-Douglas production function, quadratic (in inputs) and 
normalized quadratic, it is more flexible as it imposes less restrictions on production and substitution 
elasticities and provides a second order approximation. A better alternative would be to use a globally flexible 
Fourier functional function, which increases the number of parameters to be estimated and thus requires large 
samples. When using parametric methods like the translog function, one makes the hypothesis that the bank 
ȺȿȵɆɄɅɃɊɄ ɅɃɆȶ ȴɀɄɅ ȷɆȿȴɅȺɀȿ ȹȲɄ Ʌȹȶ ɅɃȲȿɄȽɀȸ ȷɀɃȾ ɈȹȶɃȶȲɄ Ʌȹȶ ȝɀɆɃȺȶɃ ȷɆȿȴɅȺɀȿȲȽ ȷɀɃȾ ȲȽȽɀɈɄ Ʌȹȶ ȵȲɅȲ Ʌɀ
reveal the true cost function through a large number of fitted parameters) and if this hypothesis is false, 
misspecification error occurs (Altunbas, 2000). Given the relatively small sample of banks in this study, any 
gains from estimating more flexible and general functional form would be probably outweighted by the 
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substantial loss of degrees of freedom (Kosak et. al, 2009). Berger and Mester (1997) compare the translog to 
the alternative Fourier form and found that the difference in the estimated efficiencies is almost negligible. 
 
Given the relative input prices, output levels, and output mix, banks are assumed to choose inputs so as to 
minimize total cost. It is estimated as follows: 
 
 ൬ܶܥ݌ ?൰ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅෍ߙ௝  ൬݌௝݌ଷ൰ ൅  ? ?෍෍ߙ௝௟ଶ௟ୀଵଶ௝ୀଵ௝ୀଵ ݈݊ ൬݌௝݌ଷ൰ ݈݊ ൬݌௟݌ଷ൰ ൅෍ߚ௞ ሺݕ௞ሻସ௞ୀଵ൅  ? ?෍ ෍ ߚ௞௠ ሺݕ௞ሻ ሺݕ௠ሻ ൅෍෍ߜ௞௜ ሺݕ௞ሻ ݈݊ ൬݌௝݌ଷ൰ ൅ ߮ ൬ ݁ݍݑ݅ݐݕݐ݋ݐ݈ܽܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ൰ଵ௝ୀଵଶ௞ୀଵଶ௠ୀଵଶ௞ୀଵ൅ ߤሺܿݎ݁݀݅ݐݎ݅ݏ݇ሻ ൅ ߩሺݐ݋ݐ݈ܽܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽሻ ൅ ݕ݁ܽݎ ൅ ሺܿ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕሻ ൅ ݒ ൅ ݑ 
 
where ܶܥrepresents total cost, ݕ௞ሺ݇ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ሻ stands for k-th output, ݌௝ሺ݆ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ?ሻ stands for j-th input 
price, year is a time trend capturing technical progress and the rest three variables control for the risk-taking 
propensity of each bank. Two standard properties of cost functions are linear homogeneity of the input prices 
and symmetric second-order parameters (Atlunbas et. al, 2001). The former restriction has been imposed by 
dividing ݌ ? and ݌ ?, by ݌ ?. The latter suggests that the following restrictions should apply to the parameters of 
the cost function: ߙ௜௝ ൌ ߙ௝௜݂݋ݎ݈݈ܽ݅ǡ ݆ ߚ௞௠ ൌ ߚ௞௠݂݋ݎ݈݈ܽ݇ǡ݉ ෍ߙ௝ ൌ  ?෍ߙ௝ଵ ൌ  ?݂݋ݎ݈݈ܽ݆෍ߜ௞௜ ൌ  ?݂݋ݎ݈݈ܽ݇௞௝௝  
The third debate regarding the efficiency estimations is whether a single cost frontier for all countries is 
suitable. Comparisons between singlecountry studies are definitely very misleading and inappropriate as 
methodologies and environmental conditions usually differ.  However, the common frontier is based on the 
conjecture that efficiency differences between banking industries are determined by country-specific 
differences rather than by technological ones. Bos (2002) proves that a common frontier is suitable for Europe. 
Nevertheless, in order to assure the homogeneity of banking technology within the sample, only commercial 
banks are included.  
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CHAPTER 5 - DATA/SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
The fourth and more important debate in the literature is with regards to the choice of the most representative inputs and 
outputs of the banking services production process. There are three approaches generally used in defining the bank 
production: the asset approach (or intermediation approach), the user-cost approach and the value added approach (or 
production approach) (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).  
 
Under the asset approach banks are considered as financial intermediaries between the liability holders and those who 
receive bank funds (i.e. debtors). Deposits and other liabilities are considered as inputs to the intermediation process and 
loans and other assets are considered as the outputs (Sealy and Lindley, 1977). For large banks that primarily purchase their 
funds in big quantities from other banks and large institutional depositors this approach seems appropriate. However, in the 
case of small banks, this method does not account for transaction services delivered by the latter to their depositors, 
underestimating the overall value added of banking activities.  
 
ȤȲȾȲȽȲȼȺɄȾȲȼȶɄɅȹȶɆɄȶȷɆȽȵȺɄɅȺȿȴɅȺɀȿȳȶɅɈȶȶȿɅȹȶȷɆȿȵɄȺȿɅȶɃȾȶȵȺȲɅȺɀȿȲȿȵȵȶɁɀɄȺɅɄȶɃɇȺȴȶɄɀȷȳȲȿȼɄɀȷ which 
the asset approach considers only the former. Intermediation services transform balance-sheet liabilities into assets and pay 
out and receive interest to cover the time value of the funds used in this capacity. Although some large banks tend to 
specialize in this function, most banks raise a substantial portion of their funds through produced depostis and provide 
ȽȺɂɆȺȵȺɅɊ ɁȲɊȾȶȿɅɄ Ȳȿȵ ɄȲȷȶȼȶȶɁȺȿȸ ɄȶɃɇȺȴȶɄ ȲɄ ɈȶȽȽ ȲɄ ȺȿɅȶɃȶɄɅ ɁȲɊȾȶȿɅɄ Ʌɀ ɅȹȶɄȶ ȵȶɁɀɄȺɅɀɃɄ  șȶɃȸȶɃ Ȳȿȵ ȟɆȾɁȹɃȶɊ
1999).  
 
The value-added approach (or production approach) considers that both liability and asset categories have some output 
characteristics. Nevertheless, only those categories that have substantial added value are treated as outputs, while the others 
are treated as either inputs or intermediate products, depending on the specific attributes of each category. This approach is 
ȲɁɁɃɀɁɃȺȲɅȶ ȷɀɃ ɄɅɆȵȺȶɄɀȿ Ʌȹȶ ȲȴɅȺɇȺɅɊ ɀȷȳȲȿȼȺȿȸ ȸɃɀɆɁɄ Ʌȹȶ ȽɀȴȲȽ ȲȸȶȿȴȺȶɄȳȶȺȿȸ ɅɃȲȿɄɁȲɃȶȿɅ ȷɃɀȾȲ ȷȺȿȲȿȴȺȲȽ ɁɀȺȿɅ ɀȷ
view". A major drawback of this approach is that it ignores important aspects of banking activities. This is problematic 
when the number of transactions cannot capture the quality of these services. Banks that generate large transaction flows 
and make large short term profits by grating loans to bad quality customers are not as productive in the long term as a bank 
that makes less short term profits but screens more rigorously its customers. The adoption of information technologies is at 
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the heart of this, since new technology should benefit the bank by allowing it to process information on its customers more 
efficiently. 
 
The third and least popular approach is the user-cost approach. Under the user-cost approach, the net revenue generated by 
a particular asset or liability item determines whether the financial product is an input or output. Hancock (1991) stated that 
it is not clear ex ante whether monetary goods are inputs or outputs in the production process. If the financial returns on an 
asset exceed the opportunity cost of funds (or if the financial cost of a liability is less than the opportunity cost), then the 
instrument is considered to be a financial output. Otherwise, it is considered to be an input (Hancock, 1991). According to 
this rule, demand deposits would be classified as outputs, while time deposits would be classified as inputs. But, the user 
cost fluctuates and so do interest rates. An item considered to be an output in one period can be considered an input the next 
period if the sign of its user cost changes. Second, it is difficult to measure marginal revenues and costs for each individual 
liability item.  
 
ȟɆȸȹȶɄȲȿȵȤȶɄɅȶɃɄȶȾɁȺɃȺȴȲȽɅȶɄɅȷɀɃȵȶɅȶɃȾȺȿȺȿȸɈȹȶɅȹȶɃȵȶɁɀɄȺɅɄȲȴɅȲɄȲȿȺȿɁɆɅɀɃȲȿɀɆɅɁɆɅȺȿɅȹȶɁɃɀȵɆȴɅȺɀȿɀȷ
banking services indicated that insured and uninsured deposits are inputs in all size categories (Hughes and Mester). 
Following the choice on which approach more accurately describes banking activities, the choice on which are the most 
appropriate inputs and outputs to use was based on their popularity in the literature (see appendix) as well as how well they 
capture banking production technology. Loans and other earning assets are considered as the combination of outputs that 
provides a comprehensive outcome of banking services. Loans and total securities are also used as a second combination for 
robustness checks. 
 
Latest studies call for the need to account for the output quality of banks. The inverse of non-performing to total loans is 
included in the frontier for this purpose. According to Berger and Mester (1997), whether it is appropriate to include this 
variable in the cost frontier depends on the extent to which it is exogenous. Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Pasiouras et. al 
(2009) argue that this variable may be a function of management (in)efficiency - efficient banks will be better underwriters 
and monitors and hence will have lower losses, and hence it is endogenous, not exogenous. Off-balance sheet items are also 
often used as additional outputs in the cost frontier although they are not technically earning assets. Non-traditional 
ȲȴɅȺɇȺɅȺȶɄȴɀȿɄɅȺɅɆɅȶȲȿȺȿȴɃȶȲɄȺȿȸɄɀɆɃȴȶɀȷȺȿȴɀȾȶȷɀɃȳȲȿȼɄȲȿȵɅȹȶɃȶȷɀɃȶɄȹɀɆȽȵȳȶȺȿȴȽɆȵȶȵɈȹȶȿȾɀȵȶȽȺȿȸȳȲȿȼɄȴɀɄɅ
characteristics.  
 
The inputs, whose prices are used to estimate the cost frontier, include labour, capital and total borrowed funds. For each 
bank, the price of funds is the ratio of interest expenses to total funds. The price of physical capital i.e. labour, is the wage 
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rate proxied by the ratio of total personnel expenses to total assets. This variable is an approximation as interbank 
differences in labour productivity and average working times are ignored (sometimes wage rates are corrected for national 
differences in these). The cost of physical capital is defined as the ratio between expenditures on plant and equipment (other 
non-interest expenses) and the book value of physical capital (fixed assets). The input prices, outputs and total banking costs 
 the independent variable in the translog cost function - are listed below: 
 ݕ ? ൌ ݈݋ܽ݊ݏȀݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ 
 ݕ ? ൌ ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽݏ݁ܿݑݎ݅ݐ݅݁ݏȀ݋ݐ݄݁ݎ݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ 
 ݕ ? ൌ ݅݊ݒ݁ݎݏ݁݋݂݊݋݊ െ ݌݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉݅݊݃݈݋ܽ݊ݏ 
 ݕ ? ൌ ݋݂݂ െ ܾ݈ܽܽ݊ܿ݁ݏ݄݁݁ݐ݅ݐ݁݉ݏ 
 
 ݌ ? ൌ݅݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ݁ݔ݌݁݊ݏ݁ݏݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ݂ݑ݊݀ݏ  
 ݌ ? ൌ݌݁ݎݏ݋݈݊݊݁݁ݔ݌݁݊ݏ݁ݏݐ݋ݐ݈ܽܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ  
 ݌ ? ൌ݋ݐ݄݁ݎ݋݌݁ݎܽݐ݅݊݃݁ݔ݌݁݊ݏ݁ݏ݂݅ݔ݁݀ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ  
 ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽܿ݋ݏݐݏ ൌ ݅݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ݁ݔ݌݁݊ݏ݁ݏ ൅ ݊݋݊ െ ݅݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ݁ݔ݌݁݊ݏ݁ݏ ൅ ݋ݒ݁ݎ݄݁ܽ݀ݏ 
 
The independent variable in this dissertation includes all kinds of banking costs (personnel expenses and operating expenses 
are included in non-interest expenses) as it is assumed that banks aim to minimize total costs and not just operating costs 
(Dietsch, Lozano-Vivas, 2000). The mean input prices and total banking costs by country code are portrayed in figure 1 
below. Malta, Ireland, Cyprus and the UK face the highest interest expenses/total funds ratio, Germany faces the highest 
personnel expenses ratio and the UK and Belgium face the highest ratio of operating expenses to total fixed assets. Belgium 
and Spain face the highest banking costs overall.  
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Countrycode p1 p2 p3 Total banking costs (mil EUR) 
AT 0.0272775 0.4002365 1.4142081 433.5867 
BE 0.0433373 0.3502083 7.5374097 4984.002 
BG 0.0317582 0.2317838 1.0852447 80.76068 
CY 0.1824173 0.3326611 1.3266682 850.6529 
CZ 0.0294409 0.233663 2.3127942 417.823 
DE 0.0314662 0.4288065 2.6170758 780.5107 
DK 0.0316673 0.3828674 3.5475553 376.9113 
EE 0.0252217 0.3040742 1.6856678 211.2661 
ES 0.047954 0.3180941 1.034865 3489.667 
FI 0.0309613 0.2594374 5.7707512 1201.96 
FR 0.0707538 0.3536924 6.055829 1598.501 
GB 0.4084952 0.4049753 12.807315 2375.46 
GR 0.0314114 0.3503917 1.0025214 1548.478 
HU 0.0560434 0.2732348 6.3535723 547.5278 
IE 0.1903824 0.194001 6.4276744 1687.234 
IT 0.0217694 0.3727256 2.6775215 1552.104 
LT 0.0271884 0.3439346 1.2759014 99.85131 
LU 0.0945021 0.2986522 5.888512 399.0306 
LV 0.0239875 0.3384476 1.5618422 61.23631 
MT 0.1681097 0.2103482 1.7249392 84.32864 
NL 0.0443481 0.3592327 4.5439969 1564.231 
PL 0.036505 0.3774079 3.3026434 365.8199 
PT 0.0451445 0.3377797 2.2086893 468.5863 
RO 0.0538046 0.3507165 1.393779 241.396 
SE 0.0270669 0.3006992 5.785228 1048.2 
SI 0.0334739 0.3298981 1.2036025 180.6103 
SK 0.0265267 0.3880234 1.7556522 171.536 
Total 0.0683021 0.3852512 3.6845043 1195.484 
 
Figure 1: Input prices and total banking costs 
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The stochastic cost frontier model has been applied on an unbalanced panel of banks from all member-states of the EU over 
2005-2011. Data were downloaded from the Fitch IBCA BankScope database in July 2012, which contains balance sheet 
data, income statements and other relevant notes in audited annual reports. Both consolidated as well as unconsolidated 
statements are included. All the data are in Euro (millions) and expressed in real 2005 terms using country GDP deflators. 
Furthermore, some of the variables were scaled upwards in order to avoid having many missing data when negative values 
were logged. Inactive banks, active banks that do no longer have accounts in BankScope were removed from the sample, but 
dissolved, bankrupt and in liquidation banks were included in order to avoid the selectivity bias and overestimated 
efficiency estimates. The number of observations depends on the sample of countries included. When the enlarged EU is 
examined, major frontiers in this paper consist of 4662 observations while the ones that include correlates of inefficiency 
consist of 1313 observations.    
 
 
Other variables 
 
ȠȷȺȿȵȶɁȶȿȵȶȿɅȽɊɀȷɅȹȶɀɁȶɃȲɅȺɀȿȲȽȶȿɇȺɃɀȿȾȶȿɅɅȹȶȳȲȿȼɄȾȲȺȿȲȺȾȺɄɅɀɃȶȲȴȹɅȹȶȽɀɈȶɄɅȴɀɄɅȲȿȵȹȺȸȹȶɄɅɁɃɀȷȺɅȷɆȿȴɅȺɀȿ
as soon as possible, then in the case of using proper control variables the efficiency scores measure only managerial ability. 
However, if banks have other strategic aims, such as a short-term profit target, only exogenous effects can partially be 
captured as the extent of pressure on efficiency improvement explained by operational environment cannot be controlled 
for. Overall, in the latter case, we can only capture the direct and miss the indirect effects of operational environment on 
ȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴɊ ȟɀȽȽɀȲȿȵȥȲȸɊ 
 
Explanatory variables that may affect cost efficiency can be separated into three categories: 
1) Environmental / Country-specific variables: annual GDP growth, Inflation deflator, population density and 
current account balance (obtained from the World Bank Database).  
2) Bank-specific variables: non-performing loans/total loans, equity/total assets, liquid assets/total assets, 
foreign/domestic ownership, total capital, age, the intermediation ratio, total assets. 
3) Industry-specific: market concentration ratio.  
 
Total capital, equity over total assets and non-performing loans over total loans are included in the cost frontier and the rest 
in the inefficiency term. Size is included in the disturbance term to account for heteroskedasticity. 
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Equity/total assets and total capital ratio: One of the most researched aspects of the literature is how insolvency relates to 
banking inefficiency. A bank's insolvency risk depends on the composition of its assets and on the financial capital available 
ɅɀȲȳɄɀɃȳȲȿɊȷȲȺȽȶȵȺȿɇȶɄɅȾȶȿɅɄȫȹȺɄɃȺɄȼɀȷȺȿɄɀȽɇȶȿȴɊȲȷȷȶȴɅɄȲɅȹȶɁɃȺȴȶɄɀȷȺȿɁɆɅɄȲȿȵɅȹȶɃȶȷɀɃȶȴɀɄɅɄ ɅȹɃɀɆȸȹɅȹȶ  
risk premium that banks must pay to depositors; and (b) the prices of outputs, and therefore revenue and profits, through the 
ȹȺȸȹȶɃɃȶɅɆɃȿɀȷȷȶɃȶȵȳɊɅȹȶȾɀɃȶɃȺɄȼɊȺȿɇȶɄɅȾȶȿɅɄ  (Maudos, 2001). Due to this, Berger and Mester (1997) suggest that a 
variable capturing bank insolvency risk should be introduced into the estimation of the cost function. Two variables 
capturing bank risk and risk-taking are used in this paper, the total capital ratio and equity/total assets respectively. The total 
capital ratio is calculated as (Tier 1 and Tier 2) / risk-adjusted assets (according to Basel II it had to be >=10%). Malta, 
Austria, Luxembourg and the Czech Republic have a total capital ratio greater than 22% (see figure 2). If capital is not 
included, the banks that are most prudent or most averse to risk will be penalised, even though they behave optimally in 
terms of their preferences regarding risk.  
 
 
Figure 2: Mean total capital ratio of enlarged EU by country 2005-2011   
 
 
Non-performing loans/total loans: this variable acts as a proxy for credit risk. In general, banks who grant more loans to 
risky borrowers, will also incur additional monitoring costs, for instance, by employing more skilled labour or using 
advanced information technology to manage these risks (Diamond, 1984). Higher efficiency is also expected to be 
correlated with better credit risk evaluation (Mester, 1993; Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Altunbas, Liu, Molyneux and Seth, 
1999). Clearly, Advancing economies suffer from a bigger % of non-performing loans to total loans indicating either bad 
management  ɀɃȳȲȵȽɆȴȼ ɄȶȶȷȺȸɆɃȶ 3). 
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Figure 3: Non-performing loans to total loans % by EU country and year (2005-2011) 
 
Log of total assets: Size differences may be important as banks do not operate on one banking market. Large international 
banks concentrate activities on international (wholesale) markets, whereas small, national banks conduct their business 
mainly at local (retail) markets. Competitive conditions and the need to reduce cost and to increase efficiency may strongly 
vary between these markets (Bikker and Haaf, 2002). As banking data provide insufficient information to make precise 
distinctions between the various markets, this paper uses the size of banks to capture these differences by approximation.  
Annual GDP growth (see appendix table 7): it is important to verify whether cost efficiency is dependent on business cycle 
fluctuations. This is probable given that the economic environment certainly affects managerial decisions on the allocation 
of banking services. However, this variable produces mixed results. Fries and Taci (2005) found that the level of overall 
economic development is not significantly related to costs. As they suggest this is due to that banking costs do not depend 
on the overall development, possibly reflecting a balance between wage costs and productivity across countries.  Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Schure et al., 2004; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007, found that countries with GDP growth are 
characterized by more efficient banking institutions.  
 
Inflation: Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator shows the rate of price change in the 
economy as a whole. Inflation negatively impacts cost efficiency. Grigorian and Manole (2002), found no association 
between inflation and costs. Their results are questionable given the inclusion of interest expenses in total costs (Fries and 
Taci, 2005). From figures 4 and 5 it is clear that the deflationary pressures were strong in the Eurozone which did not 
experience inflation rates above 5% unlike the non-Eurozone region. 
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Figure 4: Mean Eurozone inflation % by country between the years 2005-2011 
 
Figure 5: Mean non-Eurozone inflation % by country between the years 2005-2011 
 
Population Density: this variable was derived from. According to Lozano-Vivas and Dietsch (2000), higher density 
generates more banking costs due to the outcomes of banking competition. In particular, excessive banking costs are 
experienced if banks compete by opening up more branches for strategic in places despite that this is not required due to a 
high population density. On the other hand, the supply of banking services in areas with a low population density generates 
higher banking costs and does not encourage banks to increase their efficiency levels (Fiordelisi et al., 2011). 
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Current account balance: In advanced economies, banks often have sizeable exposures to the home sovereign, and 
generally have a strong home bias in their sovereign portfolios. Holdings of domestic government bonds as a percentage of 
bank capital tend to be larger in countries with high public debt (CGFS, 2011). Within the context of the sovereign debt 
crisis which has evolved into an EU banking crisis, it would be interesting to include a variable as a proxy for the former 
and evaluate whether it promotes cost inefficiency which is in turn likely to have worsened the banking crisis. This variable 
is an indicator of the health of an economy as well as a partial proxy of government policy. Excluding the EU countries 
suffering from a sovereign debt crisis with severe spill overs to their banking sectors, the countries that exhibit the lower 
current account balances are recent EU entrants (see figure 6). 
 
 
Liquid assets/total assets: this is a proxy for liquidity risk; liquidity holdings (particularly those imposed by the authorities) 
represent a cost to banks. Moreover, efficient banks will probably hold only low levels of liquid assets, while inefficient 
ones will hold excess amount of these low-yield assets (Altunbas, 2000).  
Intermediation ratio: the intermediation ratio is also included as a supplementary bank-specific variable indicating market 
power. A lower intermediation ratio means that a higher level of costly deposits has to be collected to support a certain 
amount of loans. It is more expensive therefore to conduct banking operations in the countries that have a lower 
ȺȿɅȶɃȾȶȵȺȲɅȺɀȿ ɃȲɅȺɀ ȘɄȝɃȺȶɄ ȲȿȵȫȲȴȺ  ɄɅȲɅȶ ȘȹȺȸȹȶɃ ȺȿɅȶɃȾȶȵȺȲɅȺɀȿ ɃȲɅȺɀȾȲɊȲȽɄɀ ɃȶȷȽȶȴɅ ȵȶɇȶȽɀɁȾȶȿɅɄ Ⱥȿ Ʌȹȶ
legal and regulatory framework that support both the financial intermediation process and lower costs to banks; for example, 
the development of effective secured transactions laws and bankruptcy procedures that are necessary to support lending to 
ȴɆɄɅɀȾȶɃɄ  Very few countries make less loans per deposit i.e. intermediation ratio below 100% and these are Slovakia, 
Luxembourg, Belgium and the Czech Republic (see figure 7). 
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Figure 6: Mean current account balance as a % of GDP by country (2005-2011) 
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Foreign ownership: this variable was constructed using information from BankScope. Specifically, the main domestic 
country of each bank was offered by BankScope and that was used to construct an ownership dummy where if the main 
domestic country was essentially the countrycode of each bank then that bank was considered as domestic. Results on this 
variable are mixed. The effect of foreign/domestic ownership on cost efficiency is another subsection of the literature.  
 
Concentration ratio: Competition is usually proxied by measures of concentration usually computed using country-level 
concentration ratios (Beck et al., 2006), even though it is widely accepted that the banking industry has become globalized 
and that financial institutions compete internationally (Shaffer, 2004). Thus, the definition of a banking market using 
national boundaries in the earlier studies may not be appropriate. Nevertheless, due to its immense significance to 
efficiency, it has been included in the estimation of the cost function as the concentration ratio of the five largest banks in 
ɅȶɃȾɄɀȷ ɅɀɅȲȽ ȲɄɄȶɅɄ ȠɅ ȺɄ ȲɄɄɆȾȶȵ Ʌɀ ȺȿȵȺȴȲɅȶ Ʌȹȶ ȺȿȵɆɄɅɃɊɄ ɄɅɃɆȴɅɆɃȶ Ⱥȿ ȶȲȴȹȴɀɆȿɅɃɊ Ȳȿȵ ɃɀɆȸȹȽɊ ɅȹȶȵȶȸɃȶȶɀȷȾȲɃȼȶɅ
power. It can be seen from figure 8 that most EU banking markets are quite concentrated  in 17 out of 27 EU member 
states the five largest banks (measured by their share of total assets) make up a market share above 60%. This could be a 
ɃȶɄɆȽɅ ɀȷ ȜȬ ȳȲȿȼȺȿȸ ȾȲɃȼȶɅ ȴɀȿɄɀȽȺȵȲɅȺɀȿ ȤȲɃȼȶɅ ȴɀȿȴȶȿɅɃȲɅȺɀȿ ȲɄ ȾȶȲɄɆɃȶȵ with the Herfindahl index and with the 
share of total assets held by the five largest institutions, increased over the aggregate period 2008-09, in line with the 
increased consolidation in the EU banking sector.  Both indices peaked in 2008 and decreased slightly in 2009, although 
ɃȶȾȲȺȿȺȿȸɈȶȽȽȲȳɀɇȶ ɅȹȶȽȶɇȶȽɄ ȮȺɅȹɃȶȸȲɃȵ Ʌɀ ȺȿȵȺɇȺȵɆȲȽȤȶȾȳȶɃȪɅȲɅȶɄ ɅȹȶɁȺȴɅɆɃȶɃȶȾȲȺȿɄ ȽȲɃȸȶȽɊɆȿȴȹȲȿȸȶȵ
with larger countries, such as Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, but also Austria, having more fragmented markets, 
and smaller countries, especially some of the new member states, being characterized by more concentrated banking sectors 
(ECB, 2010).  
Figure 7: Mean intermediation ratio of EU countries between years 2005 and 2011 
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Figure 8: Mean concentration ratio of the largest 5 banks in each EU country (as measured by total assets) between 
2005 and 2011 
 
There have been omissions of some important factors  especially to the EU - in the cost frontier which have nevertheless 
tested in previous accounts. For instance, some regulatory factors such as private monitoring, disciplinary power, and 
restrictions on banking activities were not included (due to the time necessary to gather such data). Such environmental 
variables include the accessibility of banking services (measured by the number of branches per square kilometer), the 
density of demand (measured by deposits per square kilometer), the diversification ratio (efficiency and risk) and investment 
to GDP ratio. However, there were banking systems with cost efficiencies of nearly 1 in the results indicating that noise was 
almost non-existent in the sample.  
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CHAPTER 6 - RESULTS 
 
General Results 
 
ȧɀɅȶȿɅȺȲȽȴɀɄɅȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴɊȴɀɃɃȶȽȲɅȶɄɃesults are presented in figure 9 below as produced by the individual cost 
frontiers of the enlarged EU, the old member states and the new, the Eurozone region and the non-Eurozone 
region as well as the pre/post-crisis years. How coefficients change when adding the crisis dummy in the 
enlarged EU may be found in the appendix (table 5).  
 
The year dummies appear relative to 2011 in the frontier. In 2005 and 2006 EU banks were significantly less 
cost efficient than in 2011 the majority of the frontiers. Total banking costs however were declining on an 
annual basis at a decreasing rate. The year 2007 was the first year in the sample that banks in the enlarged EU 
began to significantly cost-ɄȲɇȶ ȦȿȽɊ Ʌȹȶ ȿȶɈ ȾȶȾȳȶɃɄ ȳȲȿȼȺȿȸ ɄɊɄɅȶȾɄ ɈȶɃȶ ɄɅȺȽȽ ȽȶɄɄ ȴɀɄɅ ȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿɅ ɅȹȲȿ
2011. Year 2008 was the year when banks were banking cost efficiency was the lowest during the 7-year 
horizon. In 2009, inefficiency continued to decrease significantly for the EU-15 but not for the EU-12 or the 
non-Eurozone countries. The 2010 year dummy was only significant for the non-Eurozone region and turned 
out positive indicating that this region was more cost inefficient in 2010 than 2011. Concluding, the results 
varied across the various regions nevertheless a robust result is that 2007, 2008 and 2011 were the best years in 
terms of increasing cost efficiency. In 2007 the fifth enlargement took place and in 2008 Cyprus and Malta 
adopted the Euro, so if the reason that banks became cost efficient is fresh competition then that is positive; if 
the fact that the next best yeaɃȺȿɅȶɃȾɄɀȷȴɀɄɅȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴɊȺɄȾȶȲȿɄɅȹȲɅɅȹȶȜȚșɄȲȴɅȺɀȿɄɅɀɃȶɇȺɇȶɅȹȶȜȬ
banking system were successful then that is positive too. If year dummies are assumed to reflect on technical 
progress, then that means that during severe crises such as the banking crisis that deepened in 2009-2010, 
technical progress halts probably because banks are preoccupied more with other aspects of bank soundness. If 
these results reveal that banks react to crises by being more cost efficient then this is negative and calls for 
ȾɀɃȶȲȴɅȺɀȿȳɊɃȶȸɆȽȲɅɀɃɄȫȹȶȾȲȻɀɃȺɅɊɀȷɅȹȺɄɇȲɃȺȲȳȽȶɄȴɀȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿɅɄɈȶɃȶȿɀɅɄȺȸȿȺȷȺȴȲȿɅɁɀɄɄȺȳȽɊȵɆȶɅɀȺɅɄ
ɇȲɃɊȺȿȸ ȶȷȷȶȴɅ ɀȿȵȺȷȷȶɃȶȿɅ ɃȶȸȺɀȿɄɀɃȳȶȴȲɆɄȶɀȷ ȺɅɄȿȲɅɆɃȶ ȲɄ Ȳ ȴȲɅȴȹ-ȲȽȽ ɇȲɃȺȲȳȽȶɈȹȺȽȶɀɅȹȶɃ ȶɉɁȽȲȿȲɅɀɃɊ
variables were included in the estimations. This is somewhat reinforced by that the inclusion of the time trend 
in the plain cost frontiers, neither did alter the efficiency ranking of countries nor the average efficiency level.  
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Bank size is always found to positively influence efficiency levels. The general presumption in the literature is 
that large banks are able to hold less capital compared to their smaller counterparts, and may also be able to 
have greater portfolio and loan diversification and gain from size advantages (Hughes et al., 2001; Yildirim and 
Philippatos, 2007; Altunbas et al., 2007). 
 
According to Bolt and Tieman (2004), poor asset quality (increased credit risk) and low levels of liquidity area 
the two major causes of bank failure. In line with Berger and DeYoung (1997) as well as Fries and Taci (2005), 
credit risk proxied by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans of a bank is as expected significantly and 
positively related to banking inefficiency. Berger and DeYoung (1997) test the relationship between problem 
loans and efficiency on a sample of US commercial banks. They particularly test four hypotheses using 
Granger-causality analɊɄȺɄȫȹȶȳȲȵȽɆȴȼȹɊɁɀɅȹȶɄȺɄposits that exogenous events can cause nonperforming 
loans to increase, and cost efficienȴɊɅɀɅȹȶȿȵȶȴɃȶȲɄȶȫȹȶȳȲȵȾȲȿȲȸȶȾȶȿɅȹɊɁɀɅȹȶɄȺɄɁɀɄȺɅɄɅȹȲɅɁɀɀɃȽɊɃɆȿ
banks do badly ȲɅȳɀɅȹȴɀɄɅȴɀȿɅɃɀȽȲȿȵȲɅȽɀȲȿɆȿȵȶɃɈɃȺɅȺȿȸȲȿȵȾɀȿȺɅɀɃȺȿȸȫȹȶɄȼȺȾɁȺȿȸȹɊɁɀɅȹȶɄȺɄɄɅȲɅȶɄ
that banks might achieve low costs by under-spending on loan underwriting and monitoring in the short run, 
and in the long run this results in increases in problem loans and cost inefficiency. The last hypothesis is the 
ȾɀɃȲȽȹȲɋȲɃȵȹɊɁɀɅȹȶɄȺɄɈȹȺȴȹɄɆȸȸȶɄɅɄ ɅȹȲɅȾɀɃȶȶɂɆȺɅɊȴȲɁȺɅȲȽȿȶȸȲɅȺɇȶȽɊȞɃȲȿȸer-causes nonperforming 
loans. Berger and DeYoungɄ (1997) results suggest that the inter-temporal relationships between loan quality 
and cost efficiency run in both directions. Increases in nonperforming loans tend to be followed by decreases in 
measured cost efficiency, suggesting that problem loans cause banks to increase spending on monitoring, 
working out, or selling off problem loans. The data favor the bad management hypothesis over the skimping 
hypothesis i.e. decreases in measured cost efficiency are generally followed by increases in nonperforming 
loans, evidence that bad management practice are manifested not only in excess expenditures, but also in 
subpar underwriting and monitoring practices that eventually lead to nonperforming loans. For a subset of 
banks that are consistently efficient, however, increases in measured cost efficiency precede increases in 
nonperforming loans, consistent with the skimping hypothesis that banks trade short-run expense reductions for 
long-ɃɆȿɃȶȵɆȴɅȺɀȿɄȺȿȽɀȲȿɂɆȲȽȺɅɊ  
The first notable event signaling a possible EU wide banking crisis occurred in the United Kingdom in 2007 
and was in fact a liquidity problem. BNP Paribas, citing "a complete evaporation of liquidity", blocked 
withdrawals from three hedge funds. This soon led to a panic as investors and depositors attempted to liquidate 
assets deposited in highly-leveraged financial institutions (Elliott, 2012). Towards the end of 2008, the 
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European Central bank and the Federal Reserve purchased US$2.5 trillion of government debt and troubled 
private assets from banks. This was the largest liquidity injection into the credit market, and the largest 
monetary policy action, in world history.  
 
If Luxembourg is exempted, all else equal, countries with a higher percentage of liquid to total assets 
demonstrate greater cost efficiency. Despite that liquidity is usually found to be positively linked to bank costs, 
as liquid assets involve additional transportation, storage, protection and labor cost, in this study this link 
appeared as negative and significant. A justification for this result is that the horizon covered in this 
dissertation includes 4 crisis years out of 7 during which bank runs and lack of liquidity was a major problem. 
Therefore, during this period, banks in a better position in terms of liquidity faced lower costs while the others 
ɄɅɃɆȸȸȽȶȵɅɀɃȲȺɄȶɄȴȲɃȴȶȴȲɄȹșɃȺɄɄȺȾȺɄȶɅȲȽɈȹɀȲȽɄɀȷɀɆȿȵȲȿȶȸȲɅȺɇȶȽȺȿȼɁɃɀɇȺȵȶȲȿɀɅȹȶɃɃȶȲɄɀȿ
for this relatȺɇȶȽɊȿȶɈȷȺȿȵȺȿȸȺȿ Ʌȹȶ ȽȺɅȶɃȲɅɆɃȶȘɄ ɅȹȶɊɄɅȲɅȶȵȫɃȲȵȺɅȺɀȿȲȽȽɊȳȲȿȼɄȹȲɇȶȳȶȶȿɄɀȽɇȺȿȸ Ʌȹȶ
liquidity problem by holding cash together with a considerable amount of short-term government securities that 
they could sell for cash. Financial reform however, led to the development of new banking products and 
ȲȽɅȶɃȿȲɅȺɇȶɄɀɆɃȴȶɄɀȷȷɆȿȵɄɈȹȺȴȹȹȲɇȶȾȲȵȶȺɅȶȲɄȺȶɃȷɀɃȳȲȿȼɄɅɀɄȶȴɆɃȶȽȺɂɆȺȵȺɅɊ  
 
The age variable displays mixed results. For the enlarged EU, and old and new member states its coefficient is 
ȿɀɅɄȺȸȿȺȷȺȴȲȿɅșȶɅɈȶȶȿȲȿȵȲɄɈȶȽȽȲɄȸȶȿȶɃȲȽȽɊɈȺɅȹȺȿɅȹȶȜɆɃɀɋɀȿȶɃȶȸȺɀȿɀȽȵȶɃȳȲȿȼɄɄȶȶȾɅɀ
have managed to conduct operations more cost effectively. Old banks in this area have endured the 
competition, consolidation and all the banking sectors reforms that have been established by the EU the last 
decade. On the other hand, this variable turned positive and significant for the non-Eurozone region (the 
opposing effect of this variable on these regions is the reason that it was not significant in the main frontier).  
ȫȹȺɄȺɄȴɀȿɄȺɄɅȶȿɅɈȺɅȹɅȹȶɂɆȺȶɅȽȺȷȶȹɊɁɀɅȹȶɄȺɄɈȹȺȴȹɄɅȲɅȶɄɅȹȲɅȲɅɄɀȾȶɄɅȲȸȶȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿɅȾȲȿȲȸȶȾȶȿɅȾȺȸȹɅ
become less prominent, and opt instead for a less proactive style, leading to a decrease in efficiency. 
Furthermore, another plausible explanation is that newly established banks, result of recent mergers and 
acquisitions are more efficient to previously established ones (Brack and Jimborean, 2000). Additionally, new 
banks built their services and operations upon the new EU regulations while old banks needed to update their 
policies and the way they functioned in order to be able to implement them. 
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In line with Bonin et al. (2005), domestic bank in the non-Eurozone region face significantly higher costs than 
foreign banks. According to Kosak et. al, an important step towards the integration of the new member states in 
the EU was also extensive privatisation, in which foreign banks played a key role. For the Eurozone countries 
ɅȹȺɄȴɀȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿɅɈȲɄȿȶȸȲɅȺɇȶȳɆɅȿɀɅɄȺȸȿȺȷȺȴȲȿɅțɀȾȶɄɅȺȴȳȲȿȼɄȾȲȿȲȸȶɃȺȲȽɁȶɃȷɀɃȾȲȿȴȶȺȿȜȲɄɅȶɃȿȜɆɃɀɁȶ
is positively associated with foreign bank presence. Even during the period when competition is relatively low, 
domestic banks are catching up with foreign banks. These results suggest the strong possibility of knowledge 
ɄɁȺȽȽɀɇȶɃɄȺȿȲȵȵȺɅȺɀȿɅɀȴɀȾɁȶɅȺɅȺɀȿȶȷȷȶȴɅɄ ȱȹɆ 
 
Domestic ownership is always positively associated to greater banking costs apart from the case of post-crisis 
years. Nevertheless, it only appeared as significant in the new countries sample and the pre-crisis period. The 
former can be explained by that recent EU members and at their majority advancing economies, faced foreign 
penetration and competition in their banking system by banks from more advanced economies for the first time 
during the time period examined. The disparity between cost efficiencies in this sample was thus more obvious 
when estimating the frontier. That domestic banks facing significantly higher costs than foreign banks before 
2007 is in line with the majority of the literature (Fries and Taci, 2005; Weill, 2003). There is also a very good 
justification that only the post-crisis frontier produced a negative coefficient instead of a positive one. 
According to EU regulation, the home country is responsible for any branches or subsidiaries they have in 
foreign EU countries. During the crisis, governments supported their own banking systems (and SIFIs) for 
example by recapitalizing them or nationalizing them. So, foreign ownership banks in distressed countries were 
disadvantaged by the unsettling economic environment if they had not received any help from their home base.  
 
Banks operating in the EU will be benefitted by restructuring their balance sheets according to Basel III higher 
capital requirements. Total capital proves to be significantly negatively associated to inefficiency. It seems that 
indeed, better capitalized banks are also more cost efficient and carry less risk. As Eisenbeis et. al 1999 state, 
higher levels of capitalization may reflect higher incentives from the stockholders to monitor management, thus 
resulting in alleviating the efficiency problem caused by conflicts of interest.  
 
Surprisingly, the sign of the equity ratio is always positive and significant. The usual assumption is that a lower 
equity total assets ratio leads to lower efficiency levels, because lower equity ratios imply a higher risk-taking  
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OUTPUTS 
Loans 
Other earning assets 
 
EU-27 
 
EU-15 
 
EU-10 
 
EUROZONE 
 
NON-
EUROZONE 
 
POST-
CRISIS 
 
PRE-CRISIS 
Equity / total assets 0.0190*** 0.0153*** 0.0166*** 0.0140*** 0.0214*** 0.0178*** 0.0202*** 
Total capital ratio -0.0046*** -0.0032*** -0.010*** -0.0035*** -0.0088*** -0.0041*** -0.0075*** 
Non-performing loans / total loans 0.3102*** 0.0479*** 0.0277*** 0.0536*** 0.0712*** 0.0740 1.3446*** 
year1 = 2005 0.0342 0.0767** 0.2080*** 0.1339*** 0.0181 - 0.0642*** 
year2 = 2006 -0.0130 0.0406 0.1305*** 0.0790** 0.0017 - 0.0384** 
year3 = 2007 -0.0629** -0.0056 0.0924*** 0.0315 -0.0088 - - 
year4 = 2008 -0.1171*** -0.0939*** 0.0479 -0.0671** -0.0175 -0.1342*** - 
year5 = 2009 -0.0284 -0.0604*** 0.0522* -0.0382 0.0586** -0.0330 - 
year6 = 2010 0.0155 0.0030 0.0316 -0.0161 0.0668*** 0.0192 - 
Size -0.1747*** -0.1679*** -0.2467*** -0.0945** -0.8662*** -0.1581*** -0.3164*** 
Annual GDP growth % 0.0257 -0.0351 -0.0071*** 0.0769 0.00694 0.0217 0.0030 
Population density -0.0015** -0.0028 0.0386*** -0.0090 -0.0003*** -0.0017 -0.0014* 
Inflation % 0.0917*** -0.0302 0.0153*** -0.0335 0.0060 0.0856* 0.1378* 
Current account balance as a % of GDP -0.0322* -0.0343*** -0.0001*** -0.0692* -0.00217 -0.0202 -0.0387* 
Concentration ratio (5) -0.0270*** -0.0385** 0.0369*** -0.0470*** -0.0002*** -0.0177 -0.0311*** 
Liquid assets / total assets -0.9705*** -1.1391*** -1.1661*** -1.5260*** -0.1394*** -0.8609** -1.3384*** 
Intermediation ratio -0.0394*** -0.0438*** -0.0497*** -0.0492*** -0.0007*** -0.0403*** -0.0359*** 
Age -0.0019 -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0093*** 0.0059*** -0.0009 -0.0043** 
Domestic Ownership 0.1529 0.4325 0.2402** 0.1584 0.8173 -0.0142 2.3239* 
Crisis -0.0403 0.3106 -0.6901** 0.6656* -0.3823*   
 
Figure 9: Coefficients of cost efficiency correlates as produced by the samples of the enlarged EU, the old and new member states, the Eurozone and non-
Eurozone regions and pre/post crisis periods 
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propensity and greater leverage, which could result in greater borrowing costs (Casu and Molyneux (2002), Pasiouras and 
Lozano-Vivas (2011)). Nevertheless, during the period examined, raising equity capital was very expensive for banks. According 
to King (2009), the cost of equity estimates declined steadily across all countries from 1990 to 2005 but then rose from 2006 
onwards. Basel II accord notes, it may be costly for banks to raise additional capital, especially if this needs to be done quickly or 
at a time when market conditions are ɆȿȷȲɇɀɆɃȲȳȽȶ . Blum (1999) submits that in a dynamic setting a new intertemporal effect 
can arise which leads to an increase in risk. The key insight is that under binding capital requirements, an additional unit of equity 
tomorrow is more valuable to a bank. If raising equity is excessively costly, the only possibility to increase equity tomorrow is to 
increase risk today. ȠȿɅɆȺɅȺɇȶȽɊ ɅȹȶȾȲɃȼȶɅ ȷɀɃ ɄȶȲɄɀȿȶȵȶɂɆȺɅɊɀȷȷȶɃȺȿȸɄȾȺȸȹɅȳȶɈȹȲɅȶȴɀȿɀȾȺɄɅɄȵȶɄȴɃȺȳȶȲɄȲȾȲɃȼȶɅ ȷɀɃ
ȽȶȾɀȿɄ after a negative shock, the banks with lower quality borrowers would be more interested in issuing equity than the 
banks with higher quality lending relationships, resulting in prices for new equity that are unattractive to the latter, collapsing the 
ȾȲɃȼȶɅɀɃȶȿȸȶȿȵȶɃȺȿȸ ȽȲɃȸȶɁɃȺȴȶȵȺɄȴɀɆȿɅɄ  ȪɆȲɃȶɋȲȿȵȩȶɁɆȽȽɀ The cost of equity was estimated to have increased 
slightly for euro area banks, and is little changed for banks in the United Kingdom (CGFS, 2011). 
Market concentration is positively linked to cost efficiency in line with Lozano-vivas and Pasiouras (2008) and Grigorian and 
Manole (2002). Furthermore, market concentration is positively associated to the intermediation ratio. ȟȶȿȴȶȴɀȿȴȶȿɅɃȲɅȺɀȿȵɀȶɄ
not have to lead to abuse of market power and higher profits as assumed in the SCP paradigm, but may go hand in hand with 
ȽɀɈȶɃɁɃȺȴȶɄȲɄȺȿɅȹȶȴȲɄȶɀȷȹȺȸȹȶɃȴɀȾɁȶɅȺɅȺɀȿ șȺȼȼȶɃ, 2004). This provides proof for the efficient-structure paradigm - 
higher concentration reflects competitive selection and consolidation through survival of more efficient banks. Casu & Girardone 
ɄɅȲɅȶɅȹȲɅɅȲȼȶɀɇȶɃɄȴȲȿȳȶȶɇȶȿȴɀȿɄȺȵȶɃȶȵȲɄȲȹȶȲȽɅȹɊɀɆɅȴɀȾȶɀȷȲȴɀȾɁȶɅȺɅȺɇȶȸȲȾȶɅȹȲɅȹȲȵɁɀɄȺɅȺɇȶȶɉɅȶɃȿȲȽȺɅȺȶɄ
because it could prevent the failure of significantly inefficient banks. As expected, the intermediation ratio coefficient is robustly 
negative and statistically significant.  More X-efficient firms are able to charge lower loan and higher deposit rates and thus 
produce more output as a function of demand and supply elasticity (Fua, 2009). According to Lozano-Vivas, Pastor and Hasan 
(2001) being technically efficient is a dissuasive element for foreign competition underpinning the positively relationship between 
market concentration and cost efficiency. 
 
As far as macroeconomic variables are concerned, the results are firm. GDP growth is not associated with cost efficiency in line 
with Fries and Taci (2005). Inflation was only significant with positive coefficients and therefore has a negative impact on cost 
efficiency. Higher inflation is also associated to low interest rates which possibly increase banking costs. Current account deficits, 
as predicted, hinder cost efficiency and this relationship proves significant for the majority of the frontiers. As Barrell et al.  
(2009) states, ȘȿɆȾȳȶɃ of potential links can be traced from current account deficits to risk of banking crises. For example, 
deficits may be accompanied by monetary inflows that enable banks to expand credit excessively and they may accompany an 
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overheating economy. This may both generate and reflect a high demand for credit, as well as boosting asset prices in an 
unsustainable manner. These trends may be exacerbated by lower real interest rates than would otherwise be the case. Foreigners 
may cease to be willing to finance deficits in domestic currency if they consider their assets are vulnerable to monetization via 
ȺȿȷȽȲɅȺɀȿȲȿȵɄɆȴȹȲȴȶɄɄȲɅȺɀȿȴȲȿȵȺɄɃɆɁɅȲɄɄȶɅȾȲɃȼȶɅɄȲȿȵȳȲȿȼɄ ȷɆȿȵȺȿȸ  Population density also produced mixed results. 
Generally, within the enlarged EU area, the supply of banking services in areas with a low population density generates higher 
cost inefficiency probably because certain resources which are necessary to employ e.g. personnel or premises are not fully taken 
advantage of. The sign of this coefficient varies according to the region or time period examined.  
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COST EFFICIENCY IN THE EU   
 
In order to get a better grasp so as to what extent several factors affects cost efficiency in EU banking the most, 7 frontiers were 
estimated (see figure 10). For the combination of loans and total securities as outputs, models 1-5 are presented in the appendix 
(table 3). 
 
The results are portrayed in figure 13. Cost efficiency scores estimated using loans and other earning assets as outputs produced 
slightly higher efficiency estimates. This was expected given that other earning assets include total securities as well as several 
other earning assets so ceteris paribus with the first combination the same inputs and input prices produce more output. Cost 
frontiers without any efficiency correlates exhibit produce much lower efficiency estimates as well as different ranks (see figures 
11 and 12) confirming the importance of these in explaining cost inefficiencies. Furthermore, frontiers including macroeconomic 
variables in the inefficiency term and country dummies in the translog function also yield slightly different efficiency rankings. 
According to Bikker (1999) the country dummy coefficient measures the deviation of the level of costs of each country from the 
European-wide cost level. Hȶ ɄɆȸȸȶɄɅɄ ɅȹȲɅ ȴɀɆȿɅɃɊ ȵɆȾȾȺȶɄ ȿɀɅ ɀnly measure differences in the cost level of banks in the 
Model 1: plain model (no correlates) 
Model 2: plain model with year dummies 
Model 3: model 2 and bank-specific variables in frontier and the inefficiency term 
Model 4: model 3 and environmental variables in the inefficiency term 
Model 5: model 3 and country dummies (Country dummies have been included in the frontier because factors such as 
IT systems and advanced internet banking services affect banking technology).  
 
Model 6: model 4 and the inverse of non-performing loans as a bad output 
Model 7: model 5 and non-traditional activities as an additional output (+crisis dummy in in efficiency term) 
Figure 10: Translog cost functions estimated for the EU  
42 
 
various countries in producing identical combinations of financial services, but also reflect differences in average X-efficiency 
levels in a more straightforward way . The results of this paper reject this statement. 
 
Figure 11: Box-plot of Model 1 cost efficiency estimates by EU country   
 
Figure 12: Box-plot of Model 4 cost efficiency estimates by EU country 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
IE 0.7933476 IE 0.796362 FI 0.9895532 FI 0.9904323 FI 0.9917586 FI 0.990543 FI 0.9920664 
NL 0.7518752 NL 0.7533206 PT 0.9657695 IE 0.9648663 EE 0.9712412 IE 0.9657303 EE 0.9683661 
ES 0.7387581 ES 0.7412415 IE 0.9649877 PT 0.9639214 PT 0.9698306 PT 0.9646826 PT 0.9640946 
PT 0.7363619 PT 0.7395046 EE 0.9627982 EE 0.9571491 IE 0.9634161 EE 0.9558715 IE 0.9625206 
BE 0.7314966 BE 0.733465 ES 0.9351277 NL 0.9458976 ES 0.9444202 NL 0.9482665 ES 0.9424262 
SI 0.7159106 SI 0.718517 NL 0.9249273 BE 0.9293072 AT 0.9215796 ES 0.9312283 BE 0.9370372 
CY 0.7131248 CY 0.7159824 BE 0.9065321 ES 0.9285852 BE 0.9175514 BE 0.9295977 AT 0.9360523 
LU 0.7058482 LU 0.7061181 AT 0.9063864 DK 0.9163539 DK 0.9051051 DK 0.9184134 DK 0.9053605 
DK 0.6867859 DE 0.6879765 DK 0.9050515 AT 0.908848 SI 0.8965224 AT 0.9176128 HU 0.9003855 
DE 0.6866053 DK 0.6878227 SI 0.8805947 MT 0.8913623 IT 0.8949272 MT 0.8992258 GR 0.8958045 
GB 0.6836255 GB 0.6854844 CY 0.876617 SI 0.8817375 NL 0.8928796 SI 0.8851371 CY 0.8899247 
EE 0.6807274 EE 0.6836421 LT 0.8700082 DE 0.8776291 GR 0.8874961 DE 0.8838192 SI 0.8891237 
SE 0.6777001 GR 0.6791483 IT 0.8687741 CY 0.8729489 HU 0.8840681 GB 0.8766572 LT 0.8876347 
GR 0.6775253 SE 0.6778775 GB 0.8684059 GB 0.8719053 CY 0.8826576 IT 0.8741881 NL 0.8853778 
AT 0.6765316 AT 0.6773114 DE 0.8668773 IT 0.8671227 LT 0.8814028 CY 0.8730599 IT 0.8830042 
FI 0.675448 FI 0.6764535 GR 0.8625848 LT 0.8601301 DE 0.8760226 LT 0.8605238 DE 0.881942 
FR 0.6641263 LT 0.665759 SE 0.8435719 SE 0.8546739 BG 0.8717797 GR 0.8507269 BG 0.8737642 
LT 0.664026 FR 0.6646143 MT 0.8116747 GR 0.8530618 GB 0.8598365 SE 0.8325773 GB 0.8695586 
MT 0.6580377 MT 0.6581265 BG 0.8093649 FR 0.8106691 RO 0.8399127 FR 0.8163998 FR 0.8601623 
CZ 0.6472385 CZ 0.649778 FR 0.8093269 HU 0.7974646 MT 0.8333181 LV 0.8025629 RO 0.8379176 
LV 0.6450242 LV 0.6465355 HU 0.8084214 LV 0.7936254 LV 0.8307513 HU 0.80199 LV 0.8376475 
IT 0.6402872 IT 0.6398395 LV 0.804299 BG 0.7718665 PL 0.8207433 BG 0.7697487 MT 0.8374791 
PL 0.6162865 PL 0.6181023 LU 0.7574937 LU 0.7610929 FR 0.8143649 LU 0.7693061 PL 0.8296247 
SK 0.6115655 SK 0.6118003 PL 0.7555638 PL 0.7492426 SK 0.7787321 PL 0.7567548 SE 0.8057125 
BG 0.5970889 HU 0.6009307 RO 0.7251942 RO 0.6733336 SE 0.7735982 SK 0.6746167 SK 0.770168 
HU 0.5958996 BG 0.600895 CZ 0.6939492 SK 0.6672673 CZ 0.745552 RO 0.6685491 CZ 0.7455137 
RO 0.5087155 RO 0.5128126 SK 0.660189 CZ 0.654116 LU 0.7264826 CZ 0.6678467 LU 0.7102104 
Mean 0.6711193 0.6724774 0.848364 0.8475177 0.8735043 0.8513806 0.8729143 
Figure 13: Cost efficiency estimates of Models 1-7 by EU country (ranked by lowest to highest  
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ȫȹȺɄ ɄɅɆȵɊɄ ȶɇȺȵȶȿȴȶ ȵȶȿɀɅȶɄ ɅȹȲɅ ȳȲȿȼ-specific variables account for a greater % of inefficiencies than institutional or 
environmental factors (identified through country dummies or data on the macroeconomic environment). This is a revealing result 
since the conception held by many so far was that country factors institutional factors are what affect differences in banking 
efficiency across countries. It must be that Europe has been successful in providing a level-playing field to its member states the 
past 7 years and/or that during this particular time period when banking sectors were faced with sovereign debt crisis as well as an 
EU-banking crisis, their own abilities and soundness were much more important.  
 
Frontiers for the separate regions - EU-15 (see figure 14), EU-12 (see figure 14), non-Eurozone (see figure 17), Eurozone (see 
figure 17), pre-crisis period (see figure 20), post-crisis period (see figure 20), were estimated by model 4 as sometimes model 5 
did not converge. Fortunately, it is available for comparison for the commercial banks of the enlarged EU (see figure 13 model 4). 
 
From figure 13, it can be deduced that bank-specific variables account for almost 20% while country-specific factors account for 
only 3.5%. More rankings were reversed with frontiers that employed country dummies than frontiers the included environmental 
variables. More specifically, including country dummies undoubtedly raises countries with weaker macroeconomic conditions 
e.g. Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Greece in the ranking while it penalizes stronger economies such as the UK and 
Netherlands and Sweden. In the frontier results, country dummies always have the same signs and significance (see appendix 
table 2). Differences in costs and how they are related to cost efficiency will be analysed below.  
 
Finland, Portugal, Ireland and Estonia persistently appear as the top four performers. Spain or Netherlands usually follow in line 
with Berger (2000) who also found Spain to have an efficiency score of 91.5%. With Italy as an exception, the results are in line 
with Lozano-Vivas, Pastor and Hasan (2001) as well as Altunbas (2001) who found that within his sample the most efficient 
banking systems were those of Austria, Denmark, Germany and Italy and the least cost efficient were UK and Sweden. Romania, 
Luxembourg, Slovakia and the Czech Republic were always spotted at the lowest rankings. Unexpectedly indeed, Germany, 
Britain and France were not among the best performers while crisis-struck countries such as Cyprus, Ireland and Portugal ranked 
higher. These results create a puzzle as far as the association of banking cost efficiency and banking crises is concerned. An 
important aspect of estimating frontiers using several correlates must be kept in mind though. The inclusion of country-specific 
variables, country dummies, bank-ɄɁȶȴȺȷȺȴɇȲɃȺȲȳȽȶɄȲȿȵɅȹȶȴɃȺɄȺɄȵɆȾȾɊɄȶɃɇȶɅɀȳȶȲȳȽȶɅɀȺȿɅȶɃɁɃȶɅȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴȺȶɄȺȿȲɃȶȽȲɅȺɇȶ
manner. For instance, relative to the economic environment in which they operated and the institutional controls that were in 
place, banks in Greece managed to be more cost efficient than banks in France.  
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Including the inverse of non-performing loans as a bad output in the cost frontiers, did not significantly alter the mean efficiency 
score and neither the position of each country in the ranking probably due to the huge amounts of write-downs that banks with 
more bad loans were forced to undergo. Neither non-traditional activities were significant as an output, however including them 
altered the country rankings (see figure 13) denoting that off-balance sheet items are of varying significance to each banking 
sector. According to Rogers (1998), the increase (decrease) in cost efficiency indicates that banks tend to be producing and selling 
non-traditional output better (worse) than traditional output, on average. Thus, policy makers may want to consider such changes 
in efficiency when developing regulations related to restrictions on bank activities (Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2008). For 
instance, Sweden and France seem to have a significant proportion of their banking output in the form of off-balance sheet items 
since their cost efficiency estimates improve with them in the frontier. At least two other studies find no impact of OBS on cost 
efficiency (Jagtiani et al.,1995; Pasiouras, 2008). The inclusion of these in the cost frontier did not influence the direction of the 
impact of the determinants of cost inefficiency.  
 
 
EU-27  
 
The EU-27 commercial banks produced a mean efficiency score of 0.8453611  an average slightly higher than most other EU 
studies. This number was precisely the average of pre- crisis and post-crisis results. Ferreira (2011) for the period 2004-2008 
finds a mean of 80.589. The recent financial crisis urged commercial banks to be more efficient, but the spread of contagion risk 
through the Eurozone region is obvious through the crisis positive and significant coefficient. With country dummies instead of 
macroeconomic variables in the inefficiency term this average was 0.8708 implying that approximately 1.5% of inefficiencies are 
explained by other country-level differences other than the environmental variables used in this dissertation.  
 
Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania 
improve their positions in the cost efficiency ranking when country dummies are added in the cost frontier meaning that particular 
environmental conditions in these countries due impede the cost efficient operations of their banks. On the contrary, Germany, the 
Netherlands, France and the UK (Western European region) perform poorer than what their economic context allows them to. 
Brack and Jimborean (2000) also identified a decreasing tendency in the efficiency scores, both in Germany and the United 
Kingdom.  
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Finland exhibits the highest efficiency score, by both frontiers, which is close to the maximum cost efficiency possible i.e.  1 in 
line with Ferreira (2011). Maudos (2002) detected Finland as one of the lowest ranking banking sectors but during the 1993-1996 
but the rest of his conclusions were in line with the results of this dissertation. He identified Belgium, Austria, Germany and 
Spain as the best performers in his 10-country sample and France and Italy as the worst. Spain also robustly appears as one of the 
most cost efficient countries despite its vulnerable fiscal positions. Bikker (1999) agrees with the position of Belgium in the rank 
but not of Spain. Surprisingly perhaps, after Finland, Portugal, Estonia and Ireland follow. In line with Kosak et al. (2009), 
Estonia scored approximately 95%. In line with Altunbas (2001) who examined 15 EU-countries over the period 1989-1997 using 
the SFA, countries such as Austria, Denmark and Germany appeared as more efficient relative to British and Swedish banks. On 
the lowest parts of the ranking, the Czech Republic along with Romania, Slovakia, Poland and Luxembourg are found, in line 
with Kosak et al. (2009). In line with Ferreira (2011) Cyprus and Malta are found in the middle of the rankings. Kosak et al. 
(2009ɁȲɃɅȺȴɆȽȲɃȽɊȷɀɆȿȵɅȹȲɅɅȹȶɄȶȴɀɆȿɅɃȺȶɄȳȲȿȼȺȿȸɄȶȴɅɀɃɄɈȶɃȶȾɀɃȶȴɀɄɅȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿɅɅȹȲȿɅȹȶșȲȽɅȺȴɃȶȸȺɀȿȴɀɆȿɅɃȺȶɄșɊɅȹȺɄ 
ɄɅɆȵɊɄɃȶɄɆȽɅɄȹɀɈȶɇȶɃ ȺɅ ɄȶȶȾɄɅȹȲɅ Ʌȹȶ ȽȲɅɅȶɃȹȲɇȶȴȲɆȸȹɅɆɁ ɄȺȿȴȶȝȺȿȽȲȿȵȲȿȵȜɄɅɀȿȺȲȲɁɁȶȲɃɇȶɃɊȹȺȸȹȺȿ ɅȹȶɃȲȿȼȫhe 
Baltic states have had the highest growth rates in Europe between 2000 and 2007 and the coefficient for GDP growth for this 
region proved positively and significantly related to cost efficiency.  
 
The bigger picture reveals that, among the first 10 best performers of the enlarged EU, 9 are in the Eurozone and are old member 
states. Denmark is the only non-Eurozone country in the top 10 and Estonia and Slovenia/Malta are the only representatives of the 
new member states. These results carry important policy implications. These are the two sides of this coin. Among the worst 10 
performers, 2/5 (France, Sweden, Luxembourg and the UK) are old members of the EU and just 2/5 are in the Eurozone.  
It is clear that the single currency as well as EU policies towards greater integration of the financial services industries of the EU 
has been successful. Old member states exhibit scores between 0.8-ɈȹȺȽȶȺȿȿȶɈȾȶȾȳȶɃɄɄȴɀɃȶɄɅɀɀɃȲȿȸȶȵȳȶɅɈȶȶȿ this 
level (see figure 14). Non-Eurozone cost efficiency rose by higher levels the recent years and perhaps the most important policy 
implication of this is that systemic risk between the Eurozone countries during periods of (banking) crisis partly obstructs the 
progress made on cost efficiency during good times.  
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EU-15 vs. EU-12 
 
 
EU-15   EU-12   
FI 0.9932414 EE 0.9498267 
PT 0.9686457 SI 0.9102898 
IE 0.9649724 HU 0.908873 
NL 0.9538732 BG 0.9010729 
BE 0.9478073 CY 0.8934991 
ES 0.9245981 PL 0.8652277 
DK 0.9183712 MT 0.8608727 
AT 0.9134719 RO 0.8484558 
DE 0.8742908 LT 0.839847 
GB 0.8725047 LV 0.8377365 
IT 0.8687403 SK 0.785079 
GR 0.8640062 CZ 0.7706281 
SE 0.8453903     
FR 0.8142077     
LU 0.7766563     
Mean 0.8878799   0.8613309 
 
Figure 14: Cost efficiency country rankings of old and new EU members (highest to lowest)  
 
In line with Hollo and Naggy (2006) and Kosak (2004), there is an efficiency gap between old and new member states which 
exists even if the environment is controlled for. Nevertheless this gap only amounts to 2.5%. These results contradict Andries and 
ȚȲɁɃȲɃɆɄɄɅȲɅȶȾȶȿɅɅȹȲɅțȶɃȶȸɆȽȲɅȺɀȿȺɄȿɀɅɄɆȷȷȺȴȺȶȿɅȷɀɃȴɀȿɅȺȿɆɀɆɄȽɊȺȿȴɃȶȲɄȺȿȸȴɀȾɁȶɅȺɅȺɀȿȲȿȵɅȹȶȜȬ-27 banking-
market forces do not behȲɇȶ ȲɄ Ȳ ɄȺȿȸȽȶ ȜɆɃɀɁȶȲȿ ȾȲɃȼȶɅ  ȶɇȶȿ Ⱥȷ ɅȹȶɃȶ ȺɄ ɁɃɀȸɃȶɄɄ  ȫȹȶ ɀȿȽɊ ȿȶȸȲɅȺɇȶ ȲɄɁȶȴɅ ȺɄ ɅȹȲɅ Ʌȹȶ
standard deviation of efficiency scores for the EU-12 region is higher than the standard deviation of the EU-15 region indicating 
that consolidation in the ȷɀɃȾȶɃȲȿȵȲȿȶɇȶȿɁȽȲɊȺȿȸȷȺȶȽȵȹȲɄȿɀɅɊȶɅȳȶȶȿȶɄɅȲȳȽȺɄȹȶȵ. 
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Examining closer the efficiency scores by country code and year, the upward trend of new EU-ȾȶȾȳȶɃɄȲȿȵɁɃȶɄɆȾȲȳȽɊɈȶȲȼȶɃ
economiȶɄȺɄȴȽȶȲɃȽɊȷȲɄȴȺȿȲɅȺȿȸɄȶȶȷȺȸɆɃȶ5), particularly clear for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania and Hungary, in line 
with Ferreira (2011) and Hollo and Naggy (2006). Estonia faces the lowest costs among the EU as given by its country dummy in 
the frontier. The frontier results clearly indicate convergence. In line with Lozano-Vivas (2000), the less favourable the country-
specific conditions the greater the improvement in the average efficiency scores through time. This also holds for the non-
Eurozone region (see figure 17). Brissimis et al. (2008) for ten newly acceded EU Member States, confirms the positive effect of 
banking sector reforms on bank efficiency.   
 
According to Kosak et al. (2009) who studied the cost efficiency of South-Eastern European countries these countries are of 
particular interest because their banking sector had struggled to transform their banking sectors before they achieved EU 
ȾȶȾȳȶɃɄȹȺɁ Ⱥȿ  ȫȹȶɃȶ ɈȶɃȶ ȷȲȺȽɆɃȶ Ⱥȿ ɃȶȴȲɁȺɅȲȽȺɋȺȿȸ ȳȲȿȼɄ Ȳȿȵ ɄɀȽɇȺȿȸ Ʌȹȶ ȺȿȹȶɃȺɅȶȵ ɁɃɀȳȽȶȾ ɀȷ ȿɀȿ-performing loans 
which in some counɅɃȺȶɄȽȶȵɅɀȲɄȶɃȺȶɄɀȷȳȲȺȽɀɆɅɄ ȤȲȿɊɀȷɅȹȶȳȲȿȼɄȹȲȵȲȽɄɀɃȶȾȲȺȿȶȵɆȿȵȶɃɄɅȲɅȶɀɈȿȶɃɄȹȺɁȷɀɃȲɅɀɀȽɀȿȸ
which prolonged too close ties and unhealthy relations with ailing industrial conglomerates. 
Non-performing loans produced a greater coefficient with the EU-15 than the EU-10 implying that bad loans in the old member 
states cause a bigger increase in total banking costs. The reason for this may be that major Eurozone economies experienced 
massive write downs on some of their deteriorating assets including bad loans.  This explains why even though the new member 
states suffer a greater % of non-performing loans to total loans they managed to improve their cost efficiency during the crisis. 
Most of the old member states are also in the Eurozone and poteȿɅȺȲȽ ɄɁȺȽȽɀɇȶɃ ȶȷȷȶȴɅɄ ɀȷ ȵȶȴɃȶȲɄȶȵ ȴɀȿȷȺȵȶȿȴȶ Ⱥȿ Ʌȹȶ ȳȲȿȼɄ
portfolios was greater. 
 
The same reasoning applies for the coefficient of the current account balance and liquidity. Inflation in the EU-10 significantly 
increased banking costs but its coefficient for the EU-15 states was not significant probably due to deflationary pressures in that 
EU region. Unlike the old member states, the concentration ratio in new member states was positive and insignificant indicating 
that they have not yet converged to the stage where their most efficient banks have consolidated. This is reinforced by the 
relatively large effect of size on total banking costs; larger economies that have reaped their scale economies are in a better 
position in the market. It is also reinforced by that population density was positive and significant for the new member states but 
ȺȿɄȺȸȿȺȷȺȴȲȿɅ ȷɀɃ ɅȹȶɀȽȵȟȺȸȹȶɃȵȶȿɄȺɅɊȸȶȿȶɃȲɅȶɄȾɀɃȶȳȲȿȼȺȿȸȴɀɄɅɄȵɆȶ ɅɀȴȹȲɃȲȴɅȶɃȺɄɅȺȴɄɀȷȳȲȿȼȺȿȸȴɀȾɁȶɅȺɅȺɀȿ¡ȺȷȳȲȿȼs 
compete by opening up more branches for strategic in places despite that this is not required due to a high population density. 
GDP growth proved to lower banking costs during the period examined in line with Kosak et. al (2009). 
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Figure 15ȜɇɀȽɆɅȺɀȿɀȷɀȽȵȲȿȵȿȶɈȜȬȾȶȾȳȶɃɄȴɀɄɅȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴɊɄȴɀɃȶɄȳȶɅɈȶȶȿȲȿȵ 
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EUROZONE vs. NON-EUROZONE 
 
Eurozone   Non-Eurozone 
FI 0.9976746 DK 0.8835772 
EE 0.9814754 SE 0.8598791 
PT 0.9754445 LT 0.8369036 
IE 0.9743022 GB 0.8062106 
NL 0.956537 LV 0.8044375 
BE 0.9517018 HU 0.8016617 
AT 0.9483775 PL 0.7879585 
ES 0.9438982 BG 0.7869846 
SI 0.9006201 CZ 0.6752644 
CY 0.8939446 RO 0.6611315 
GR 0.8926667     
IT 0.8911288     
DE 0.8884324     
MT 0.877153     
FR 0.8343878     
LU 0.7911929     
SK 0.6711937     
Mean 0.8988077   0.7929514 
 
Figure 16: Cost efficiency country rankings of Eurozone and non-Eurozone members (highest to lowest)  
 
The Eurozone exhibits on average 10% higher cost efficiency than the non-Eurozone region and none of the 
non-ȜɆɃɀɋɀȿȶȳȲȿȼȺȿȸɄȶȴɅɀɃɄȴɀɄɅȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴɊȶɉȴȶȶȵɀȷɅȹȶȳȶɄɅɁȶɃȷɀɃȾȶɃɄɀȷɅȹȶɁɃȶ-crisis sample 
and 13/14 of the post-crisis sample are Eurozone countries. This is a strong argument in favour of the single 
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currency and is in line with Ferreira (2011). Market concentration is more benefitting in the Eurozone area 
banking efficiency as consolidation has been easier to come and stronger in this region. 
The significant coefficients of the year dummies 2008 and 2009 reveal that the Eurozone faced lowered costs 
those years which is ambiguous given the high costs of funding that banks faced during this period and the 
increase in bad loans. It is possible that the increasing unemployment in the euro area put pressure on personnel 
expenses. The current account deficits of the Eurozone clearly had a negative impact on banking cost 
efficiency while the equivalent coefficient for non-Eurozone region was not significant. The banking systems 
ȹȶȲɇȺȽɊ ȶɉɁɀɄȶȵ Ʌɀ ȷɀɃȶȺȸȿ ȴɀɆȿɅɃȺȶɄ ɄɀɇȶɃȶȺȸȿ ȵȶȳɅ ȴɃȺɄȺɄ ȳɆɃȵȶȿȶȵ ɅȹȶȾ Ȳȿȵ ȴȽȶȲɃȽɊ ɅȹȶɊ ȹȲȵ ȵȺȷȷȺȴɆȽɅɊ
maintaining their cost efficient operations. A representative example is Cyprus.  
In order for a country to enter the Eurozone, there were fiscal conditions that had to be satisfied. Member 
nations had to keep long-term interest rates, inflation, and exchange rates within a specific range. In 1997, two 
additional criteria were added: The ratio of a country's deficit to its GDP had to be <3%, and the ratio of their 
gross government debt to GDP must be at or below 60%. Some of the benefits of entering the Eurozone, the 
cost of borrowing evened out, which allowed weaker nations such as Greece to borrow more money and banks 
in the larger economies such as Germany to boost their earnings by lending money to the weaker 
ones. ȘȵȵȺɅȺɀȿȲȽȽɊ ȳȺȸȾȲȿɆȷȲȴɅɆɃȶɃɄ ȺȿȞȶɃȾȲȿɊɈȶɃȶ ȲȳȽȶ Ʌɀ ɄȶȽȽ ɅȹȶȺɃ ȸɀɀȵɄ Ʌɀ Ʌȹȶ ɃȶɄɅ ɀȷȜɆɃɀɁȶȫȹȲɅ
seemed to be a win-win for all Eurozone member states, especially when the region boomed, but it also created 
fiscal and trade imbalances between the countries. When the housing bubble burst, it was clear that the weaker 
nations had used the borrowed money to spend too much on real estate. And wealthier nations had enabled this 
ȳȶȹȲɇȺɀɃ ȳɊ ȽȶȿȵȺȿȸ ȶɉȴȶɄɄȺɇȶȽɊ ɈȺɅȹɀɆɅ ɃȶȸȲɃȵ Ʌɀ Ʌȹȶ ȷȺȿȲȿȴȺȲȽ ɈȹȶɃȶɈȺɅȹȲȽ ɀȷ ȳɀɃɃɀɈȶɃɄ Ʌɀ ɃȶɁȲɊ ȽɀȲȿɄ 
(Schlesinger, 2012). Among the new member states, relative to the time they entered the EMU Cyprus, 
Slovenia and Estonia have performed satisfactorily. 
Figures 14 and 16 provide proof that estimating cost efficiency by separate frontiers for individual countries 
does not produce comparable results simply because the benchmarks are different. According to Bikker (1999) 
who tested how efficiencies vary between a common frontier and separate frontiers for a sample of the oldest 
and major EU countries, efficiencies by separate frontiers are overestimated.  
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Figure 17: Evolution of Eurozone and non-ȜɆɃɀɋɀȿȶȾȶȾȳȶɃɄȴɀɄɅȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴɊɄȴɀɃȶɄȳȶɅɈȶȶȿȲȿȵ 
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PRE-CRISIS vs. POST-CRISIS EU COST EFFICIENCY  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-crisis   Post-crisis   
FI 0.9924217 FI  0.9906094 
NL 0.9692737 PT  0.9765241 
IE 0.9565847 IE  0.9761636 
BE 0.9503058 EE  0.9695776 
PT 0.937782 NL  0.9343952 
EE 0.9323702 ES  0.9330594 
DK 0.9307126 BE 0.9177447 
ES 0.9265828 AT 0.915319 
AT 0.9204581 DK 0.9029099 
DE 0.9188244 MT 0.9024616 
MT 0.8871687 SI 0.9001733 
CY 0.8843691 LT 0.8907673 
SE 0.8830026 IT 0.8864734 
GB 0.8637535 GR 0.880357 
SI 0.8528107 GB 0.8800427 
IT 0.8465114 CY 0.8786435 
GR 0.8408167 DE 0.8620648 
FR 0.8109726 HU 0.8468203 
LT 0.797111 BG 0.8367365 
LU 0.7425033 SE 0.8261334 
LV 0.7293238 FR 0.8215107 
HU 0.7088912 LU 0.8139468 
PL 0.7026991 LV 0.8124614 
SK 0.6921567 PL 0.8086982 
CZ 0.6815818 RO 0.7170125 
BG 0.6003305 SK 0.6585499 
RO 0.5637475 CZ 0.6528787 
Mean 0.8248207   0.8658813 
 
Figure 18: Pre-crisis (2005-2007) and post-crisis (2008-2011) cost efficiency country rankings (highest to lowest)    
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The post-crisis efficiency average is higher by 4%. Banks are more cost-saving in the crisis, moreover, there 
could be seen some effect of deflation and anti-crisis measures (Oboril, 2012). In line with Andries and 
ȚȲɁɃȲɃɆɈȹɀȴȹȲɃȲȴɅȶɃȺɋȶɄ ɅȹȶȴɃȺɄȺɄɁȶɃȺɀȵȲɄȲȽȲȸȸȺȿȸȳȶȹȺȿȵ ɁɃɀȴȶɄɄ Ʌȹȶ ȺȿȴɃȶȲɄȶɈȲɄȾɀɄɅȽɊȲ
result of significantly decreased cost inefficiencies in the EU-12 and non-Eurozone regions. Not unexpectedly, 
the crisis dummy only appeared as positive (and significant) for the Eurozone sample due to the spread of the 
contagion risk in the EMU banking sectors and wider interconnected economies. This was also obvious from 
the evolution of the cost efficiency scores through time. The crisis dummy coefficient for the enlarged EU was 
insignificant possibly due to that a part of the EU i.e. Eurozone, the crisis urged banks to be more cost efficient 
and for the other i.e. non-Eurozone, efficiency was impeded.  
 
Apart from Luxembourg and Great Britain (to a lesser extent), the only countries among the old member states 
that have clearly managed to improve their performances are crisis-stricken countries - Portugal, Ireland, Italy 
and Greece. This is salient considering that Italy, Portugal and Greece have received international assistance, 
after they were unable to raise funding at reasonable cost and Ireland massively nationalized its banking 
system. Even though one can think that this was partly the reason why they remained as some of the most cost 
efficient banking sectors, pre-crisis efficiency scores also identify them in the high positions in the rank. 
According to the CGFS (2011 Ʌȹȶ ɄȹȲɃȶ ɀȷ ȶɉɅȶɃȿȲȽ ȽȺȲȳȺȽȺɅȺȶɄ Ⱥȿ ɅȹȶɄȶ ȴɀɆȿɅɃȺȶɄ ȶɄɁȶȴȺȲȽȽɊ ȵȶȴɃȶȲɄȶȵ
ȠȿɅȶɃȳȲȿȼȲȿȵɀɅȹȶɃȵȶɁɀɄȺɅɄȹȲɇȶɃȺɄȶȿɃȶȷȽȶȴɅȺȿȸȸɃȶȲɅȶɃɃȶȽȺȲȿȴȶɀȿȴȶȿɅɃȲȽȳȲȿȼȽȺɂɆȺȵȺɅɊɈȹȺȴȹȴɆɃɃȶȿɅȽɊ 
accounts for between 7 and 17% of total funding). Borrowing from the Eurosystem has allowed banks in these 
ȴɀɆȿɅɃȺȶɄɅɀȲɇɀȺȵɄȹɃȺȿȼȺȿȸɅȹȶȺɃȳȲȽȲȿȴȶɄȹȶȶɅɄȲȸȸɃȶɄɄȺɇȶȽɊɅȹȶɃȶȳɊɁɃȶɇȶȿɅȺȿȸȲȴɃȶȵȺɅȴɃɆȿȴȹ  
 
Average efficiency in the Eurozone did not change during the post-crisis years and the non-Eurozone average 
increased by just 1%. Higher sovereign risk since late 2009 has pushed up the cost and adversely affected the 
ȴɀȾɁɀɄȺɅȺɀȿ ɀȷ ɄɀȾȶ ȶɆɃɀ ȲɃȶȲ ȳȲȿȼɄ ȷɆȿȵȺȿȸ ɈȺɅȹ Ʌȹȶ ȶɉɅȶȿɅ ɀȷ Ʌȹȶ ȺȾɁȲȴɅ ȳɃɀȲȵȽɊ in line with the 
deterioration in the creditworthiness of the home sovereign. The EU-10 average did not change and the EU-15 
average fell by just 1%. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Latvia and 
Slovakia actually managed to conduct their banking operations more cost efficiently despite their high non-
performing loans. Again, the majority of these countries are not in the Eurozone which suffered clear setbacks 
from contagion risk being spread through the financial system. Also, unlike Eurozone members, non-Eurozone 
ones had the ability to use monetary policy and this may indicate its positive impact on banking operations. 
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Apart from Luxembourg, the rest EU countries, exhibited declining efficiency scores during the crisis years 
with Sweden experiencing the largest drop.  
 
Certain countries which faced even double the costs of others were more cost-efficient during the crisis. 
ȘȴȴɀɃȵȺȿȸɅɀɅȹȶȴɀɆȿɅɃɊȵɆȾȾȺȶɄȴɀȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿɅɄȠɅȲȽȺȲȿȳȲȿȼȺȿȸȷȲȴȶɄȵɀɆȳȽȶɅȹȶȴɀɄɅɄɅȹȲɅɅȹȶBritish banking 
does. Nevertheless not only did the cost efficiency of Italian banks reach the levels of the British one but in 
2011, it was almost 10% more efficient. The country dummies of some of the major economies in the EU 
indicate that their costs were much lower than some other advancing or distressed economies nevertheless their 
banking cost efficiency appears as lower or not progressing. There are two possible scenario regarding this. 
Either the potential to actually produce quality output (for Eurozone countries especially) fell by more than the 
costs to actually produce it. Clearly, banks were more reluctant and/or strict in giving out loans and bank asset 
growth and its potential dramatically reduced. According to the CGFȪ  Ƞn most econoȾȺȶɄ ȳȲȿȼɄ
assets decelerated markedly around two to four quarters after the start of the economic downturn, reaching a 
trough in late 2009 and early 2010. The deleveraging was pronounced for Irish banks, but negative asset 
growth was also observed in France and Germany. Over the course of 2010, as advanced economies returned to 
growth, bank asset expansion picked up in most countries and that is when cost efficiencies started pacing up . 
Or simply, and more plausibly, managerial incompetence is a persistent phenomenon.  
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CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION 
 
The fact that given the environmental, bank-specific, and industry-specific variables the efficiency ranking 
and/or score of some countries was still unjustifiable led to a brief research on each individual EU members in 
an effort to identify unique characteristics that may inhibit or encourage their cost efficiency. This set of 
ɆȿȺɂɆȶȴȹȲɃȲȴɅȶɃȺɄɅȺȴɄȾȲɊȳȶȵȺɇȺȵȶȵȺȿɅɀɄȶɇȶɃȲȽɄɆȳɄȶȴɅȺɀȿɄȫȹȶɄȶȲɃȶȺȿȲȵȶɂɆȲɅȶsatisfactory managerial 
ability, bad luck, environment, institutions, banking system structure, banking costs, unique features. 
In 2005, Sweden had the highest banking cost efficiency in Europe but since 2007 when it declined by 20% it 
never bounced back (in stark contrast to the rest of the EU-15 member states) despite the fact that it faces the 
lowest banking costs after Ireland as estimated by the country dummies in the translog function. During the 
period examined, Sweden experienced the highest % of overhead expenses to total costs (see appendix table 4) 
as well as the highest operating expenses in the EU (see figure 1). Furthermore, it has the lowest efficiency 
scores among non-Eurozone countries despite its perceived healthy status and low bond spreads. The Swedish 
banking system has weaknesses of a more structural nature that cause persistent inefficiencies and could have a 
negative effect on financial stability in the longer run (Sverijes Riskbank, 2012).  
 
Seeking to plug liquidity shortages, most Polish banks focused on attracting deposits from households by 
increasing interest rates on saving accounts thus increasing total banking costs and decreasing interest revenue. 
Not only this was not offset by income from fees and commissions, or revenue from other financial activities, 
ȳɆɅɅȹȶɊȶȲɃ-on-year cost base grew by +2.7% as a delayed effect of the 2008 expansion in the number of bank 
branches, which grew by 1200 units. Operational costs represented as much as 50.3% of income in the first 
three quarters of 2009, against 48.7% in the corresponding timeframe oȷ ȚȝȠȥPoland also faces 
one of the highest percentages of non-performing loans to total loans across Europe. This % has been stable 
between 2005 and 2011 whereas for most other EU countries it increased the past 2 years. This provides more 
proof ȷɀɃȧɀȽȲȿȵɄɁɀɀɃȴɃȶȵȺɅȾɀȿȺtoring and managerial ability. Finland on the other hand has a very low % 
of non-performing to total loans indicative of management ability to run technically and allocatively efficient 
banks.  
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Estonia provides proof that cost efficiency is correlated to the ability for financial integration but is not 
dependent on it. Even though it only entered the Eurozone the last year of the sample it had been among the 
highest achievers from previous years. It is also the banking sector with the highest level of foreign capital 
penetration which stands at 98% (Steindl, 2012).  
The UK dummy exhibits one of the largest negative association with total banking costs yet that does not 
translate into a high efficiency level in fact, it is below the mean, in line with Turati (2003), Bikker (1999) and 
Maudos (2002). Unlike Germany, that also exhibits lower cost efficiency than expected the UK scores never 
overcame 88% between 2005 and 2011 so the scenario of inadequate managerial performance is the most 
plausible.  
 
The Economist refers to ȠɃȶȽȲȿȵ ȲɄ Ȳȿ ȲȳɄɅȶȾȺɀɆɄ ȻɀȸȸȶɃ ɅȹȲɅ ȹȲɄ ɄɆȷȷȶɃȶȵ Ȳ ȹȶȲɃɅ ȲɅɅȲȴȼ Luck was a 
protagonist in determining banking performance for the period examined. Irish banking cost efficiency had 
been the highest in 2005 after Netherlands and Finland. Ireland, according to its country dummy in the frontier, 
faces the lowest banking costs of all EU countries and following ȤȲȽɅȲ ȺɅ ȶȿȻɀɊɄ Ʌȹȶ ȜȬɄ ȹȺȸȹȶɄɅ
intermediation ratio. This is despite the need of the government to proceed to massive nationalizations during 
the recent credit crisis. Similar to Ireland, Greece faces record unemployment levels and detrimental investor 
confidence. Greek banks suffer from very low liquidity and a high current account deficit. It has been reported 
that approximately a third of all Greek bank deposits were withdrawn between January 2010 and March 2012. 
țȶɄɁȺɅȶɅȹȶȷȲȴɅȞɃȶȶȼȳȲȿȼɄȴɀɄɅȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴɊȵȶȾɀȿɄɅɃȲɅȶȵɃȶȾȲɃȼȲȳȽȶɁȶɃȷɀɃȾȲȿȴȶȷɃɀȾɅȹȶȳȶȸȺȿȿȺȿȸɀȷɅȹȶ
crisis. Cost efficiency increased from 85% in 2008 to 94% in 2011. One might think that this was the result of 
Ʌȹȶ ȺȾɁɀɄȺɅȺɀȿɀȷȲɆɄɅȶɃȺɅɊȾȶȲɄɆɃȶɄȲȿȵɄɅɃȺȴɅ ɄɆɁȶɃɇȺɄȺɀȿɀȿȳȲȿȼɄȿȶɇȶɃɅȹȶȽȶɄɄȞɃȶȶȴȶɄ ȺȾɁɃɀɇȶȾȶȿɅȹȲȵ
begun from before the crisis.  
The two largest Cypriot banks lost 2.5 billion Euros overnight due to their exposure to Greek sovereign debt. 
Suffering demand in financial services in Greece also harmed the overseas operations of the three domestically 
owned largest banking groups which represented 40% of their total consolidated assets and of which ¾ were in 
Greece. This ɀȷȴɀɆɃɄȶɃȶȵɆȴȶȵɅȹȶȲȾɀɆȿɅɀȷȚɊɁɃɆɄȳȲȿȼɄȶȲɃȿȺȿȸȲɄɄȶɅɄȲȿȵȴɀȿɄȶɂɆȶȿɅȽɊȴɀɄɅȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴɊ 
 
The German banking sector is also thought to have been unlucky as during the crisis it was exposed to a large 
amount of toxic assets it had invested in abroad. In 2011, cost efficiency rebounded by 12% implying that the 
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ȞȶɃȾȲȿȳȲȿȼȺȿȸɄȶȴɅɀɃȺɄȳȲȴȼȺȿɄȹȲɁȶȲȿȵɅȹȲɅɆȿȽȺȼȶɅȹȶȬȢȺɅɄȳȲȿȼɄȹȲɇȶɅȹȶɁɀɅȶȿɅȺȲȽɅɀɃȶȲȴȹɇȶɃɊȹȺȸȹ
cost efficiency levels. 
 
The Slovenian institutionalised capital market has barely 15 years of experience yet, as the fastest-
growing euro zone member in 2007 (Novak, 2012) it was situated just below Estonia in the new member 
ɄɅȲɅȶɄ rankings. Furthermore, over the first three quarters of 2007, the ratio of financial assets to GDP in 
Slovenia increased by 18 percentage points (Ljubljana, 2008). Estonia also enjoyed prosperous times within the 
horizon examined. In 2006 the World Bank reclassified it from being an upper-middle income economy to a 
high-income economy reinforcing the fact the environment, more so relative to the environment within other 
EU counterparts, is a factor contributing to the health of the banking system. 
The environment was not so promising in some other countries of the EU however. Germany experienced large 
negative asset growth during the crisis years which justifies the abrupt decrease of cost efficiency scores. The 
Cypriot economy was booming after its entrance in the Eurozone and its banking sector was experiencing 
advancing cost efficiency until 2009 when it peaked at 89%. The year 2009 was the first year in 35 years that 
Cyprus experienced a negative growth rate -1.9% and the first year its banking cost efficiency fell. 
 
Luxembourg provides the perfect case to prove that institutional factors or particular features of the banking 
system can affect banking cost efficiency to a great extent, even if all the prerequisites for reaching its 
maximum exist. In 2009, Luxembourg was added to a "grey list" of nations with questionable banking 
arrangements by the G20 due to concern about its banking secrecy laws, and its reputation as a tax haven. As 
a financial center, Luxembourg has the advantages of strict banking secrecy, a trained multilingual workforce, 
ȲȿȵȲȸɀɇȶɃȿȾȶȿɅɅȹȲɅȺɄɄɊȾɁȲɅȹȶɅȺȴɅɀɅȹȶɄȶȴɅɀɃ
ɄȿȶȶȵɄ  So, in plain words, banks in Luxembourg have no 
reason to be as cost efficient as they can be and despite their healthy economic status they are displaying 
abnormal fluctuations in their efficiency which are difficult to explain otherwise. The UK banking sector has 
also been ȴɃȺɅȺȴȺɋȶȵȲɄȺȿȴɀȹȶɃȶȿɅ , ɈȺɅȹɀɆɅȴȽȶȲɃȽȺȿȶɄɀȷȲȴȴɀɆȿɅȲȳȺȽȺɅɊ ȲȿȵɃȲɅȹȶɃlight-ɅɀɆȴȹɄɆɁȶɃɇȺɄȺɀȿ 
(Cohens, 2012). According to (Chortareas, Girardone and Ventouri, 2010), market discipline has a strong 
negative and statistically significant relationship with inefficiency. 
Within the context of, a yet advancing economy and underdeveloped institutional underpinnings to the banking 
system, even if managerial ability is respectable, cost efficiency is likely suffer. The first commercial banks in 
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ȣȲɅɇȺȲɈȶɃȶȶɄɅȲȳȽȺɄȹȶȵȺȿȻɆɄɅɅȹɃȶȶɊȶȲɃɄȳȶȷɀɃȶɃȶȸȲȺȿȺȿȸȺȿȵȶɁȶȿȵȶȿȴȶȣȲɅɇȺȲ has the biggest % of 
ȺɅɄɁɀɁɆȽȲɅȺɀȿȶɉȴȽɆȵȶȵ ȷɃɀȾȷȺȿȲȿȴȺȲȽɄȶɃɇȺȴȶɄȤɀɃȶɀɇȶɃȲȴȴɀɃȵȺȿȸɅɀȜɆɃɀɄɅȲɅɀɇȶɃɀȷȧɀȽȶɄ
still do not own a bank account ȜȚȝȠȥ. Even though at the moment these countries are disadvantaged 
relative to others, they still have economies of scale to enjoy in their banking sectors later in the future and 
their cost efficiencies is expected to gradually improve.  
On the contrary to the above case, the Belgian and Estonian banking systems have long been known to be a 
sophisticated and liberal banking system. It has rightfully achieved a status as an international business centre; 
more than half of all banking transactions are international financial transactions. Nonetheless, its exposure to 
international economic conditions is also primarily the reason why its cost efficiency fell by 4% during the 
post-crisis period. 
The German banking system has been criticized as having a very fragmented structure, possibly related to the 
particularly rigid three-pillar structure, with the public sector exerting a strong influence and deficiencies in 
banking regulation and supervision (Hufner, 2010). In parallel, the banking system of France is very 
centralized in that a huge institution  the Bank of France - controls a large part of the entire business of the 
republic. The chief characteristics of this institution are its comparative freedom from legislative regulations 
pertaining to the details of its business, and to its close connection with the government (Scott, n.a.). These 
banking business models may in part be to blame for lower inefficiencies than expected in these countries. 
 
Italy, for decades considered its banks as sub scale, and so doubled their overall network to 35,000 bank 
branches between 1990 and 2010. Italian bank branches that were in high demand during 2005-2008 caused 
banking costs to increase, while their profitable outputs had not yet been produced. Of course, this is also a 
product of bad luck. The high density of bank offices, the fourth highest in Europe with 56 branches per 
100,000 inhabitants is a primary reason of why its mean efficiency only reaches 84%. Italy's deep economic 
recession coupled with the shrinking value of Italian government bonds held by Italian banks have depressed 
returns on equity to near zero and sent bad loans soaring, making the current business model unsustainable.  
 
Both Spain and Portugal are much smaller economies than for instance the UK or France, as a result, since 
privatisation and deregulation of markets, there has been a trend of consolidation of the industry within these 
countries. As the potential for further economies of scale within each of these countries was reduced, 
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successful businesses simply expanded abroad to reap benefits from further economies of scale or acquired less 
efficient competitors to remain relatively efficient in relation to their counterparts e.g. acquisition of Abbey 
National in 2004 by the Bank of Santander. The strategies followed by these banks, perceived as leaders in 
their countries in terms of best practice, have certainly been instrumental in boosting the image of the banking 
systems in these countries, which up to the beginning of the 1990s were still regarded as lagging well behind 
the banking sectors of the core countries of the EU. 
 
Relative banking costs are much more important than absolute banking costs which do not explain differences 
in cost efficiency as well. French banks have lower costs than Spain for example but after Luxembourg they 
are the worst performers among the old member states and the Eurozone too. The efficiency estimates indicate 
that in 2005 France scored 94%. According to Gouteroux (2006), the consolidated activity of the main French 
banking groups, as measured by the total assets, had risen globally, by 21%, over 2005. The charges of 
functioning rose more rapidly than the net banking product, the personnel expenses increasing by relatively 
21% in 2005  (Brack, Jimborean, 2008). A year later, cost efficiency in the French banking sector plummeted 
by 20%. So, FrenȴȹȳȲȿȼɄȴɀɄɅȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴɊȵȶȴɃȶȲɄȶȵȵɆɃȺȿȸ ɅȹȶɁȶɃȺɀȵȶɉȲȾȺȿȶȵȳȶȴȲɆɄȶȶɇȶȿ ɅȹɀɆȸȹ ɅȹȶȺɃ
costs are low relatively to other EU countries that perform better they are high relative to their previous levels. 
As the German economist Hans-Werner Sinn noted in 2012, Ireland was the only country that had 
implemented relative wage moderation in the last five years, which helped decrease its relative price/wage 
levels by 16%.  
Certain unique characteristics of the banking sectors are often the most important contributors to higher cost 
efficiency. For instance, banking systems such as the Finnish and Estonian are highly concentrated and 
characterised by the strong presence of foreign, in particular Scandinavian, banking groups. More than 90% of 
the banks operating in Estonia are under Scandinavian ownership.  
Ș ɃȶɁɀɃɅ ȷɃɀȾ Ʌȹȶ ȜȚș ȜɆɃɀɁȶȲȿ ȪȶȴɅɀɃ ȪɅȲȳȺȽȺɅɊ  ȺȿȵȺȴȲɅȶȵ ȤȲȽɅȲ ȲɄ ȹȲɇȺȿȸ Ʌȹȶ ȾɀɄɅ ɄɀȽɇȶȿɅ ȳȲȿȼȺȿȸ
system of the EU in 2008. That the Maltese banking sector is not found as among the most cost efficient ones is 
somewhat perplexing. For countries, such as Malta that still have emerging and concentrated banking systems 
it may be that the SCP paradigm holds. This is a good example of that even though certain bank-specific 
variables are correlated with cost efficiency, other factors may prove more important.  
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Therefore, being cost efficient is beneficial but this is not an absolute statement. Banking systems that have not 
been proven as very cost efficient have better endured the crisis (e.g. France).  According to Xiao (2009) stated 
French banks were less profitable than their European peers before the crisis, but were pounded less hard by 
Ʌȹȶ ȴɃȺɄȺɄ   Furthermore, Casu and Girardone (2006) suggest that ȳȲȿȼɄ ɈȺɅȹ Ʌȹȶ ȹȺȸȹȶɄɅ ȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴɊ ɄȴɀɃȶɄ
generate the lowest total revenues per Euro of assets. These results may be explained by the fact that banks that 
show the highest inefficiencies and incur the highest costs might be able to generate greater profits than more 
ȴɀɄɅȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿɅȳȲȿȼɄ  This dissertation also provides proof that that technical and allocative efficiency are more 
important than low costs. Countries such as Estonia that faced higher costs than others e.g. Slovenia managed 
to nevertheless be more cost efficient.  
 
Most studies reach the conclusion that the market conditions prevailing in banking sectors can best be 
characterized by naturally oligopolistic. This means that in the long term there is only room for few banks 
(Bikker, 2004). A long standing view in the literature is that this largely depends on the existence of scale or 
scope efficiencies or more precisely the multiproduct cost subadditivity in banking as expressed by Baumol 
(1977). In line with Keely (1990), Fiordelisi, Molyneux (2010) find a negative and significant link between 
concentration and the probability of default (EDF) indicating that more concentrated markets are more stable. 
This is actually rational if one considers the systemic risks which this industry carries. The fact that when 
consolidation occurs, the potential for further economies of scale is reduced and successful banks need to go 
abroad to continue growing and remain relatively efficient in relation to their counterparts -like the examples of 
Portugal and Spain - is absolutely in line with EU objectives. Consolidation occurs because inefficient banks 
either go bankrupt or merge with more efficient ones. Average efficiency therefore increases. Those banks seek 
to benefit more from economies of scale and as a result expand their operations cross-border. Therefore, the 
EU should continue to pursue competition and consolidation within its banking industry conditional on having 
the right controls in place for failures in any of the links of the system. 
 
As in the majority of the literature, the conclusion of this research is that the EU and the Eurozone have 
promoted cost efficiency in the banking system as desired. It is also evident however that during the crisis the 
Eurozone suffered a greater setback in cost efficiency than the non-Eurozone region which demonstrated 
impressive convergence the past two years. The same applies to new member states. Eight out of twenty-seven 
EU banking sectors demonstrate cost efficiency over 90% ɈȹȺȽȶȝȺȿȽȲȿȵɄȴɀɄɅȶȷȷȺȴȺȶȿȴɊɄɀȾȶɅȺȾȶɄȶɉȴȶȶȵs 
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99%. Three of these countries have requested a bail-out during the crisis. This entails an optimistic message for 
banking cost efficiency. First and foremost, achieving the maximum possible technical and allocative 
efficiency is not impossible. Secondly, good managerial decision making outweighs the adverse effects of the 
economic environment or crises on banking cost efficiency. Third, variables such as total capital and 
population density are more likely to precede changes in cost efficiency while market concentration, credit 
deterioration and a higher intermediation ratio are more likely to be its consequences. Fourth, firm institutions, 
accountability and transparency in the banking system supplement cost efficiency to a great extent. Bank 
managers can learn to isolate exogenous factors from affecting their conduct operations. These conclusions 
ȴɀȿɄɅȺɅɆɅȶɅȹȶɄɁȺȿȶɀȷɅȹȺɄȵȺɄɄȶɃɅȲɅȺɀȿɄȷȺȿȵȺȿȸɄ 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
 INPUTS OUTPUTS 
Gilligain et. al (1984) Labour and capital Loans and deposits 
Sherman and Gold (1985) Labour, Capital (rent paid for each branch), cost of supplies Number of transactions 
Rangan et. al (1988) Labour (employees), capital, purchased funds Loans, deposits (time and demand) 
Aly et. al(1990) Labour (employees), capital, loanable funds Lonas, demand deposits 
Charnes et. al (1990) Total operating expenses, total non-interest expenses, 
provision for loan losses, actual loan losses 
Total operating income , total interest income, total non-
interest income, total net loans 
Elyasiani and Mehdian (1990, 1992) CD, time and saving depostits, demand depostis, capital (fixed 
assets and premises), labour (employees) 
Investments, loans (real estate, other loans) 
Ferrier and Lovell (1990) Labour (employees), expenditures on materials, occupancy 
costs and expenditure on furniture and equipments 
Number of deposits 
Number of loans 
Noulas et. al (1990) Deposits, labour, funds, capital Deposits, funds, labour ,capital 
Berger and Humphrey (1991) Deposits, loans 
 
Labour, purchased funds, capital 
Gropper (1991) Labour, capital and funds Investment, total loans and trust accounts 
English et. al (1993) Deposits, labour, purchased funds Loans and investments 
Berg et. al(1993) Labour (man hours per year) 
capital 
Loans, deposits, number of branches (services) 
Chang et. al (1998)  Labour, physical capital, fund (deposits) Assets, loans, other bank output 
Altunbas et. al (2000) Labour, funds and physical capital Total securities and off balance sheet items 
Lozano-Vivas and Dietsch (2000) Labour, physical capital, financial capital Loans, deposits and other 
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productive assets 
Alam (2001) Capital (equity and physical), labour, purchased funds, 
deposits 
Loans and securities 
Altunbas et. al (2001)  Labour, physical capital and deposits Loans, earning assets and off-balance sheet items 
Chen (2001)  Labour, deposits, net fixed assets, no. of bank brances Loans, investments and non-income revenue 
Drake (2001) Fixed asets, eployees, deposits  Loans, liquid assets, deposits 
Turati (2001)  Labour, physical capital and financial capital Loans and investments 
Isik and Hassan (2002) Labour, physical capital and loanable funds Loans, off-balance sheet items and other earning assets 
Rezvanian and Mehdian (2002) Borrowed funds, labour, capital Total loans, securities, other earning assets 
Brissimis et. al (2008) Personnel expenses, non-interest expenses , total deposits, and 
short-term funding 
Total loans and total securities 
Kosak, Zajc and Zoric (2009) Borrowed funds, physical capital, labour Loans, securities and other earning assets 
Casu and Girardone (2010) Deposits, labour, physical capital Loans and securities 
Casu and Molyneux (n.a.) Deposits, labour, capital, total customers and short-term 
funding 
Total loans and other earning assets 
Andries and Capraru (2011) Personnel expenses, fixed assets and financial capital Loans, other eaning assets and demand deposits 
 
Chortareas et. al (2011) Personnel expenses, fixed assets, and deposits Total loans and other earning assets 
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Table 2 (Models 1-7) 
 
 
Model 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                          
                 sigma_u     .5329267   .0135799                      .5069643    .5602186
                                                                                          
                   _cons    -1.258743   .0509634   -24.70   0.000    -1.358629   -1.158856
lnsig2u                   
                                                                                          
                   _cons    -1.008801   .1826698    -5.52   0.000    -1.366828    -.650775
                lntotass    -.4409975   .0403864   -10.92   0.000    -.5201533   -.3618416
lnsig2v                   
                                                                                          
                   _cons     .8453403   .1179773     7.17   0.000     .6141091    1.076572
    otherearningassetsp2    -.0091944   .0047742    -1.93   0.054    -.0185516    .0001628
    otherearningassetsp1     .0206464   .0048043     4.30   0.000     .0112301    .0300626
                 loansp2     .0038752       .005     0.78   0.438    -.0059246     .013675
                 loansp1     .0165739    .004619     3.59   0.000     .0075207     .025627
                    p1p2    -.0904372   .0095124    -9.51   0.000    -.1090812   -.0717932
                    p2sq     .0856989   .0105333     8.14   0.000     .0650539    .1063438
                    p1sq     .1035778   .0099746    10.38   0.000     .0840279    .1231276
loansxotherearningassets    -.1032035   .0026539   -38.89   0.000    -.1084051   -.0980019
     otherearningassets2     .1024148   .0030524    33.55   0.000     .0964321    .1083975
                  loans2     .1291216   .0034504    37.42   0.000     .1223589    .1358844
                      p2     .1988195   .0362321     5.49   0.000     .1278059     .269833
                      p1     .5252022   .0391733    13.41   0.000      .448424    .6019805
      otherearningassets     .4193185   .0191483    21.90   0.000     .3817886    .4568485
                   loans     .4234642   .0226469    18.70   0.000     .3790771    .4678512
cost                      
                                                                                          
                    cost        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                          
Log likelihood =   -2143.38                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(14)   =  119173.15
Stoc. frontier normal/half-normal model           Number of obs   =       4262
Iteration 12:  log likelihood =   -2143.38  
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Model 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                          
                 sigma_u     .5298559   .0135694                      .5039169    .5571302
                                                                                          
                   _cons      -1.2703   .0512191   -24.80   0.000    -1.370688   -1.169913
lnsig2u                   
                                                                                          
                   _cons    -.9721747   .1804663    -5.39   0.000    -1.325882   -.6184673
                lntotass    -.4506985   .0399193   -11.29   0.000    -.5289388   -.3724582
lnsig2v                   
                                                                                          
                   _cons     .8835449   .1185633     7.45   0.000     .6511651    1.115925
                yeardum6     .0159924   .0240477     0.67   0.506    -.0311403    .0631251
                yeardum5    -.0039752   .0237571    -0.17   0.867    -.0505383    .0425879
                yeardum4    -.0646755    .024063    -2.69   0.007    -.1118382   -.0175129
                yeardum3      -.02284   .0240298    -0.95   0.342    -.0699375    .0242576
                yeardum2      .009702   .0239894     0.40   0.686    -.0373163    .0567204
                yeardum1     .0407409   .0239171     1.70   0.088    -.0061358    .0876177
    otherearningassetsp2    -.0067343   .0047659    -1.41   0.158    -.0160753    .0026068
    otherearningassetsp1     .0180447    .004807     3.75   0.000     .0086231    .0274663
                 loansp2     .0015814   .0050017     0.32   0.752    -.0082217    .0113845
                 loansp1     .0189137   .0046289     4.09   0.000     .0098414    .0279861
                    p1p2    -.0901191   .0095803    -9.41   0.000    -.1088961   -.0713421
                    p2sq     .0853548   .0104919     8.14   0.000      .064791    .1059186
                    p1sq     .1031339   .0101029    10.21   0.000     .0833325    .1229353
loansxotherearningassets    -.1027446   .0026497   -38.78   0.000    -.1079379   -.0975514
     otherearningassets2     .1021429   .0030371    33.63   0.000     .0961902    .1080955
                  loans2     .1286258   .0034465    37.32   0.000     .1218708    .1353809
                      p2     .1915205   .0362201     5.29   0.000     .1205305    .2625106
                      p1      .534323   .0392051    13.63   0.000     .4574825    .6111635
      otherearningassets     .4112011   .0191093    21.52   0.000     .3737476    .4486546
                   loans      .429806   .0226117    19.01   0.000     .3854879     .474124
cost                      
                                                                                          
                    cost        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                          
Log likelihood = -2128.6123                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(20)   =  123709.44
Stoc. frontier normal/half-normal model           Number of obs   =       4262
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Model 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                          
                   _cons     3.775467   1.464399     2.58   0.010     .9052975    6.645637
                domestic     .4297571   .6577672     0.65   0.514    -.8594429    1.718957
                     age    -.0017587   .0012706    -1.38   0.166     -.004249    .0007316
                intratio    -.0419521   .0073896    -5.68   0.000    -.0564354   -.0274689
                    lata     -1.03701    .288478    -3.59   0.000    -1.602417   -.4716037
                     CR5    -.0166345   .0067772    -2.45   0.014    -.0299176   -.0033514
lnsig2u                   
                                                                                          
                   _cons    -2.249391   .1965501   -11.44   0.000    -2.634623    -1.86416
                lntotass    -.1889462   .0303124    -6.23   0.000    -.2483574   -.1295349
lnsig2v                   
                                                                                          
                   _cons     .9493653   .2304346     4.12   0.000     .4977218    1.401009
                yeardum6     .0156954   .0234495     0.67   0.503    -.0302648    .0616557
                yeardum5     -.030324   .0241686    -1.25   0.210    -.0776937    .0170456
                yeardum4    -.0932131   .0260688    -3.58   0.000     -.144307   -.0421191
                yeardum3     -.030863    .026288    -1.17   0.240    -.0823865    .0206604
                yeardum2     .0153865   .0263267     0.58   0.559     -.036213    .0669859
                yeardum1     .0580618   .0271807     2.14   0.033     .0047887     .111335
                nplloans     .2932902   .0922023     3.18   0.001      .112577    .4740034
                  totcap    -.0046975   .0009918    -4.74   0.000    -.0066414   -.0027537
                   eqass     .0204996   .0023076     8.88   0.000     .0159768    .0250224
    otherearningassetsp2    -.0112376   .0086964    -1.29   0.196    -.0282823     .005807
    otherearningassetsp1     .0035973   .0085887     0.42   0.675    -.0132363    .0204309
                 loansp2     .0002861   .0100621     0.03   0.977    -.0194351    .0200074
                 loansp1     .0099388   .0102094     0.97   0.330    -.0100712    .0299489
                    p1p2    -.1308666   .0164029    -7.98   0.000    -.1630157   -.0987175
                    p2sq     .1042952   .0187465     5.56   0.000     .0675528    .1410377
                    p1sq     .1401863   .0179752     7.80   0.000     .1049556    .1754169
loansxotherearningassets     -.118349   .0057722   -20.50   0.000    -.1296622   -.1070358
     otherearningassets2     .1204139   .0063711    18.90   0.000     .1079268    .1329009
                  loans2     .1249216   .0068661    18.19   0.000     .1114642     .138379
                      p2     .1242343   .0602244     2.06   0.039     .0061965     .242272
                      p1     .8115025   .0703858    11.53   0.000     .6735488    .9494561
      otherearningassets     .2907711   .0305972     9.50   0.000     .2308016    .3507406
                   loans     .6371673    .046608    13.67   0.000     .5458174    .7285172
cost                      
                                                                                          
                    cost        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                          
Log likelihood =  71.141776                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(23)   =  114445.32
Stoc. frontier normal/half-normal model           Number of obs   =       1343
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Model 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                          
                   _cons     4.032885   1.206339     3.34   0.001     1.668503    6.397267
                domestic     .1528552   .6358881     0.24   0.810    -1.093463    1.399173
                     age    -.0019495   .0013133    -1.48   0.138    -.0045234    .0006245
                intratio    -.0393999   .0051721    -7.62   0.000     -.049537   -.0292628
                    lata    -.9705892   .2217376    -4.38   0.000    -1.405187   -.5359915
                     CR5    -.0270309   .0070613    -3.83   0.000    -.0408708    -.013191
   Currentaccountbalance    -.0322914   .0186274    -1.73   0.083    -.0688004    .0042175
               Inflation      .091659    .030925     2.96   0.003     .0310472    .1522709
                  Popden    -.0015037   .0007496    -2.01   0.045     -.002973   -.0000345
               GDPgrowth     .0256519   .0210264     1.22   0.222    -.0155591    .0668629
lnsig2u                   
                                                                                          
                   _cons    -2.388198   .1797145   -13.29   0.000    -2.740432   -2.035964
                lntotass    -.1746504     .02932    -5.96   0.000    -.2321165   -.1171842
lnsig2v                   
                                                                                          
                   _cons     .8508718   .2168966     3.92   0.000     .4257623    1.275981
                yeardum7            0  (omitted)
                yeardum6     .0154904   .0228587     0.68   0.498    -.0293119    .0602928
                yeardum5    -.0284414   .0244316    -1.16   0.244    -.0763263    .0194436
                yeardum4    -.1171105   .0259608    -4.51   0.000    -.1679927   -.0662283
                yeardum3    -.0629108   .0265301    -2.37   0.018    -.1149088   -.0109128
                yeardum2    -.0130308   .0265395    -0.49   0.623    -.0650472    .0389856
                yeardum1     .0341616   .0271779     1.26   0.209    -.0191062    .0874293
                nplloans     .3101598   .0893823     3.47   0.001     .1349738    .4853459
                  totcap    -.0046288   .0009509    -4.87   0.000    -.0064926   -.0027651
                   eqass     .0190153   .0022456     8.47   0.000     .0146141    .0234166
    otherearningassetsp2    -.0143786   .0085892    -1.67   0.094    -.0312132     .002456
    otherearningassetsp1     .0111346   .0084116     1.32   0.186    -.0053518    .0276209
                 loansp2     .0020682   .0100532     0.21   0.837    -.0176357    .0217722
                 loansp1      .004414   .0100275     0.44   0.660    -.0152395    .0240676
                    p1p2    -.1299288   .0161517    -8.04   0.000    -.1615855   -.0982721
                    p2sq     .1058927   .0188276     5.62   0.000     .0689912    .1427941
                    p1sq     .1364183   .0176149     7.74   0.000     .1018938    .1709428
loansxotherearningassets     -.117495    .005613   -20.93   0.000    -.1284962   -.1064938
     otherearningassets2     .1205769   .0061798    19.51   0.000     .1084648     .132689
                  loans2     .1216833   .0066237    18.37   0.000     .1087012    .1346654
                      p2     .1397163   .0600648     2.33   0.020     .0219915     .257441
                      p1     .7846916   .0686958    11.42   0.000     .6500503    .9193329
      otherearningassets     .3167489     .03013    10.51   0.000     .2576952    .3758025
                   loans     .6309212    .044744    14.10   0.000     .5432246    .7186177
cost                      
                                                                                          
                    cost        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                          
Log likelihood =  100.46499                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(23)   =  119302.97
Stoc. frontier normal/half-normal model           Number of obs   =       1313
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Model 5 
 
 
 
                                                                                          
                   _cons     3.219506   .9844311     3.27   0.001     1.290057    5.148956
                domestic     .5588203   .6013525     0.93   0.353     -.619809     1.73745
                     age     .0019948   .0013511     1.48   0.140    -.0006533    .0046429
                intratio    -.0461641   .0045274   -10.20   0.000    -.0550377   -.0372904
                    lata    -.9895088    .187544    -5.28   0.000    -1.357088   -.6219293
                     CR5    -.0136616   .0058993    -2.32   0.021     -.025224   -.0020992
lnsig2u                   
                                                                                          
                   _cons    -2.944883    .183116   -16.08   0.000    -3.303784   -2.585983
                lntotass    -.1444306   .0314149    -4.60   0.000    -.2060027   -.0828586
lnsig2v                   
                                                                                          
                   _cons     .4934616   .1938499     2.55   0.011     .1135227    .8734004
                Slovakia            0  (omitted)
                Slovenia    -.2486291   .0533596    -4.66   0.000     -.353212   -.1440463
                  Sweden    -.5730082   .0701742    -8.17   0.000     -.710547   -.4354693
                 Romania     .2194642   .0567214     3.87   0.000     .1082923    .3306361
                Portugal    -.3337558   .0581176    -5.74   0.000    -.4476642   -.2198474
                  Poland    -.1281335   .0537452    -2.38   0.017    -.2334723   -.0227948
             Netherlands      -.54249    .054817    -9.90   0.000    -.6499293   -.4350507
                   Malta    -.2753883   .0952613    -2.89   0.004     -.462097   -.0886796
                  Latvia    -.0913519   .0557479    -1.64   0.101    -.2006158    .0179119
              Luxembourg    -.4155942   .0750196    -5.54   0.000    -.5626298   -.2685585
               Lithuania    -.1706379    .058154    -2.93   0.003    -.2846177   -.0566581
                   Italy    -.1986009   .0506257    -3.92   0.000    -.2978255   -.0993763
                 Ireland    -.5921718   .0574206   -10.31   0.000    -.7047141   -.4796295
                 Hungary    -.0546139   .0592718    -0.92   0.357    -.1707845    .0615568
                  Greece    -.2240675   .0539126    -4.16   0.000    -.3297342   -.1184007
                      UK    -.4042469   .0530691    -7.62   0.000    -.5082604   -.3002334
                  France    -.3899395   .0624062    -6.25   0.000    -.5122533   -.2676257
                 Finland    -.2571441   .0788005    -3.26   0.001    -.4115903    -.102698
                   Spain    -.3798469   .0531221    -7.15   0.000    -.4839642   -.2757295
                 Estonia    -.2887865   .0663981    -4.35   0.000    -.4189243   -.1586487
                 Denmark    -.2972438   .0540378    -5.50   0.000     -.403156   -.1913317
                 Germany    -.4010033   .0586189    -6.84   0.000    -.5158942   -.2861124
           CzechRepublic    -.1586294    .059085    -2.68   0.007    -.2744339   -.0428249
                  Cyprus    -.3166155   .0577792    -5.48   0.000    -.4298607   -.2033703
                Bulgaria     .0495878   .0573847     0.86   0.388    -.0628842    .1620598
                 Belgium    -.4110022   .0629378    -6.53   0.000     -.534358   -.2876464
                 Austria    -.3095481   .0600152    -5.16   0.000    -.4271757   -.1919205
                yeardum6     .0194272   .0190118     1.02   0.307    -.0178352    .0566896
                yeardum5    -.0299477   .0195924    -1.53   0.126    -.0683481    .0084528
                yeardum4    -.0874739   .0214342    -4.08   0.000    -.1294843   -.0454636
                yeardum3    -.0373388     .02174    -1.72   0.086    -.0799485    .0052709
                yeardum2     .0094995   .0217952     0.44   0.663    -.0332182    .0522173
                yeardum1     .0612682   .0224523     2.73   0.006     .0172624    .1052739
                nplloans     .0325256   .0812116     0.40   0.689    -.1266462    .1916974
                  totcap    -.0035922   .0007923    -4.53   0.000    -.0051451   -.0020392
                   eqass     .0133503   .0018864     7.08   0.000     .0096531    .0170475
    otherearningassetsp2    -.0286025   .0078312    -3.65   0.000    -.0439514   -.0132536
    otherearningassetsp1     .0159994   .0077875     2.05   0.040     .0007361    .0312627
                 loansp2    -.0040303   .0088396    -0.46   0.648    -.0213557     .013295
                 loansp1     .0116702   .0090152     1.29   0.195    -.0059993    .0293397
                    p1p2     -.125746    .013839    -9.09   0.000    -.1528699   -.0986222
                    p2sq      .097572   .0158562     6.15   0.000     .0664945    .1286496
                    p1sq     .1240675   .0151958     8.16   0.000     .0942843    .1538508
loansxotherearningassets    -.1274096   .0048616   -26.21   0.000    -.1369381   -.1178811
     otherearningassets2     .1248612   .0056974    21.92   0.000     .1136946    .1360279
                  loans2     .1326904   .0057854    22.94   0.000     .1213512    .1440296
                      p2     .3209697   .0513382     6.25   0.000     .2203486    .4215908
                      p1     .6186798   .0589247    10.50   0.000     .5031895    .7341701
      otherearningassets     .3941714   .0275733    14.30   0.000     .3401287    .4482142
                   loans     .6366117   .0398367    15.98   0.000     .5585333    .7146902
cost                      
                                                                                          
                    cost        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                          
Log likelihood =  342.66164                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(49)   =  167674.92
Stoc. frontier normal/half-normal model           Number of obs   =       1343
74 
 
Model 6 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                          
                   _cons     3.862718   1.267503     3.05   0.002     1.378458    6.346977
                domestic     .1015771   .6431618     0.16   0.875    -1.158997    1.362151
                     age    -.0018645    .001351    -1.38   0.168    -.0045123    .0007834
                intratio    -.0393638   .0056239    -7.00   0.000    -.0503866   -.0283411
                    lata    -.9666351   .2281385    -4.24   0.000    -1.413778   -.5194919
                     CR5    -.0247168   .0073347    -3.37   0.001    -.0390926    -.010341
   Currentaccountbalance    -.0348275   .0190266    -1.83   0.067     -.072119     .002464
               Inflation     .1020809   .0319117     3.20   0.001     .0395351    .1646267
                  Popden    -.0015867   .0007682    -2.07   0.039    -.0030924   -.0000811
               GDPgrowth     .0241491    .021409     1.13   0.259    -.0178117    .0661099
lnsig2u                   
                                                                                          
                   _cons    -2.584989   .1860847   -13.89   0.000    -2.949709    -2.22027
                lntotass    -.1436986   .0300174    -4.79   0.000    -.2025317   -.0848655
lnsig2v                   
                                                                                          
                   _cons     1.094238   .2324272     4.71   0.000     .6386892    1.549787
                yeardum6     .0113728    .022744     0.50   0.617    -.0332047    .0559502
                yeardum5    -.0358849    .024327    -1.48   0.140     -.083565    .0117952
                yeardum4     -.128629   .0255455    -5.04   0.000    -.1786972   -.0785608
                yeardum3    -.0695962   .0261143    -2.67   0.008    -.1207792   -.0184132
                yeardum2    -.0147223   .0262032    -0.56   0.574    -.0660796     .036635
                yeardum1     .0371398   .0269233     1.38   0.168    -.0156289    .0899085
                  totcap    -.0050469   .0010289    -4.90   0.000    -.0070636   -.0030302
                   eqass     .0194895   .0022111     8.81   0.000     .0151558    .0238233
                invnplp2     .0904665   .1190364     0.76   0.447    -.1428404    .3237735
                invnplp1    -.0663154   .1060814    -0.63   0.532    -.2742312    .1416004
    otherearningassetsp2    -.0179317   .0086887    -2.06   0.039    -.0349612   -.0009022
    otherearningassetsp1     .0081504   .0084445     0.97   0.334    -.0084005    .0247012
                 loansp2     .0071962   .0106319     0.68   0.499     -.013642    .0280344
                 loansp1     .0078101   .0103911     0.75   0.452    -.0125562    .0281764
                    p1p2    -.1338758   .0159989    -8.37   0.000    -.1652331   -.1025185
                    p2sq     .1153388   .0187233     6.16   0.000     .0786418    .1520358
                    p1sq     .1362329    .017468     7.80   0.000     .1019962    .1704697
         otearassxinvnpl     .0302506   .0648506     0.47   0.641    -.0968542    .1573555
            loansxinvnpl    -.1579578   .0865814    -1.82   0.068    -.3276543    .0117387
loansxotherearningassets    -.1187443   .0057025   -20.82   0.000    -.1299209   -.1075677
                 invnpl2     1.643712   .7093389     2.32   0.020     .2534335    3.033991
     otherearningassets2     .1196571   .0060856    19.66   0.000     .1077296    .1315845
                  loans2     .1290352   .0071314    18.09   0.000     .1150579    .1430125
                      p2     .1143739   .0629841     1.82   0.069    -.0090727    .2378204
                      p1     .7720152   .0711382    10.85   0.000     .6325868    .9114436
                  invnpl    -.1227283   .6460582    -0.19   0.849    -1.388979    1.143523
      otherearningassets     .3207374   .0329917     9.72   0.000      .256075    .3853999
                   loans     .5825009   .0495972    11.74   0.000     .4852922    .6797096
cost                      
                                                                                          
                    cost        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                          
Log likelihood =  123.60301                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(28)   =  119025.67
Stoc. frontier normal/half-normal model           Number of obs   =       1302
75 
 
Model 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                          
                   _cons     3.876468   1.535154     2.53   0.012     .8676217    6.885314
                  crisis    -.4988901   .2320331    -2.15   0.032    -.9536667   -.0441136
                domestic     .3544769   .7300513     0.49   0.627    -1.076397    1.785351
                     age     .0010075   .0017854     0.56   0.573    -.0024918    .0045068
                intratio    -.0442265   .0065547    -6.75   0.000    -.0570734   -.0313797
                    lata    -1.123588   .3179267    -3.53   0.000    -1.746713   -.5004629
                     CR5    -.0151236    .007266    -2.08   0.037    -.0293647   -.0008825
lnsig2u                   
                                                                                          
                   _cons    -3.055308   .2010663   -15.20   0.000    -3.449391   -2.661226
                lntotass    -.1151575   .0347932    -3.31   0.001     -.183351    -.046964
lnsig2v                   
                                                                                          
                   _cons     .7162911   .2450595     2.92   0.003     .2359834    1.196599
                Slovakia            0  (omitted)
                Slovenia    -.2809213   .0594956    -4.72   0.000    -.3975305    -.164312
                  Sweden    -.5720267   .0771487    -7.41   0.000    -.7232353   -.4208181
                 Romania     .2106752   .0621964     3.39   0.001     .0887724    .3325779
                Portugal    -.3279398   .0668723    -4.90   0.000    -.4590071   -.1968724
                  Poland    -.1406289   .0599575    -2.35   0.019    -.2581434   -.0231144
             Netherlands    -.4521707   .0641675    -7.05   0.000    -.5779367   -.3264047
                   Malta     -.297846   .0977768    -3.05   0.002    -.4894851    -.106207
                  Latvia     -.079302   .0623397    -1.27   0.203    -.2014855    .0428815
              Luxembourg    -.3958446   .0947444    -4.18   0.000    -.5815402    -.210149
               Lithuania    -.1755684   .0643206    -2.73   0.006    -.3016344   -.0495023
                   Italy    -.2080467   .0579629    -3.59   0.000    -.3216518   -.0944415
                 Ireland      -.59547   .0643327    -9.26   0.000    -.7215596   -.4693803
                 Hungary    -.0502179   .0721876    -0.70   0.487     -.191703    .0912671
                  Greece    -.2551195   .0636885    -4.01   0.000    -.3799466   -.1302923
                      UK    -.4096905   .0592644    -6.91   0.000    -.5258466   -.2935343
                  France    -.4276235   .0712532    -6.00   0.000    -.5672773   -.2879697
                 Finland    -.2545481   .0866642    -2.94   0.003    -.4244068   -.0846894
                   Spain    -.4305098   .0599662    -7.18   0.000    -.5480414   -.3129782
                 Estonia    -.2862334   .0766906    -3.73   0.000    -.4365443   -.1359225
                 Denmark    -.2944989   .0603983    -4.88   0.000    -.4128774   -.1761205
                 Germany    -.4004829   .0653347    -6.13   0.000    -.5285365   -.2724293
           CzechRepublic    -.1586362   .0650694    -2.44   0.015    -.2861698   -.0311026
                  Cyprus    -.2962631   .0672391    -4.41   0.000    -.4280493   -.1644769
                Bulgaria     .0300294   .0631624     0.48   0.634    -.0937666    .1538254
                 Belgium    -.4962131   .0922943    -5.38   0.000    -.6771066   -.3153197
                 Austria    -.3648451    .079923    -4.56   0.000    -.5214913   -.2081989
                yeardum6     .0153876   .0206144     0.75   0.455    -.0250159    .0557912
                yeardum5     -.023859   .0214298    -1.11   0.266    -.0658606    .0181426
                yeardum4    -.0807084   .0236124    -3.42   0.001    -.1269878    -.034429
                yeardum3    -.0445698   .0265019    -1.68   0.093    -.0965126    .0073729
                yeardum2     .0025349    .027279     0.09   0.926    -.0509309    .0560008
                yeardum1     .0328358   .0277918     1.18   0.237    -.0216352    .0873068
                nplloans    -.0151029    .091223    -0.17   0.869    -.1938967     .163691
                  totcap     -.004375   .0012109    -3.61   0.000    -.0067484   -.0020015
                   eqass     .0130873   .0021169     6.18   0.000     .0089382    .0172365
                  offbp2    -.0002834   .0099815    -0.03   0.977    -.0198468    .0192799
                  offbp1     .0148322   .0109176     1.36   0.174    -.0065659    .0362304
    otherearningassetsp2    -.0269596   .0086637    -3.11   0.002    -.0439401   -.0099792
    otherearningassetsp1     .0125996   .0091179     1.38   0.167    -.0052712    .0304704
                 loansp2     .0044341   .0126896     0.35   0.727     -.020437    .0293052
                 loansp1    -.0069505   .0131761    -0.53   0.598    -.0327752    .0188742
                    p1p2    -.1392856   .0160458    -8.68   0.000    -.1707347   -.1078365
                    p2sq     .1203496   .0181876     6.62   0.000     .0847025    .1559967
                    p1sq     .1326255   .0176519     7.51   0.000     .0980284    .1672227
           offbxotearass    -.0090733   .0064949    -1.40   0.162     -.021803    .0036565
              offbxloans     .0103284    .010746     0.96   0.336    -.0107333    .0313901
loansxotherearningassets    -.1260803   .0067197   -18.76   0.000    -.1392507   -.1129099
             offbalance2     .0038475   .0101473     0.38   0.705     -.016041    .0237359
     otherearningassets2     .1289859    .007367    17.51   0.000     .1145468     .143425
                  loans2     .1206347   .0127087     9.49   0.000     .0957262    .1455432
                      p2     .2376652   .0611299     3.89   0.000     .1178527    .3574776
                      p1     .7009898   .0676289    10.37   0.000     .5684396    .8335399
              offbalance     .0285554   .0525271     0.54   0.587    -.0743959    .1315068
      otherearningassets     .4023063   .0319018    12.61   0.000       .33978    .4648327
                   loans     .5816596   .0684564     8.50   0.000     .4474875    .7158317
cost                      
                                                                                          
                    cost        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                          
Log likelihood =  259.39308                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(55)   =  120192.91
Stoc. frontier normal/half-normal model           Number of obs   =       1135
76 
 
Table 3 
Model 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
     sigma_u     .6526569   .0158646                      .6222919    .6845037
                                                                              
       _cons    -.8534073   .0486156   -17.55   0.000    -.9486921   -.7581226
lnsig2u       
                                                                              
       _cons    -.3175587   .2750931    -1.15   0.248    -.8567313    .2216139
    lntotass    -.5945465   .0648715    -9.16   0.000    -.7216924   -.4674007
lnsig2v       
                                                                              
       _cons     2.050594   .1398108    14.67   0.000     1.776569    2.324618
    totsecp2    -.0164197   .0038871    -4.22   0.000    -.0240382   -.0088012
    totsecp1     .0253695   .0036991     6.86   0.000     .0181194    .0326196
     loansp2     .0133042   .0053143     2.50   0.012     .0028883    .0237201
     loansp1     .0120304   .0046233     2.60   0.009     .0029689    .0210918
        p1p2    -.1233743   .0103303   -11.94   0.000    -.1436213   -.1031273
        p2sq      .097852   .0111568     8.77   0.000      .075985     .119719
        p1sq     .1507473    .011057    13.63   0.000      .129076    .1724186
loansxtotsec    -.0769012   .0025249   -30.46   0.000    -.0818498   -.0719525
     totsec2     .0731921    .002665    27.46   0.000     .0679687    .0784154
      loans2      .123671   .0037126    33.31   0.000     .1163944    .1309477
          p2     .0313445   .0409715     0.77   0.444    -.0489581    .1116471
          p1     .6774302   .0472918    14.32   0.000     .5847401    .7701204
      totsec     .4148285     .01886    22.00   0.000     .3778635    .4517935
       loans     .2402682   .0269072     8.93   0.000     .1875311    .2930052
cost          
                                                                              
        cost        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -2666.4414                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(14)   =   75981.13
Stoc. frontier normal/half-normal model           Number of obs   =       4089
77 
 
Model 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
     sigma_u     .6495374   .0155923                      .6196849     .680828
                                                                              
       _cons    -.8629896   .0480104   -17.98   0.000    -.9570883    -.768891
lnsig2u       
                                                                              
       _cons    -.2875367   .2553437    -1.13   0.260    -.7880012    .2129278
    lntotass    -.6036763   .0596748   -10.12   0.000    -.7206368   -.4867158
lnsig2v       
                                                                              
       _cons     2.041713   .1416678    14.41   0.000      1.76405    2.319377
    yeardum6     .0174706   .0278879     0.63   0.531    -.0371887    .0721299
    yeardum5     .0187491   .0275815     0.68   0.497    -.0353097    .0728079
    yeardum4    -.0103945   .0273625    -0.38   0.704    -.0640241    .0432351
    yeardum3     .0372414   .0273941     1.36   0.174    -.0164501    .0909328
    yeardum2     .0729404   .0276579     2.64   0.008      .018732    .1271488
    yeardum1     .1018686   .0272955     3.73   0.000     .0483704    .1553669
    totsecp2    -.0149417   .0038891    -3.84   0.000    -.0225643   -.0073191
    totsecp1     .0243508   .0037077     6.57   0.000     .0170838    .0316178
     loansp2     .0123732   .0052698     2.35   0.019     .0020445    .0227018
     loansp1     .0127367   .0046103     2.76   0.006     .0037006    .0217727
        p1p2      -.12794   .0102035   -12.54   0.000    -.1479384   -.1079415
        p2sq      .100806    .010973     9.19   0.000     .0792993    .1223126
        p1sq     .1577859   .0110713    14.25   0.000     .1360866    .1794853
loansxtotsec    -.0758005   .0025122   -30.17   0.000    -.0807243   -.0708766
     totsec2     .0723924   .0026546    27.27   0.000     .0671895    .0775953
      loans2     .1224317   .0036889    33.19   0.000     .1152017    .1296618
          p2     .0157662   .0408055     0.39   0.699    -.0642111    .0957435
          p1     .6995778   .0469892    14.89   0.000     .6074807    .7916749
      totsec     .4089978   .0188723    21.67   0.000     .3720087    .4459869
       loans      .245868   .0270673     9.08   0.000      .192817     .298919
cost          
                                                                              
        cost        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -2650.6287                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(20)   =   84971.23
Stoc. frontier normal/half-normal model           Number of obs   =       4089
78 
 
Model 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     3.182651   1.058753     3.01   0.003     1.107533    5.257769
    domestic     .3732429   .7432747     0.50   0.616    -1.083549    1.830034
         age    -.0017071   .0013125    -1.30   0.193    -.0042795    .0008653
    intratio    -.0434579   .0046105    -9.43   0.000    -.0524943   -.0344215
        lata    -.3433191   .1222945    -2.81   0.005    -.5830119   -.1036263
         CR5    -.0219925   .0055156    -3.99   0.000     -.032803    -.011182
lnsig2u       
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.387132   .2162567   -11.04   0.000    -2.810987   -1.963276
    lntotass    -.1554572   .0340932    -4.56   0.000    -.2222786   -.0886358
lnsig2v       
                                                                              
       _cons     .9273966   .2422636     3.83   0.000     .4525686    1.402225
    yeardum6     .0226679   .0240771     0.94   0.346    -.0245224    .0698582
    yeardum5    -.0078726   .0247156    -0.32   0.750    -.0563143    .0405691
    yeardum4    -.0453108    .027082    -1.67   0.094    -.0983905    .0077689
    yeardum3     .0231501    .027324     0.85   0.397    -.0304039    .0767042
    yeardum2     .0668616   .0271328     2.46   0.014     .0136823    .1200409
    yeardum1     .1079484     .02798     3.86   0.000     .0531087    .1627881
    nplloans     .4305506    .099204     4.34   0.000     .2361143    .6249869
      totcap    -.0036559   .0010702    -3.42   0.001    -.0057535   -.0015582
       eqass     .0228193   .0023934     9.53   0.000     .0181283    .0275102
    totsecp2    -.0195518   .0072141    -2.71   0.007    -.0336912   -.0054125
    totsecp1     .0018678   .0065354     0.29   0.775    -.0109413     .014677
     loansp2     .0073786   .0096008     0.77   0.442    -.0114385    .0261957
     loansp1     .0156343   .0091385     1.71   0.087    -.0022769    .0335455
        p1p2    -.1576387   .0168393    -9.36   0.000    -.1906431   -.1246344
        p2sq     .1282178   .0194579     6.59   0.000      .090081    .1663547
        p1sq     .1622396   .0182476     8.89   0.000      .126475    .1980042
loansxtotsec    -.0805471   .0068916   -11.69   0.000    -.0940545   -.0670397
     totsec2     .0746707   .0055239    13.52   0.000      .063844    .0854974
      loans2     .0954886   .0105623     9.04   0.000     .0747869    .1161902
          p2      .036946   .0654931     0.56   0.573     -.091418      .16531
          p1     .8053478   .0726163    11.09   0.000     .6630224    .9476732
      totsec     .2954201   .0340162     8.68   0.000     .2287495    .3620907
       loans     .6271553   .0585784    10.71   0.000     .5123438    .7419669
cost          
                                                                              
        cost        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  15.246125                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(23)   =  103138.48
Stoc. frontier normal/half-normal model           Number of obs   =       1333
79 
 
Model 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                       
                _cons     3.209983   1.023873     3.14   0.002     1.203229    5.216738
             domestic     .2324384   .7180749     0.32   0.746    -1.174963    1.639839
                  age    -.0018049   .0013361    -1.35   0.177    -.0044237    .0008138
             intratio    -.0406369   .0041263    -9.85   0.000    -.0487243   -.0325495
                 lata    -.2529034   .1136858    -2.22   0.026    -.4757236   -.0300833
                  CR5      -.03019   .0060308    -5.01   0.000    -.0420102   -.0183698
Currentaccountbalance    -.0276613   .0175256    -1.58   0.114    -.0620109    .0066882
            Inflation     .0914674   .0309447     2.96   0.003     .0308168    .1521179
               Popden    -.0014708   .0006959    -2.11   0.035    -.0028348   -.0001069
            GDPgrowth    -.0075754   .0190389    -0.40   0.691    -.0448911    .0297402
lnsig2u                
                                                                                       
                _cons    -2.511379   .2142622   -11.72   0.000    -2.931326   -2.091433
             lntotass    -.1419297   .0339663    -4.18   0.000    -.2085025   -.0753569
lnsig2v                
                                                                                       
                _cons     .8159287   .2424019     3.37   0.001     .3408297    1.291028
             yeardum7            0  (omitted)
             yeardum6     .0239078   .0236311     1.01   0.312    -.0224083    .0702238
             yeardum5     -.016279   .0252432    -0.64   0.519    -.0657549    .0331968
             yeardum4    -.0674076   .0270144    -2.50   0.013     -.120355   -.0144603
             yeardum3    -.0007165    .027438    -0.03   0.979    -.0544939     .053061
             yeardum2     .0478423   .0271699     1.76   0.078    -.0054097    .1010942
             yeardum1     .0907785   .0279556     3.25   0.001     .0359864    .1455705
             nplloans     .4472714   .0975966     4.58   0.000     .2559857    .6385572
               totcap    -.0037132   .0010441    -3.56   0.000    -.0057597   -.0016667
                eqass     .0217874   .0023563     9.25   0.000     .0171693    .0264056
             totsecp2    -.0200297   .0071917    -2.79   0.005    -.0341251   -.0059342
             totsecp1     .0053533   .0064901     0.82   0.409     -.007367    .0180736
              loansp2     .0063247   .0096367     0.66   0.512    -.0125629    .0252123
              loansp1     .0142911   .0090515     1.58   0.114    -.0034495    .0320318
                 p1p2    -.1556268   .0166674    -9.34   0.000    -.1882943   -.1229593
                 p2sq     .1281638   .0194872     6.58   0.000     .0899696     .166358
                 p1sq     .1568561   .0180699     8.68   0.000     .1214397    .1922725
         loansxtotsec    -.0819808   .0068118   -12.04   0.000    -.0953317   -.0686299
              totsec2     .0759316   .0054807    13.85   0.000     .0651897    .0866736
               loans2     .0954118   .0103858     9.19   0.000      .075056    .1157676
                   p2     .0557524   .0660976     0.84   0.399    -.0737965    .1853013
                   p1     .7725876   .0726196    10.64   0.000     .6302558    .9149195
               totsec     .3186432   .0339999     9.37   0.000     .2520047    .3852817
                loans     .6255489   .0578491    10.81   0.000     .5121667    .7389311
cost                   
                                                                                       
                 cost        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                       
Log likelihood =  40.586509                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(23)   =  104612.56
Stoc. frontier normal/half-normal model           Number of obs   =       1303
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Model 5 
 
                                                                               
        _cons      2.22221   .8644359     2.57   0.010     .5279463    3.916473
     domestic      .797897   .6924642     1.15   0.249    -.5593079    2.155102
          age     .0013835   .0012063     1.15   0.251    -.0009808    .0037477
     intratio    -.0446059   .0034771   -12.83   0.000    -.0514208    -.037791
         lata    -.2220493   .0933253    -2.38   0.017    -.4049635   -.0391351
          CR5    -.0194684   .0051864    -3.75   0.000    -.0296336   -.0093033
lnsig2u        
                                                                               
        _cons    -3.135753   .2108869   -14.87   0.000    -3.549084   -2.722422
     lntotass    -.1128311   .0358951    -3.14   0.002    -.1831842    -.042478
lnsig2v        
                                                                               
        _cons     .4997854   .2083409     2.40   0.016     .0914446    .9081261
     Slovakia            0  (omitted)
     Slovenia    -.2851455    .051601    -5.53   0.000    -.3862815   -.1840095
       Sweden    -.4639755   .0699325    -6.63   0.000    -.6010405   -.3269104
      Romania     .1938472    .055484     3.49   0.000     .0851006    .3025937
     Portugal    -.2762121   .0567959    -4.86   0.000    -.3875301   -.1648941
       Poland    -.1631806   .0521149    -3.13   0.002    -.2653239   -.0610372
  Netherlands    -.5153868   .0541943    -9.51   0.000    -.6216056   -.4091679
        Malta    -.2321872   .1012324    -2.29   0.022     -.430599   -.0337754
       Latvia    -.0832687   .0547917    -1.52   0.129    -.1906585    .0241211
   Luxembourg    -.2627175   .0787354    -3.34   0.001    -.4170361   -.1083989
    Lithuania    -.2283442    .056487    -4.04   0.000    -.3390567   -.1176317
        Italy    -.1752557   .0491616    -3.56   0.000    -.2716107   -.0789008
      Ireland     -.539922   .0570888    -9.46   0.000    -.6518139     -.42803
      Hungary    -.0668516   .0571361    -1.17   0.242    -.1788363    .0451332
       Greece    -.2143754   .0524646    -4.09   0.000    -.3172041   -.1115467
           UK    -.3994892   .0526634    -7.59   0.000    -.5027075   -.2962708
       France    -.2236339   .0606984    -3.68   0.000    -.3426005   -.1046672
      Finland     .0392751    .076579     0.51   0.608    -.1108169    .1893671
        Spain    -.3856122   .0514348    -7.50   0.000    -.4864225   -.2848018
      Estonia    -.3218254   .0644625    -4.99   0.000    -.4481695   -.1954813
      Denmark    -.2951259   .0521683    -5.66   0.000    -.3973739   -.1928779
      Germany    -.3557713    .058219    -6.11   0.000    -.4698785   -.2416641
CzechRepublic    -.1330805    .058866    -2.26   0.024    -.2484558   -.0177052
       Cyprus    -.2459754   .0573698    -4.29   0.000    -.3584181   -.1335328
     Bulgaria      .055891    .055918     1.00   0.318    -.0537062    .1654882
      Belgium    -.3184678   .0640791    -4.97   0.000    -.4440605   -.1928751
      Austria    -.2323246   .0596182    -3.90   0.000    -.3491741   -.1154752
     yeardum6     .0284134   .0194473     1.46   0.144    -.0097027    .0665294
     yeardum5     .0001914   .0200441     0.01   0.992    -.0390944    .0394771
     yeardum4    -.0288754   .0224616    -1.29   0.199    -.0728992    .0151485
     yeardum3     .0259535   .0228106     1.14   0.255    -.0187544    .0706613
     yeardum2     .0682574   .0224768     3.04   0.002     .0242037    .1123112
     yeardum1      .118817   .0232418     5.11   0.000     .0732639    .1643701
     nplloans      .250207   .0861828     2.90   0.004     .0812917    .4191222
       totcap    -.0027359   .0008494    -3.22   0.001    -.0044007   -.0010711
        eqass     .0171287   .0019146     8.95   0.000     .0133762    .0208811
     totsecp2    -.0247158   .0063523    -3.89   0.000    -.0371662   -.0122655
     totsecp1     .0018155   .0057662     0.31   0.753    -.0094861     .013117
      loansp2    -.0092156   .0082482    -1.12   0.264    -.0253818    .0069506
      loansp1     .0338698   .0078747     4.30   0.000     .0184357    .0493039
         p1p2    -.1261478   .0142151    -8.87   0.000    -.1540088   -.0982868
         p2sq     .0931861   .0164556     5.66   0.000     .0609336    .1254385
         p1sq      .126402   .0153992     8.21   0.000     .0962201    .1565838
 loansxtotsec    -.0917017   .0056469   -16.24   0.000    -.1027693   -.0806341
      totsec2     .0778123   .0046242    16.83   0.000      .068749    .0868756
       loans2      .114195   .0086283    13.23   0.000     .0972838    .1311062
           p2     .3127632    .055604     5.62   0.000     .2037814    .4217449
           p1     .5186181    .061514     8.43   0.000     .3980529    .6391832
       totsec     .3713604   .0286708    12.95   0.000     .3151666    .4275542
        loans     .6084726   .0477431    12.74   0.000     .5148979    .7020473
cost           
                                                                               
         cost        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
Log likelihood =  266.65276                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(49)   =  150662.00
Stoc. frontier normal/half-normal model           Number of obs   =       1333
81 
 
      Total     .31248183   .11502221        5397
                                                 
         SK     .35033374   .06218937          77
         SI     .29905093   .06631833         102
         SE     .38729396   .07525967          73
         RO     .35281584   .06377718         131
         PT     .27825174   .12014902         103
         PL     .32962881   .07040226         225
         NL     .22997209   .10974035         151
         MT     .31413935   .15555109          25
         LV      .3609967   .07408213         129
         LU     .20380791   .14084388         378
         LT     .32585947   .08101014          56
         IT     .36196406   .07866861         634
         IE     .17774044   .12465793          62
         HU     .34111508   .07802488         118
         GR     .31842765   .05809187          93
         GB     .28675979   .12805511         645
         FR     .33837449   .11059574         482
         FI     .32561919   .10046207          48
         ES     .27051869   .11160776         194
         EE     .32890204   .06152672          25
         DK     .36394361   .07663522         325
         DE     .32033579   .11244217         558
         CZ     .31111018    .1034368          98
         CY     .26343547   .07978217          49
         BG     .34222862   .06258454         120
         BE     .25973484   .11432789         126
         AT     .31960076   .13166861         370
                                                 
countrycode          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                   Summary of ninexptotcost
      Total     .37503634   .23004442        5397
                                                 
         SK     .29933253   .12437874          77
         SI     .40189814   .13263666         102
         SE     .22541208   .15051934          73
         RO     .29436832   .12755435         131
         PT     .44349651   .24029804         103
         PL     .34074239   .14080453         225
         NL     .54005581   .21948069         151
         MT     .37172131   .31110218          25
         LV     .27800661   .14816425         129
         LU     .59238419   .28168777         378
         LT     .34828107   .16202029          56
         IT     .27607188   .15733721         634
         IE     .64451912   .24931585          62
         HU     .31776985   .15604976         118
         GR     .36314471   .11618375          93
         GB     .42648042   .25611023         645
         FR     .32325101   .22119148         482
         FI     .34876162   .20092413          48
         ES     .45896262   .22321551         194
         EE     .34219592   .12305343          25
         DK     .27211279   .15327043         325
         DE     .35932842   .22488435         558
         CZ     .37777965   .20687359          98
         CY     .47312907   .15956433          49
         BG     .31554276   .12516909         120
         BE     .48053032   .22865577         126
         AT     .36079849   .26333723         370
                                                 
countrycode          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                    Summary of inexptotcost
Table 4 
Overhead expenses/total costs                                        
 
Interest expenses/total costs                                           Non-interest expenses/total costs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Total     .31248183   .11502221        5397
                                                 
         SK     .35033374   .06218937          77
         SI     .29905093   .06631833         102
         SE     .38729396   .07525967          73
         RO     .35281584   .06377718         131
         PT     .27825174   .12014902         103
         PL     .32962881   .07040226         225
         NL     .22997209   .10974035         151
         MT     .31413935   .15555109          25
         LV      .3609967   .07408213         129
         LU     .20380791   .14084388         378
         LT     .32585947   .08101014          56
         IT     .36196406   .07866861         634
         IE     .17774044   .12465793          62
         HU     .34111508   .07802488         118
         GR     .31842765   .05809187          93
         GB     .28675979   .12805511         645
         FR     .33837449   .11059574         482
         FI     .32561919   .10046207          48
         ES     .27051869   .11160776         194
         EE     .32890204   .06152672          25
         DK     .36394361   .07663522         325
         DE     .32033579   .11244217         558
         CZ     .31111018    .1034368          98
         CY     .26343547   .07978217          49
         BG     .34222862   .06258454         120
         BE     .25973484   .11432789         126
         AT     .31960076   .13166861         370
                                                 
countrycode          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                     Summary of ovtotcost
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Table 5 
Model 4 + crisis dummy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                          
                   _cons     4.054175   1.229344     3.30   0.001     1.644706    6.463645
                  crisis    -.0403441   .2189668    -0.18   0.854    -.4695111    .3888229
                domestic     .1543085   .6361372     0.24   0.808    -1.092498    1.401115
                     age    -.0019509   .0013149    -1.48   0.138     -.004528    .0006262
                intratio    -.0394393   .0052312    -7.54   0.000    -.0496922   -.0291865
                    lata    -.9725586   .2246541    -4.33   0.000    -1.412872   -.5322447
                     CR5    -.0268301   .0070364    -3.81   0.000    -.0406213    -.013039
   Currentaccountbalance    -.0322174   .0185931    -1.73   0.083    -.0686593    .0042245
               Inflation     .0916735   .0309787     2.96   0.003     .0309564    .1523907
                  Popden    -.0015043   .0007498    -2.01   0.045    -.0029738   -.0000347
               GDPgrowth     .0233342   .0242042     0.96   0.335    -.0241052    .0707736
lnsig2u                   
                                                                                          
                   _cons    -2.389575    .179656   -13.30   0.000    -2.741694   -2.037455
                lntotass    -.1743215   .0292873    -5.95   0.000    -.2317236   -.1169194
lnsig2v                   
                                                                                          
                   _cons     .8517942   .2170585     3.92   0.000     .4263673    1.277221
                yeardum7            0  (omitted)
                yeardum6     .0155932   .0228447     0.68   0.495    -.0291816     .060368
                yeardum5    -.0291027   .0246898    -1.18   0.239    -.0774939    .0192885
                yeardum4    -.1169653   .0259432    -4.51   0.000     -.167813   -.0661176
                yeardum3    -.0645644   .0280723    -2.30   0.021    -.1195852   -.0095436
                yeardum2    -.0146278   .0279562    -0.52   0.601     -.069421    .0401654
                yeardum1     .0324311   .0288238     1.13   0.261    -.0240624    .0889246
                nplloans     .3083219   .0900023     3.43   0.001     .1319207    .4847232
                  totcap    -.0046307   .0009503    -4.87   0.000    -.0064932   -.0027682
                   eqass     .0190297   .0022485     8.46   0.000     .0146227    .0234368
    otherearningassetsp2    -.0143559   .0085905    -1.67   0.095    -.0311929    .0024812
    otherearningassetsp1      .011033   .0084348     1.31   0.191    -.0054989    .0275649
                 loansp2     .0020302   .0100534     0.20   0.840    -.0176742    .0217346
                 loansp1     .0045026   .0100351     0.45   0.654    -.0151658    .0241711
                    p1p2    -.1299403   .0161476    -8.05   0.000     -.161589   -.0982915
                    p2sq     .1059668   .0188246     5.63   0.000     .0690713    .1428623
                    p1sq     .1363364   .0176176     7.74   0.000     .1018065    .1708662
loansxotherearningassets     -.117542   .0056176   -20.92   0.000    -.1285522   -.1065318
     otherearningassets2     .1206265   .0061851    19.50   0.000      .108504     .132749
                  loans2     .1217526   .0066384    18.34   0.000     .1087416    .1347636
                      p2     .1398343   .0600515     2.33   0.020     .0221355    .2575332
                      p1     .7844219   .0686661    11.42   0.000     .6498387     .919005
      otherearningassets     .3163851    .030192    10.48   0.000     .2572099    .3755602
                   loans     .6310517   .0447106    14.11   0.000     .5434206    .7186828
cost                      
                                                                                          
                    cost        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                          
Log likelihood =  100.48214                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(23)   =  119008.10
Stoc. frontier normal/half-normal model           Number of obs   =       1313
83 
 
Model 5 + crisis dummy 
                                                                                           
                   _cons      3.34135   1.026193     3.26   0.001     1.330048    5.352651
                  crisis    -.2065045   .1871878    -1.10   0.270     -.573386    .1603769
                domestic     .5364688   .6084383     0.88   0.378    -.6560483    1.728986
                     age     .0019074   .0013879     1.37   0.169     -.000813    .0046277
                intratio    -.0462932   .0046135   -10.03   0.000    -.0553355   -.0372508
                    lata    -1.002921   .1940521    -5.17   0.000    -1.383256   -.6225859
                     CR5     -.012734   .0059307    -2.15   0.032     -.024358     -.00111
lnsig2u                   
                                                                                          
                   _cons    -2.962194   .1816695   -16.31   0.000     -3.31826   -2.606128
                lntotass    -.1407245   .0311903    -4.51   0.000    -.2018564   -.0795927
lnsig2v                   
                                                                                          
                   _cons     .5121016   .1946436     2.63   0.009     .1306072     .893596
                Slovakia            0  (omitted)
                Slovenia    -.2482523   .0534509    -4.64   0.000    -.3530141   -.1434904
                  Sweden    -.5726087   .0703874    -8.14   0.000    -.7105654    -.434652
                 Romania     .2188878   .0568285     3.85   0.000      .107506    .3302696
                Portugal    -.3335647    .058232    -5.73   0.000    -.4476973   -.2194321
                  Poland    -.1288799   .0538475    -2.39   0.017     -.234419   -.0233408
             Netherlands    -.5411386   .0549202    -9.85   0.000    -.6487802   -.4334969
                   Malta    -.2734948   .0953491    -2.87   0.004    -.4603756    -.086614
                  Latvia    -.0896147   .0558268    -1.61   0.108    -.1990333    .0198038
              Luxembourg    -.4143969   .0751324    -5.52   0.000    -.5616538   -.2671401
               Lithuania    -.1716599   .0582367    -2.95   0.003    -.2858017   -.0575181
                   Italy     -.196241   .0507591    -3.87   0.000    -.2957269    -.096755
                 Ireland    -.5908397   .0575655   -10.26   0.000    -.7036659   -.4780135
                 Hungary    -.0543534   .0594437    -0.91   0.361    -.1708609    .0621541
                  Greece    -.2232559    .054073    -4.13   0.000     -.329237   -.1172748
                      UK    -.4006274   .0532998    -7.52   0.000    -.5050932   -.2961617
                  France    -.3915532   .0625768    -6.26   0.000    -.5142016   -.2689049
                 Finland    -.2585623   .0790112    -3.27   0.001    -.4134213   -.1037032
                   Spain    -.3772393   .0532501    -7.08   0.000    -.4816075   -.2728711
                 Estonia    -.2873426   .0665214    -4.32   0.000    -.4177223    -.156963
                 Denmark    -.2944103   .0541647    -5.44   0.000    -.4005712   -.1882493
                 Germany    -.3988664    .058687    -6.80   0.000    -.5138908   -.2838421
           CzechRepublic    -.1593207   .0591592    -2.69   0.007    -.2752706   -.0433709
                  Cyprus    -.3158497   .0579333    -5.45   0.000    -.4293968   -.2023026
                Bulgaria     .0462917   .0575647     0.80   0.421     -.066533    .1591163
                 Belgium    -.4098053    .063102    -6.49   0.000     -.533483   -.2861276
                 Austria    -.3074978   .0601278    -5.11   0.000    -.4253461   -.1896496
                yeardum6      .019424   .0189323     1.03   0.305    -.0176826    .0565307
                yeardum5     -.029863   .0195095    -1.53   0.126    -.0681008    .0083748
                yeardum4    -.0881148   .0213593    -4.13   0.000    -.1299782   -.0462513
                yeardum3    -.0458399   .0231305    -1.98   0.048    -.0911749   -.0005049
                yeardum2     .0008709   .0232496     0.04   0.970    -.0446975    .0464392
                yeardum1     .0523714   .0239845     2.18   0.029     .0053625    .0993802
                nplloans     .0263566    .081387     0.32   0.746     -.133159    .1858723
                  totcap    -.0036012   .0007885    -4.57   0.000    -.0051467   -.0020557
                   eqass     .0133885   .0018863     7.10   0.000     .0096913    .0170856
    otherearningassetsp2    -.0286145   .0078165    -3.66   0.000    -.0439346   -.0132943
    otherearningassetsp1     .0156789   .0077845     2.01   0.044     .0004215    .0309362
                 loansp2    -.0035925   .0088277    -0.41   0.684    -.0208944    .0137094
                 loansp1     .0113741     .00901     1.26   0.207    -.0062852    .0290335
                    p1p2    -.1260573   .0138162    -9.12   0.000    -.1531366    -.098978
                    p2sq     .0987244   .0158355     6.23   0.000     .0676875    .1297613
                    p1sq     .1234592   .0151923     8.13   0.000     .0936827    .1532356
loansxotherearningassets     -.127337   .0048474   -26.27   0.000    -.1368377   -.1178362
     otherearningassets2      .124976   .0056962    21.94   0.000     .1138117    .1361402
                  loans2     .1326142   .0057704    22.98   0.000     .1213045    .1439239
                      p2     .3166645    .051368     6.16   0.000      .215985     .417344
                      p1     .6218338   .0588555    10.57   0.000     .5064792    .7371885
      otherearningassets     .3919127   .0276295    14.18   0.000     .3377599    .4460654
                   loans     .6357636   .0398254    15.96   0.000     .5577072    .7138199
cost                      
                                                                                          
                    cost        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                          
Log likelihood =  343.27485                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(49)   =  167002.70
Stoc. frontier normal/half-normal model           Number of obs   =       1343
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